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ABSTRACT
The thesis investigates the link between development and security - the ‘development-security 
nexus’- which emerged during the 1990s, facilitated by the formulation of human development and 
human security. It  examines how this development-security nexus has evolved over time and has 
influenced the interrelated significance of development and security for international relations. The 
thesis questions this interdependence and analyses the theory and practice that see development and 
security issues as reciprocally reinforcing each other, in particular through a set of policies called 
Security Sector Reform (SSR).
The research includes three main areas of interest  related to the different meanings of 
development and security focusing in particular on human development and human security; the 
various interpretations of the development-security nexus since the 1990s; and the analysis of how 
Security Sector Reform, publicised as development-security nexus policies, are designed to 
translate it into practice.
The thesis argues that the nexus between development and security  is under-theorised, and the 
originality of this research is to investigate the link between its theories and practices. The critical 
view of this thesis towards current dominant theoretical and operational orientations of the 
development-security nexus is based on an analysis of literature on Critical Security Studies, Post-
Development, and Non-mainstream International Relations approaches.
The thesis contributes to existing scholarship by unpacking the different meanings of 
development and security embedded in Security Sector Reform policies and reveals the need to 
contextualise the significance of their interlinkages within each policy  scenario. In particular the 
three case studies on Defence Reform of Armenia, SSR Afghanistan and SSR Guinea-Bissau 
highlight respectively: 1) the novelty  of concerns raised by  SSR and the complexity to categorise 
concerns on security within a single, even if inclusive, policy discourse. 2) the need to go beyond 
the narrow view of a militarised view of security and its inadequacy to support the implementation 
of development objectives and 3) that the link between development and security is still very  much 
dependent on a vision of security linked to the state’s armed forces, and of development which is 
focused on state security governance capacity.
3
LIST OF CONTENTS         
           Page
List of Figures               5
Acknowledgements               6
Author’s Declaration               7
I. Introduction                                                8
II. Human Development and Human Security                                                   31
III. The Emergence of the Development-Security Nexus                               55
IV. Armenia: a Defence Reform through the Looking Glass                    83
V. SSR Afghanistan: a Policy Theatre in a War Theatre                                 103
VI. Guinea-Bissau: an Idyllic Policy Theatre                    120
VII. Conclusion                                  141
Glossary                                                                                                                         159
Bibliography                                                                                                                  161
4
LIST OF FIGURES
                    Page
Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan    110
Security Sector Reform and the Berlin Declaration     110
National Security Policy Outline       112
ANDS - Programmatic Framework        113
5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to Dr Dibyesh Anand for showing me that searching for my own voice also means 
living up to it.
6
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION
I hereby declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work.
7
I. INTRODUCTION
The significance of development and security and how they  are perceived, exercised and 
experienced by different actors continue to change with time. Though since the birth of 
development studies in the 1950s, development and security issues have been framed alongside 
each other, this correlation was neither explicitly formulated nor were development and security 
regarded as mutually dependent in theoretical and operational terms. The theoretical shift in both 
discourses that occurred in the 1990s, represented by  the concepts of human development and 
human security, favoured the vision that development and security reciprocally  reinforce each other 
so much that this interlinkage has often been referred to as the development-security nexus.
Despite the current publicity of this nexus in the international policy  arena, its exact meaning 
remains ambiguous because it depends on the definition of development and security and how the 
merge between these two discourses is formulated. The complexity of defining the multifaceted 
relations between development and security and how their merge is operationalised have as a 
substratum international relations which nowadays are made up of a multiplicity  of interactions by 
diverse actors such as people, intergovernmental organisations, states, private corporations, and so 
on. These evolving patterns and proliferation of actors of international relations have been 
accompanied, in the last two decades, by  a trend that diverges from a state-centric approach that has 
dominated the discipline of International Relations (IR) since its beginning. In particular, the 
elaboration of the concepts of human development and human security  in the 1990s can be 
considered as an example of a trend that highlights the need to include, alongside states, how people 
are affected by international relations’ issues.
As the discipline of IR starts giving more attention to people, and including them as subjects and 
agents of international relations, the development-security  nexus perspective facilitates this 
orientation by aiming at providing a comprehensive response to people experiencing insecurity and 
neglect. If in theoretical terms the emphasis given to the humanity in development and security has 
provided a consensus for developing a policy  response based on people’s needs rather than on 
states’ interests, the state has still very much monopolised the development-security nexus 
discourse. This has created the need to clarify  the diverse scenarios and expectations linked to 
policies addressing development and security concerns.
In fact, dealing with situations where there is a deficit of both implies that the spectrum of 
intervention of the development-security nexus policies and the magnitude of issues that can be 
included under this banner are wide. It derives that various interpretations and perceptions of the 
nexus between development and security  are linked to international relations patterns which are 
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characterised nowadays by  the will and expectation to tackle development and security issues under 
a unified and exhaustive policy response. One of the best examples of this nexus is a set of policies 
called Security Sector Reform (SSR). Despite their promotion by various actors such as the OECD, 
the UN, the EU, individual states such as the UK, these policies have benefited from diverse 
definitions which seem to fit each SSR stakeholder. While this opens up opportunities to format 
SSR policies according to each country’s needs, it also creates a need to investigate this multiform 
policy tools.
The research question focuses the investigation on how the development-security nexus is 
conceptualised and operationalised in order to highlight the significance of this discourse which has 
become increasingly popular in framing development and security relations at national and 
international level. I argue that the nexus between development and security is under-theorised, and 
the originality  of this research is to investigate the link between its theories and practices. I 
contribute to this theorising by unpacking the multifaceted meaning of development and security 
and revealing the need to contextualise the significance of their interlinkages within each policy 
scenario.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The analysis of the research question which focuses on how the development-security nexus is 
conceptualised and operationalised is driven by  a Post-Positivist approach to research (Groff 2004; 
Smith et al 1996; Turenne Sjolander et al 1994). This approach challenges the hypothesis testing 
and deductive method of analysis which are typical of Positivism and offers a framework that 
allows me to look at  real events without testing or building theories, but rather questioning existing 
practices (Morris 2006). The rationale behind the choice of this approach for addressing the 
research question (Goulding 1996) is that it  does three things. First, it offers access to multiple 
qualitative sources of information to increase the understanding of the many interpretations of 
development and security and their interlinked discourses. Second, it regards SSR cases as unique 
and therefore it avoids the random sampling and generalisation of the Positivist approach. Finally, it 
allows for drawing up of conclusions by interpreting the findings of the research without comparing 
them with previous hypotheses and using them instead to enhance the understanding of the theories 
and practices of the development-security nexus. The Post-Positivist approach has guided me 
through the selection of specific events without regarding them as variables or samples from which 
generalise or generate theories but according to their potential to address the research question.
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Furthermore, by  highlighting that there are as many truths as interpretations and that there is no 
neutral knowledge, the Post-Positivist approach allows me to question the interpretations of the 
development-security relation with the awareness that there is no separation between a ‘neutral’ 
reality  and the researcher as implicit in the Positivist  approach. This subjectivity  implies that each 
researcher carries out the research bringing into it her own implicit knowledge based on her own 
experience (Zalewski in Smith et al 1996). In the case of this research, I would like to point out that 
issues that I have dealt with in the thesis such as defence reforms, justice and prison reforms, DDR, 
train and equip policies and so on, are events that I have observed during my  professional 
experience in Africa and Latin America where I worked as a humanitarian worker before starting 
this thesis. I only mention this because as a researcher I cannot ignore my past professional 
experience. However, it does not prejudge my  thesis because had all my judgments been based on 
my experience I would see them as a bias. Instead it  had provided me with skills such as familiarity 
with analysing policy  documents, networking, knowledge of the functioning of intergovernmental 
organisations, and this has helped me in carrying out the research.
As far as the research design is concerned, this has been defined as “the logic that links the data 
to be collected to the initial questions of study” (Yin 1984:19). The research design of this thesis 
includes the choice for a theoretical and conceptual framework; methodology and access to data 
rather than collecting data (Yanov & Schwartz-Shea 2006:xviii) such as literature review, analysis 
of policy documents and material from conferences and from a SSR practitioners’ course that I have 
participated, interviews and correspondence with multiple stakeholders and case studies (see 
below).
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
Theories are usually regarded as lenses to study  a certain issue (Anfara & Mertz 2006). 
However, a theory  is not  only a “conceptual vehicle that assigns patterns to individuality”, it  “not 
only reveals, it conceals” (Flinders & Mills 1993:vii,viii). Rather than using a theory or theories to 
investigate an issue, I have used a theory “as a verb rather than as a noun” (Zalewski in Smith et al 
1996:346) and I have questioned the theorising about development and security. As far as the 
conceptual framework underpinning the research is concerned, this has been defined in general “as 
a synthesis of literature, development of models, applied to a theory or theories, with possible 
empirical testing” (Solomon & Solomon 2000:1,2).
The conceptual framework used in the thesis is that the development-security  nexus which 
came to the fore in the 1990s under the aegis of human security is not an axiomatic binomial but 
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subject to a changing conceptualisation of development and security that deserves investigation. I 
research this change, namely the two theoretical trends of developmentalisation of security and 
securitisation of development which influenced respectively the 1990 and 2000 decades, and I 
elucidate policy makers’ validation for this nexus under the banner of Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) policies. These policies are often presented as strengthening the security sector of states so 
that state institutions can then create an environment conducive to their citizens’ enjoyment of 
development entitlements (OECD 2005). The changing nature of development and security  and the 
formulation of human development and human security have facilitated the merge of their 
discourses and the elaboration of the development-security nexus perspective. This has also 
facilitated the adaptation and adoption of policies responding to the theoretical orientation 
represented by the development-security  nexus. The conceptual framework forming the basis for 
the contribution to this research addresses the relation between development and security, how these 
discourses have merged their concerns and have been translated into practice in SSR policies.
As far as the IR theoretical framework used in the thesis is concerned, I have adopted a Post-
Positivist approach shared by Critical Security studies as well as Post-Development literature 
(Booth & Smith 1995; Escobar 1995; George & Campbell 1990; Groff 2004; Hoffman 1991; 
Linklater 1992; Rist 1997; Smith et al 1996). The Post-Positivist approach emerges from the IR 
theoretical landscape of the late 1980s and ‘90s as a response to the dissatisfaction with the 
mainstream positivist theories and as critical reflections on IR. It reexamines the basic assumptions 
of the discipline (Porter in Turenne Sjolander et al 1994:125) by questioning the neutrality of 
knowledge, truth claims by Positivism, and the applicability  of science to the study of world politics 
(Booth & Smith 1995; Lapid 1989). Post-Positivism questions the epistemology, the methodology, 
the ontology of Positivism. It challenges the formulation of objective truth about the social world 
through the scientific method as well as the rationalist assumptions about human nature (George & 
Campbell 1990).
In particular Post-Positivism points out that truth is not singular, ready-made and out there, but 
that there are many truths depending on different perspectives and that truths are constructed by 
these very  diverse interpretations. Therefore, truth(s) is not to be described and given to the public 
as an imposed message because, as Post-Positivism would say, “there is in fact no such thing as a 
reality  that does not belong in quotation marks” (Groff 2004:1). What the Post-Positivist  approach 
does is to point out the existence of these quotation marks when analysing the world, thus 
highlighting that  there are many  actors that can voice their worlds through diverse interpretations of 
their realities. This implies that  there are more than one method to construct knowledge, thus urging 
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for the adoption of other methods of investigation than the positivist scientific one. This Post-
Positivist way  of interpreting the interaction between the social world and the researcher/people is 
similar to the abolition of the so called fourth wall in the Realist  Theatre which was initiated by 
Pirandello in the 1920s. Like in the theatre where the abolition of this imaginary wall between the 
actors and the public allowed the construction of the scene on the stage through a dialogue between 
them, Post-Positivism advocates that there is not one reality  separated from the researcher through a 
wall of science. In fact, there are as many walls and lenses as there are interpretations, and there are 
various methods that construct those lenses which allow the researcher to interpret and create her 
reality(ies).
Post-Positivism is also defined as a reflexive approach because it challenges the IR discipline 
itself, and in particular the way the discipline has used theory to choose its object of analysis, the 
method of analysis and the interpretation of the findings (Ashley  1987). This reflexive approach 
leads to interrogate how the discipline describes, interprets but also how it constructs the world. In 
other words, “Reflexive IR theory accepts that theory  is as much a reflection of the world as it is, as 
a construction of the world as it might be” (Turenne Sjolander in Turenne Sjolander et al 1994:10). 
This questioning does not only imply the abolition of the dichotomy objectivity/subjectivity  which 
is the backbone of the Positivist approach, but also it draws scholars’ attention to reflect  on what is 
included and excluded as a subject of investigation by  mainstream IR. In synthesis, the object of 
observation, the method of observation as well as the theoretical framework used to approach this 
analysis all undergo a critical reflection. This means that according to Post-Positivism science is not 
“without a subject” as instead claimed by Positivism that says that  the researcher, through the usage 
of a scientific research method, does not influence the description of the world that she presents. It 
highlights the underlying assumptions which are embedded in all interpretations, this “in the 
absence of a neutral observation language” (Neufeld in Turenne Sjolander et al 1994:13,14; see also 
Hooker 1987; Margolis 1987).
This orientation leads Post-Positivism to challenge the hypothesis testing methods of Positivism 
and the language used to understand and/or construct reality (Phillips 1977; Shapiro 1987; West 
1989). This because, according to George “the world is always an interpreted ‘thing’, and it is 
always interpreted in conditions of disagreement and conflict, to one degree or another”. This is 
why “there can be no common body of observational or tested data that we can turn to for a neutral, 
objective knowledge of the world. There can be no ultimate knowledge, for example, that  actually 
corresponds to reality per se” (George 1994:24). Consequently, Post-Positivism is a question-driven 
rather than a problem-solving approach, and it offers a path of analysis that challenges the 
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assumptions of the discipline and patterns of inclusion and exclusion that  are embedded in IR 
theories (Linklater 1992; Price & Reus-Smit in Chan et al 2009).
Post-Positivist theorists claim that truth is problematic and that there is a plurality of methods for 
creating and interpreting knowledge and this has led to define this approach as anti-foundationalist, 
meaning that “each theory  will define what counts as the facts and so there will be no neutral 
position available to determine between rival claims” (Baylis et al 2008:274). Post-Positivist 
perspectives such as Postmodernism, Feminism, Post-Colonialism, Critical Studies are 
characterised by this anti-foundationalist approach that makes them rejecting the foundationalist 
one of Positivism (Ling 2002). The latter is based on an empiricist epistemology  according to which 
the same scientific method can be used to discover the social world and that there is a distinction 
between neutral facts and values (Baylis et al 2008:274). It was this empiricist  epistemology  that, 
according to Post-Positivism, “has determined what could be studied because it has determined 
what kinds of things existed in international relations” (Smith et al 1996:11; see also Der Derian 
1992).
The dissent of Post-Positivism theorists (Ashley  & Walker 1990; George & Campbell 1990) 
towards mainstream IR theorists is motivated by their criticism towards the way they conceptualise 
theory  and reality, inhibiting their “ability or even desire to widen or change their existing agendas 
for IR theory” (Zalewski & Enloe in Booth & Smith 1995:289). The need to deepen and widen the 
“thinking space” of the discipline (George & Campbell 1990:269) is pointed out by Post-
Modernism which examines “the ‘truths’ of IR theory to see how the concepts and knowledge 
claims that dominate the discipline in fact are highly contingent  on specific power relations” (Baylis 
et al 2008:284). By  stressing that  knowledge is not neutral but that it embeds specific power 
relations (Foucault  1972), the Post-Positivist approach urges to unpack the significance of 
assumptions of mainstream IR theories such as their state-centric view which regards all other 
issues i.e. relations between world actors, security, power, threat, war and so on gravitating around 
the state (Lawson 2003; Linklater 1992); and the “different  ways of thinking about the 
international” when talking about international relations (Bilgin in Chan et al 2009:282; Chan et al 
2001, 2009; Neuman et  al 1998; Waever 1998). As far as the former issue is concerned, according 
to Post-Positivism, this state-system should not be taken for granted but better theorised through 
other perspectives (Ashley 1983), rejecting the Positivist view that “the state does not need to be 
theorised, because it speaks for itself - just as the facts do” (Keyman in Turenne Sjolander et al 
1994:155). As far as the second issue is concerned, questioning the meaning of international means 
challenging the very  core of the discipline so much that nowadays some theorist  say  that “there is 
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no longer any  clear sense of what the discipline is about, what its core concepts are, what its 
methodology should be, what  central issues and questions it  should be addressing. In many ways, it 
is now easier to say what IR is not that what it is” (Hoffman in Chan et al 2009:29).
The issue of what is regarded as international by  the discipline of IR calls into question not only 
what are accepted dichotomies such as national/international but also from which point of view this 
issue of international is analysed. For instance, according to Bilgin, “The ‘Non West’, even when it 
was made the focal point of IR, was not treated as the referent  object” (Bilgin in Chan at el 
2009:287; see also Ayoob 1991; Luckham 1983). Moreover, there is also the questioning of who are 
the subjects of analysis in IR, and how these subjects have been represented and constructed by  the 
discipline. In this regard, Post-Colonial literature analyses patterns of dominance and resistance that 
characterise not only historical defined colonial encounters but  also beyond them (Darby & Paolini 
in Chan et al 2009; Doty 1996; Said 1979), instilling in the state-centric view of the discipline a 
sense that states are subjects to centripetal and centrifugal geopolitical and economic forces which 
influence states’ formation and transformation. This critical view on the theoretical boundaries of 
the discipline of IR and its “unhelpful dichotomies”, as Booths regards terms such as national order/
international anarchy, and a reflection on what objects of analysis should compose the mosaic of 
international relations, also includes a re-visioning of security (Tickner in Booth & Smith 1995:185; 
Walker 1988a).
All these Post-Positivist insights directly feed into the research approach adopted in this thesis 
which aims at investigating the complex spectrum of interlinkages between development and 
security. Thus truth claims about development and security  have been constructed through bodies of 
literature such as Critical Security  Studies and critical approaches to IR that allow the analysis of 
the transversalities of these concepts implicit in the development-security nexus.
Security has been an inherent subject of analysis of IR and since the beginning of the discipline 
in the 20th century  in the UK it has been framed according to a vision of the international made up 
of states or, as Post-Colonial and other critical IR theories claim, Western states (Krippendorf 
1987). In fact, “The subject of security studies as it developed in its orthodox form during the Cold 
War was constructed in the image of political realism” (Boots 2005:2). The state-centric level of 
analysis of international relations offered by Realism influenced the conceptualisation of security 
which was regarded as a function of, a threat to and for the benefit of the state (Carr 2001; Datta 
2008; Keohane 1986; Terriff et al 1999; Waltz 1979). This state straightjacket had the function to 
constrain security concerns within its borders and regarded threats as coming from outside the state 
and provoked by other states. The analysis provided by  Realism was not  deepened (Paris 2001) by 
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Liberalism, which would imply an investigation of the security ‘within the state’, but it  was 
broadened. According to Liberalism, states are not regarded in isolation in the anarchical space of 
the international but they are interdependent, and therefore should cooperate because they face 
common threats (Doyle 1986; Richardson 1997; Smith 1982). Therefore the Realist concept of 
“anarchy” is transformed by the liberal institutionalism’ into a “mature anarchy” in which states can 
manage the chaos of the international arena by  following collective security norms and practices 
(Lawson 2003:82).
A diverse conceptualisation of security which takes into account a non-state perspective, if not 
one de-linked from the state, is offered by Critical Security  Studies (Booth et al 1991, 2005; Buzan 
et al 1998; Collins et al 2007; Linklater 1990), and my thesis may be seen as belonging to this 
disciplinary  development. The meaning of the term “critical” has more to do with an “orientation 
towards the discipline than a precise theoretical label” (Krause et al 1997:xi). This body of literature 
points out the need to re-examine security because the “meaning of security is fluid” (Pettiford & 
Curley  1999:4), its character is contested and there is no neutral definition of security (Smith in 
Booths et al 2005: 27-28). Moreover, there is the criticism that “the security of units below the level 
of the state has rarely, if ever, been an important point at  issue in most Western IR discussions and 
analyses of the concept of security” (Pettiford & Curley  1999:8). This has led Critical Security 
Studies to abstract the significance of security  from the state by matching it  with other referent 
objects of analysis: people, environment, development and so on. According to the Critical Security 
studies literature (Krause et al 1997; Linklater 1990), the emphasis on new dimensions of security  is 
not simply  due to an expansion of the conceptual realm of the term in line with the geopolitical 
expansion of the so called West after the demise of the Cold War in the 1990s. One reason can be 
that the broadening of security interests towards non-military issues, such as the environment or 
migration instilled a sense of urgency prompting a response by  policy makers in these fields (Dewi 
et al 2005; Dodds et  al 2005; Najam et al 2003; Nef 1999). For instance, the UNDP stated that “One 
of the clearest consequences of population growth and deepening poverty in developing countries is 
the growth in international migration” (UNDP 1994:35). Thus the UNDP, by  stressing the link 
between an increase in the level of poverty, population, and population movement (for figures on 
the increased number of refugees and internationally displaced for the period 1980-2000s see also 
Human Security  Centre 2005; UNDP 1990, 1997), it ends up  contextualising an evolving 
demographic geography  within a discourse of danger “The real threat to human security in the next 
century will arise more from the actions of millions of people than from aggression by  a few 
nations” (UNDP 1994:34).
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However, topics such as the environment and migration could simply be considered as problems 
rather than concepts (Dorff 1994). By  seeing them as concepts this would change the primacy that 
they  have within security studies but also, Walt has argued, this “would destroy its [security] 
intellectual coherence” (Walt 1991:213) causing what was regarded as “the paralysis of our ability 
to prioritise” (Foong Khong 2001:233) because everything becomes a security concern. This goes 
beyond the exercise of crossing the theoretical boundaries between disciplines, such as security and 
migration, development, conflicts, environment (Kerr 2007; Uvin 2004). By  putting people at the 
centre of the theorising discourse, they  are contextualised (and all issues related to them) into a 
framework of danger and a threat that so far had belonged primarily  to the state (Campbell 1998; 
Walker 1990). The issue for Critical Security Studies was not  to create a hierarchy of security 
discourses between people and state (Walker 1988), but that the sovereign identity  of the state was 
to be regarded as one among many, this to avoid “the manifestly  political exclusion of 
others” (Ashley 1988:251 George & Campbell 1990:287).
According to Critical Security  Studies theorists (Booth et al 1991) the security discourse should 
include people as one of the referent object  of analysis even if, according to Buzan, “the state is the 
most important and effective provider of security” (Tickner in Booth & Smith 1995:185). However, 
this re-examination of security does not simply  imply  a pluralistic focus of the security problematic, 
but a revisiting of how the meaning of security  is constructed. In this security  equation Weldes 
includes culture by saying that “all social insecurities are culturally produced” (Weldes et al 1999:1) 
and contests the view that takes for granted the hegemony of the state and its security in security 
studies. She affirms that:
this particular form of naturalisation ends up expressing the point of view of the (insecure) 
political actor, generally the state. Making such an ontological assumption force the analysts, 
willy-nilly, to define and investigate security and insecurity from the point of view of the 
(naturalised) state, with the consequences both that other sites of insecurity are ignored and that 
insecurities themselves are understood to be natural facts rather than mutable social 
constructions. It  is hardly surprising, then, that  most  of the work in security studies adopts the 
standpoint  of the state, takes state insecurities to be given rather than constructed, and neglects 
the investigation of other loci, or indeed victims, of insecurity (Weldes 1999:20).
The security concerns of this thesis fit with the ones of Critical Security  Studies and contribute 
directly  to this critical approach to IR. The analysis of the development-security nexus, which is the 
object of this thesis, needed a theoretical tool which did not impose a message about a predefined 
meaning of security and development. The Critical Security Studies perspective allows me to 
unpack the security discourse and contextualise it  within contemporary international relations where 
security has become fluid (Pettiford & Curley 1999:4), where reality(ies) as well as what is national 
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and international is perceived by Postmodernist “in a perpetual state of flux - of movement, change, 
and instability” (George 1994:29), and where Post-Development theorists affirm that what is 
needed is “Not more Development but a different regime of truth and perception” (Escobar 
1992:12).
In this scenario a state-centric approach alone would have been inadequate to explore the 
relations between development and security  taking into account  their changing interpretations and 
responses to a scenario where patterns of inclusions and exclusions are overlapping and fluid. The 
theoretical boundaries of Critical Security Studies orient my research by questioning the 
contemporary  significance of development and security including as participants of the security 
equation diverse actors such as states, people, international and regional organisations, and 
analysing their security  discourses without a predefined ‘security-mould’ that should shape this 
research.
My contribution to the critical approaches to IR is in having unpacked the significance of 
security and development which is embedded in the development-security  nexus set of policies 
called Security Sector Reform. My research shows the necessity to go beyond dichotomies such as 
human/state security  because by considering security as a plastic word, as much as development is 
perceived (Poerksen in Rist  1997), it  implies that these dichotomies are regarded as mere 
representations of interests, power, knowledge, discourses. The contribution to the critical security 
studies literature is not to hollow or relativise the theorising about security. On the contrary  it  is to 
show how powerful the choice of language related to the security discourse is by taking as 
examples SSR policies in which the language of human security is used to address concerns related 
to state security and state governance development capacities.
The analysis of the meaning of ‘human’ within human security and development carried out in 
chapter II as well as addressing the ‘security  for whom’ question when talking about security, have 
the purpose to highlight if and why  concerns about the human(s) must necessarily pass through the 
state and in doing so be postponed because of the state’s responsibility to deal with its own citizens. 
Thus the research shows the need to investigate the interrelations between development and security 
and how these concepts are constructed. By taking the critical view that security  is not given but it 
is what we make of it, that the inside and outside of the state are fluid boundaries (Walker 1994), 
and that the relation between state and people should be explored horizontally  rather than vertically 
by accepting a pluralistic view of security, the research contribution to security is towards a vision 
of human security whose dialectic should not  be limited to its relation with state security. Instead it 
should but contextualised within a situation of urgency of addressing the conditions that make 
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people secure according to their own vision of threats, dangers, safety, dignity of life. If the relation 
people-state security  in locked in a continuum according to which you need a secure state to have 
secure citizens, the voice of the people will be subordinate to the one of the state, and the responses 
to them will also be postponed.
Despite the diverse conceptualisations of development and security, both concepts are regarded 
as plastic words; both have put human beings at the centre of their theorising efforts through the 
concepts of human development and human security; both these concepts need the state to fulfil the 
priorities framed by  their definitions; and when these concepts are translated into policy objectives 
both development and security are moulded into state’s interests and concerns which means that 
despite the language of human development and security the state is still at the centre and indeed 
reinforced by this same language. This is why when talking about development, security  and their 
diverse interpretations and interrelations it is necessary to question which interests and concerns 
they  address. This is not because the language adopted to defined human development and human 
security is perfidious, but because the centric-view of international relations is still embedded in the 
significance, interpretation and construction of development and security so that it is necessary to 
disentangle the various development and security threads belonging to the various actors in the 
national and international arena. This is why the investigation on the current significance of the 
development-security nexus aims at elucidating as Weldes said, “other loci, or indeed victims, of 
insecurity” (Weldes  et al 1999:20), and lack of development.
METHODOLOGY
Bodies of Literature
By adopting a Post-Positivist approach, I have not started with a theory  but “with an area of 
study” and I have selected what is relevant to that area (Strauss & Corbin 1990:23). As Strauss and 
Corbin said, the role of the literature review is for the researcher to acquire what they defined as 
theoretical sensitivity, namely the comprehension by  the researcher of the significance of data 
gathered (Strauss and Corbin quoted in Morris 2006:82). I have chosen three main areas of study: 
development, security, and SSR policies. Within these broad fields, I have selected three narrower 
topics: human development, human security and about SSR policies I have focused on the 
significance of the development-security  nexus in the design of these policies. I have preceded the 
analysis of this aspect  of SSR by an overview of the origins of these policies in the 1990s and this 
background has been provided by the Civil-Military Relations literature. I have also carried out 
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literature reviews related to the three case studies used to address the research question, but this will 
be dealt in the case studies section below.
I have analysed development literature to give an overview of the theoretical scenario that has 
accompanied the evolution of the concept of development since the birth of development studies in 
the 1950s to nowadays. This has included theories such as Modernisation, Dependency, Wold 
System, Post-Development. The purpose of this summary of diverse theories is to acquire an 
understanding of the changing nature of this concept and why the formulation of human 
development in the 1990s publicised by the UNDP (UNDP 1990) represented a powerful policy 
statement that facilitated the merge of development and security concerns.
The review of the security literature centres on understanding the meaning of human security and 
in particular how the role of the state is envisaged within a human security discourse and what is the 
meaning of ‘human’ within this discourse. The prominence of the notion of security  in the IR 
literature and the internationalisation of security and development concerns and approaches mean 
that a changing conceptualisation of security and development, such as human security and human 
development, also implies a changed view of international relations. This is why the understanding 
of the novelty and significance of human development and human security  has also been 
approached through the lens of IR theories, in particular Non-mainstream IR theories, in order to 
contextualise human development and human security within the weaving of international relations 
between world actors.
As far as SSR literature is concerned, I have focused on the academic contribution coming 
from the UK considering that this country has been at the fore front in the promotion of these 
policies, but also from organisations working on SSR such as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). To elucidate the origins of this policies I have included the 
Civil-Military Relations literature considering that  the language and concerns of SSR can also be 
traced back to the focus on democratic governance of the security  sector during the 1990s. 
Considering that the main topic of the research is not on the changing methods of doing SSR but on 
contemporary  theories and practices of the development-security nexus that SSR policies are 
publicised as addressing (OECD 2007), the section dealing with the Civil-Military Relations is 
relevant because it shows the continuity  of policy makers’ concerns for the democratic management 
of state (security) structures which is the focus of SSR. This concern is further analysed in one of 
the case studies, namely Armenia.
The literature that relates to development, security and SSR also includes policy statements from 
governments, international organisations and other stakeholders working in the field of the 
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development-security nexus and SSR policies. In particular I have used policy  documents from UK, 
and above all DfID, MoD, FCO, and OECD, UN agencies, the EU and NATO. These primary 
sources constitute an important source of qualitative information considering that the practice of 
SSR has seen a boom in recent years. Furthermore, the Practitioner Course on SSR that I attended 
in Birmingham (7-10 December 2008) organised by the Global Facilitator Network for SSR (GFN 
SSR) and funded by three UK departments, DfID, MoD and FCO, has been precious for gathering 
primary and secondary  sources. While the majority  of the literature that I have used is in English, a 
certain number of policy documents and government pronouncements but also secondary sources 
that I have used are in Portuguese, French, Italian, Spanish. The knowledge of these languages has 
also been necessary for conducting interviews (see below). While the bulk of this literature review 
material has been indeed significant  for the analysis of the development-security nexus, a method 
that I have used for enhancing the understanding of this material is the interview.
Interviewing
The choice of conducting interviews as part of the research design is to have raw material to 
analyse that reflects different views on the theory and practice of the development-security nexus. I 
have started the interview process with the selection of the interviewees. They include academics 
who have been writing on the subject of SSR or on case studies selected for the research; 
practitioners on SSR such as national civil servants, members of intergovernmental organisations 
working on SSR, and SSR consultants. While a list  of people interviewed is provided after the 
bibliography section, here I present the rationale for the selection of interviewees, the choice of 
method for conducting interviews, and data analysis.
As far as academics working on SSR is concerned, I have selected those who are UK based or 
knowledgeable on the SSR debate taking place in the UK. This is because this country has been the 
most vocal promoter of SSR, officially  since 1999 by the then Secretary of DfID Claire Short (Short 
1999), and this has encouraged a production of policy papers and links with different academic 
institutions, such as Kings College in London, to enhance the understanding of this policy tool as a 
response to countries experiencing a development and security deficit. Practitioners and consultants 
on SSR that  have been interviewed include those working for UK government departments, DfID, 
MoD, but also in UN, NATO, OECD, EU.
The choice of interviewees has been guided by  their insight on the topic and how their own work 
or the institution they represent reflect different points of view on the subject. The approach that I 
have used to interview them is the one defined as depth interviewing research or responsive 
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interviewing, namely  each interview has its own dynamic and focus, and it is driven by the insight 
of the interviewee on a specific topic. With this method, I could guide “a conversational partner in 
an extended discussion” (Rubin & Rubin 2005:4). It is similar to the “focused interview” approach 
in the sense that the interviewees have first hand experience on the topic and I have a priori 
knowledge of the subject of the interview through literature review and analysis of policy 
documents carried out before interviewing them. However, having adopted a Post-Positivist 
approach, I have not used these interviews to test hypotheses that emerged from a pre-situation 
analysis on the subject, as typical of focused interviews (Merton et al 1990), but to enhance my 
knowledge on the subject  under investigation through the gathering of diverse perspectives from 
academics and professionals of the field.
Some interviews could be done in-person while other were phone interviews; in both cases the 
completion time of the interview was more or less the same (Shuy in Holstein et al 2001). Some 
interviews were conducting in English while others in Spanish and French. In all cases, interviews 
were preceded by a written correspondence with the interviewee which included information 
regarding my academic and professional background; the focus of my research and how my 
research links with their area of interest; the purpose of the interview; and what is called an 
informed consent (Morris 2006:251). When requested, a list of indicative questions were sent in 
advanced above all with some interviewees related to the case studies for which I had specific 
questions. The majority  of interviewees accepted to be quoted while it was agreed with all of them 
that they could check their quotes included in the text of the thesis before its final submission to the 
academic commission of the university.
As far as the method used to do the interviews is concerned (Patton 1990), generally interviews 
started with “opener or introductory” questions which allowed interviewees to give a “free-answer” 
type of response (Payne 1951:34). This allowed me to narrow down the interviewee’s point of view 
among the diverse perspectives on SSR policies, and to have a background from which building 
other types of questions such as reason-why  questions, i.e. when investigating the relation between 
the development-security nexus and SSR policies; informational questions, i.e. when enquiring 
about the purpose of SSR policies; two-way  questions, used to grasp the nuances between defence 
reforms carried out within or without  a wider SSR framework as it is today understood (Payne 
1951). The interviews were semi-structured (Bryman 2008), in the sense that even if I had a list of 
questions prepared in advanced, conversations depended on how interviewees formulated their 
responses and which issues within SSR policies they gave more prominence. The data analysis of 
interview material was used as a “source of raw data” (Patton 1990:24) inserted in the text as direct 
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quotations, but also it was used as “evidence-based interpretations” in the final chapter of the thesis 
(Rubin & Rubin 2005:201).
Apart from interviews, contacts with stakeholders were also made though email correspondence 
through which selected questions were sent on issues such as those related to the case studies. These 
contacts were preceded by an introductory  email about my background and my  research topic, the 
agreement of the stakeholder to exchange her view on the subject under investigation and the 
informed consent as for oral interviews.
Case Studies
It is quite common to use case studies in the discipline of IR (Harvey et al 2002; Maoz et al 
2004) and this method is one of the tools used in qualitative research. However, “It is not a method 
of research technique that  determines whether something is qualitative research; it is how the study 
is conceived, what is to be accomplished, and how the data are understood” (Willis 2005:150). The 
Post-Positivist approach that I have adopted in this research implies that I do not start the study 
presenting some hypotheses but by a “search for emerging concepts and themes as the study 
progresses and the data is collected”, followed by a “search for the connection between those 
concepts and themes” (Morris 2006:71). For this problem-setting analysis, the case study method is 
then used as a tool to provide with an in depth description and analysis of the subject of the 
research. In this framework, then, the selection of case studies is not done by random sampling but 
as a “purposive” sampling (Morris 2006: 90, 94), based on how they support the answer to the 
research question taking into account the diverse conceptualisations and operationalisations of the 
development security nexus.
Before explaining the rationale for the usage of this method it is necessary  to define what a case 
is and what, in this research, has been framed as a case. A case has been defined as “a spatially 
delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at  a single point in time or over some period of 
time” (Gerring 2007:19); as “an examination of a specific phenomenon such as a program, an event, 
a person, a process, an institution, or a social group” (Merriam 1988:9); as “an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary  phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1984:13); and a method 
that gives a “thick description” through the interpretations of the people most knowledgeable about 
the case (Stake 1995:102). The case study method provides with an in-depth analysis of what is 
framed as “a case”, enhancing the understanding of the nature of the topic and of the concepts that 
emerge from the research (Meckstroth 1975); it  allows the breaking up  of the research question into 
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sub-questions or case study questions creating some building blocks for analysing and questioning 
(Hamel et al 1992); and it is not used to generalise findings but to help conceptualising issues under 
investigation (Gomm et al 2000:4).
I have judged this method useful to explore how the development-security nexus is 
conceptualised and operationalised because it gives a thick description (Geertz 1973) of this issue 
through the view of specialists of this field, and this enhances the understanding of the concept and 
practice of the link between development and security. Furthermore, the unclear definitional 
boundaries of SSR policies and the fact that their implementation is contextualised in different 
timeframes require a methodology  that can bring to the fore the uniqueness of each set of policies as 
well as providing with analytical findings about the relation between development and security. 
Considering that each set of SSR policies is unique in its design and implementation, the purpose of 
investigating SSR policies through case studies is not to generalise qualitative findings but 
highlighting inadequacies and other particularities in current designs and practices of framing 
together development and security issue (Harvey et al 2002).
The selection of the case studies, Armenia, Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau, corresponds to the 
tackling of the research question through different angles of analysis in order to understand the 
novelty of these policies and their significance in framing together development and security 
concerns. Before entering into the details of these cases, and “what was studied in the case; what 
was included and what was excluded; and how it was processed” (Maoz in Harvey et  al 2002:181), 
it is necessary  to point out that “While a case is always singular, a case study work or research 
design often refers to a study that includes several cases” (Gerring 2007:27). Despite presenting 
three different contexts for analysis, the method used is not a within-case comparison because there 
is not hypothesised relationships (Levy in Harvey  et al 2002:145) or what was called by  George a 
method of structured focused comparison with a comparative analysis of the cases (George 
1979:61). This because the aim of the selection of cases is not to develop a “differentiated theory 
comprised of conditional generalisations” (George 1979:59) but to investigate the contemporary 
conceptual and operational significance of the development-security nexus. When comparison 
between cases was done (Lijphart 1975) it was to provoke and question and not to prove a certain 
issue (Stretton 1969). The cases were selected to explore the nature and outcome (Yin 1984) of the 
usage of the development-security nexus in contemporary policy  settings. The boundaries of the 
cases were framed by the case study question that each case addresses, and they do not correspond 
to the classification of cases in different categories according to their capacity  to test or generate 
hypotheses or on the value of the variables they contain (Gerring 2007; Levy in Harvey et al 2002).
23
The Armenia case study investigates the significance of using nowadays the language of SSR for 
reforms, such as the Armenian defence reform, which are not framed according to current SSR 
holistic parameters. According to an analysis of the legal framework of the Armenian defence 
reform, this country has initiated a defence reform with the support of NATO and is not 
implementing a SSR policy package which follows the development-security  nexus rationale 
promoted by OECD. The reason it is chosen as a case study  is because this defence reform allows 
for an investigation of the language adopted and adapted in this reform. This investigation 
contributes to researching the novelty of SSR policies and the rationale behind the international 
consensus for their promotion. The theoretical background of this study is the Civil-Military 
Relations literature which highlights that the language and concern of SSR policies were already 
there in the 1990s before the SSR promotion during the 2000s decade as the development-security 
nexus policies. Terms such as democratic control of the armed forces, rule of law, the role of the 
civilian oversight bodies in defence issues, scrutiny of the management of military expenditure that 
are SSR concerns are not a recent invention. The issue is, as pointed out during an interview with 
Dennis Blease, “if SSR is an old wine in a new bottle, or if there will be a new bottle in the years to 
come when the debate over SSR will move forward” (Dennis Blease, Brigadier General, retired, 
Centre for Security  Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK, 8 June 2010). This case study is 
introduced by an historical overview of the country  which has the purpose to illustrate the current 
foreign policy of the country upon which its defence reform choices are based. I start the empirical 
research on the development-security nexus with Armenia because of the need to contextualise SSR 
policies within broader settings that reveal that policy  makers’ quest for addressing issues related to 
security, justice and state democratic management is not only framed within the contemporary ways 
of doing SSR. This case study  constitutes a launching pad for questioning the shift from the 1990s 
adoption of this type of language due to a concern for democracy and international security, to the 
years 2000s when the same language expresses a concern for the development-security nexus.
The Afghanistan case study is selected because it questions the decision of policy  makers to 
adopt SSR policies in a war theatre; it questions the meaning of security embedded in this set of 
SSR policies; and it  questions how this context and this conceptualisation of security promote the 
development-security nexus rationale for SSR policies. Investigating the implementation of SSR 
policies in a war theatre has the purpose to question not only  the meaning of security  but also about 
the spectrum of feasibility  of these policies, the expectations about the implementation of the 
development-security nexus, and why the ambition of policy makers in rebuilding the Afghan 
security forces needed to be expressed through the language of SSR. The analysis of the legal 
24
framework of SSR in Afghanistan shows that this country has been officially  carrying out these 
policies since 2002 when SSR was included into a broader framework of rebuilding state 
institutions following the USA led military  attack to the country  in 2001. This case study  starts with 
illustrating the legal framework of SSR without preceding it by an historical overview of the 
country  because this set of policies is a direct consequence of the political fracture in the history of 
the country that happened in 2001 with the starting of the war between the Afghan regime and the 
USA led international coalition. Considering that Afghanistan is doing SSR, this case study is not 
exploratory such as the one of Armenia where I examined the choice of language in the defence 
reform. In this case, the SSR framework is analysed through the lens of the development-security 
nexus which is the leitmotif of SSR policies.
Guinea-Bissau is selected as a case study because this country has a security and development 
deficit but is not at war, and it is implementing SSR policies since 2008. Therefore it constitutes a 
policy theatre in the sense that it allows the study of how development-security nexus policies 
address this nexus in a country where both development and security are in high demand. The 
analysis of the SSR framework is preceded by an overview of the political and development 
situation of the country to show how political instability, militarisation of politics and the dire living 
conditions of the people of Guinea-Bissau call for a set of reforms which are publicised as 
addressing development and security concerns.
In this case, like the one of Afghanistan, SSR policies are analysed through the lens of the 
development-security nexus perspective which constitutes the promotional background of these 
policies. The choice of selecting two SSR cases is that these two contexts where these policies are 
implemented bring to the fore questions about the meaning of security  and development that is 
adopted in the policy design of SSR; the feasibility  of translating into practice the development-
security nexus in a scenario of conflict  and political instability; and how the conceptualisation of 
SSR in each policy setting challenges the interpretation of the development-security  nexus. 
Furthermore, they raise questions about expectations, perceptions of success and failure of policy 
makers and of the addressees of SSR regarded as beneficiaries or as local owners of these policies.
Data collection regarding these cases includes secondary  sources of the country under 
investigation in order to draw an historical overview of Armenia which explains the geopolitical 
foreign policy of this country and its choice for a defence reform with the auxiliary of NATO; a 
background of the adoption of SSR in Afghanistan which is the war that started in 2001 considering 
that SSR policies are a direct consequence of this conflict; and an overview of the current political 
and economic development situation of Guinea-Bissau which explains the need for policies to 
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address development and security issues. For the analysis of the defence reform in Armenia and 
SSR policies in Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau, I have used primary sources such as policy 
documents produced by governments involved in these policies, international organisations, as well 
as material from conferences above all on Afghanistan, which was displayed in internet and 
referenced throughout the text. Selected interviews, discussed in the section above, also contributed 
to the gathering of data. Data from these cases were not used to formulate generalisations about the 
concept and practice of the development-security nexus because this method of research does not 
lend itself to an empirical sample inference due to the fact that these cases cannot claim to be 
“representative” of the many defence reforms and SSR policies that are carried out, even if there are 
“contingent generalisations that [can] apply to the subclass of cases that are similar to those under 
study” (George & Bennett 2005:30, 32). In this research, the conceptualisation of development and 
security that relates to each of these cases can be useful for understanding other cases, but I do not 
consider them as generalisation of findings (Yin 1984) done by  inductive analysis (Patton 1990:44). 
This is also why  I have not done any triangulation of data between case studies due to the 
uniqueness of the cases (Stake 1995:4). Each case has contributed to the understanding of a 
particular situation that I have later interpreted (Willis 2005:239) in order to highlight, from the 
ambiguous “space of signification” or the “semantic battlefield” (Åkerstrøm Andersen 2003:vi) 
represented by the concepts of development and security, what is the development-security nexus 
that is currently translated into practices through SSR policies.
CHAPTER LAYOUT
Chapter I introduces the research question which focuses on analysing the significance of the 
development-security nexus in conceptual and operational terms. It continues by  presenting the 
conceptual and theoretical framework adopted in the thesis which is informed by a Post-Positivist 
approach, and the methodology used to gather and analyse qualitative data for the research mainly 
through literature review, interviews, and case studies.
Chapter II examines the changing conceptualisation of development and security and it focuses 
in particular on the formulation of human development and human security. This because while 
human development contributed to a new reading of the development problématique, human 
security merged development and security concerns, creating de facto the development-security 
nexus. As far as development is concerned, throughout the time this concept has changed its 
significance, aims and strategies. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s development concerns were 
used as a banner by  anti-colonial movements for demanding independence to pursue development 
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and modernisation, but also by most postcolonial states that framed their domestic politics by 
adopting and adapting combined Western and USSR models of development. In the 1970s and 
1980s development was also seen as a basic need to fulfil through an economic development of the 
state that used economic growth as a benchmark. The benefits of the trickle down of neoliberal 
economic theories started to be contested in the 1990s when the limits of a development model 
centred only  on economic growth were recognised (UNICEF 1987, 1988; World Bank 1990). A part 
from contesting old development approaches, the 1990s saw the emergence of a person-centred 
development paradigm called human development. Its promoter was the UNDP and its inauguration 
was the publication in the 1990 of the Human Development Report (UNDP 1990). The analysis of 
this diverse perspective on development points out that despite questioning the market led economic 
growth, its weight  in the development discourse remains unchanged. I regard human development 
as a powerful policy statement that paved the way for a discussion on the management of 
development and security  issues that includes, in theory more than in practice, how these affect 
people.
The emergence of the human security perspective with its emphasis on the need to have states 
capable to create an environment where development entitlements of people are guaranteed (UNDP 
1994), pushed for an analysis of the means and ends of security as well as for a debate on state’s 
responsibility which challenges the dichotomy national/international when dealing with security 
issues. In this regard, I focus my analysis on to what extent human security brings the human at the 
centre of its theorising and how it considers the role of the state. I argue that both human 
development and human security  have left unaltered respectively the primacy of market led 
economic growth and the state in their theorising. However both these perspectives put the human 
being at the centre of theorising about development and security  which paved the way for the 
acknowledgement that there is a nexus between development and security  and that theories and 
practices of these two discourses should merge. The merge of development and security concerns in 
the 1990s was facilitated by a series of factors such as sharing the human being as their referent 
object of analysis; paying closer attention to issues linked to sustainability in the field of 
environment but also economics (Anand & Sen 2000; Haq 1995; WCED 1987); broadening of the 
spectrum of issues included in the field of security due to geopolitical changes in the 1990 decade 
which required more comprehensive responses that included security, development, state 
governance considerations to redraw the political boundaries following the demise of the USSR.
Chapter III rethinks the formulation of the development-security nexus and one of its set of 
policies, Security Sector Reform, by investigating the significance of two theoretical shifts that 
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regard development and security as interlinked, namely  the developmentalisation of security and the 
securitisation of development, which occurred respectively in the 1990s and 2000s (Duffield 2001, 
2007; Klingebiel et al 2006; Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007). The first shift  emerged in the 1990s and 
focuses on the imperative to link development and security concerns, exemplified by human 
security. This trend highlights the need to merge human development concerns with the urgency to 
secure them as expressed by human security. In particular, I argue that this trend is another powerful 
statement that emphasises that development and security  concerns are intrinsically linked and 
should be addressed together. The emergence of new international security  challenges in the 2000s 
prompts the vision of “underdevelopment as dangerous” (Duffield 2001:159) which characterises 
the interpretation of the link between development and security embedded in the securitisation of 
development trend. In particular, according to this trend, development assistance is regarded as a 
tool to prevent conflicts because “Without peace, there may be no development. But without 
development, peace is threatened” (UNDP 1994:iii). I argue that while the argument that lack of 
development causes war is weak (Beall et  al 2006; Duffield 2001; Hehir 2007; Klingebiel 2006), 
there has been a validation of this trend by  international policy makers about promoting policies 
which focus on state security while contextualising their interventions in the need to secure the 
human security  and development of people. Therefore, while the developmentalisation of security 
trends stressed the nexus between development and security, the securitisation of development 
anchors development entitlements to state responsibility, thus justifying the need to have secure 
states in order to have secure citizens. This is what has caused the boom of policies focusing on 
state governance security which are nowadays contextualised within wider development concerns. 
One example of these policies is Security Sector Reform (SSR), and I analyse in particular the 
contribution to this set of policies by DfID and OCED which have been prominent promoters of 
SSR, as well as academics. I contribute to the recent literature on SSR by highlighting first of all 
that the multifaceted relation between development and security  does not lead to a univocal 
definition of these policies. I argue that regarding security as a prerequisite for development is not 
sufficient to say that by addressing security we also address development issues. This implies that 
the development-security  nexus that these policies address depends on the meaning given to these 
related issues in each policy context. This is why it is necessary to have an in-depth analysis of 
diverse policy contexts that illustrate the various significance of development, security and their 
interrelations.
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Chapters IV, V and VI are devoted to the case studies of Armenia, Afghanistan and Guinea-
Bissau1. Their aim is not to analyse the progress or failure of these policies but to question the 
meaning that development and security acquire under the aegis of SSR policies and how their nexus 
is conceptualised and implemented. Armenia is doing a defence reform with the assistance of 
NATO and is not implementing SSR policies as nowadays defined. However, it  includes in the text 
the technical language that is also found in SSR policies. This case study provides with a reflection 
on the origins of the concerns that these policies address such as the state governance of the security 
sector in a manner that is consistent with democratic rules. In this regard the Civil-Military 
Relations literature contributes to this discussion by stressing that these policies as they  are 
currently conceived have not invented or monopolised the lexicon of SSR which has existed since 
the 1980s and 1990s when states started paying more attention to issues such as good governance 
(World Bank 1989a, 1992a). This case study contributes to contextualise current security-nexus 
policies within a broader temporal scenario in which the meaning of security  and development, or 
maybe just their theories and rhetoric, have undergone a change.
Chapter V addresses this change through the analysis of the conceptual underpinnings of SSR 
policies that have been implemented in Afghanistan since 2002. Since then these policies have 
received a consistent international backing and financial support above all from USA and EU 
countries that are at the forefront in promoting SSR. The particularity of this policy  setting is that it 
is also a war theatre and this raises questions about the applicability of these policies as well as the 
significance of development and security when they come to terms with military necessities of the 
battlefield.
The case study of Guinea-Bissau in chapter VI, instead, represents an idyllic policy situation 
because paradoxically this country, by being one of the poorest countries in the world according to 
the HDI (UNDP 2007-08), it  does need policy makers attention for supporting, among various 
issues, security, development, governance, democracy, and people. This situation of poverty and 
past colonial and civil wars is the “recommended” background for the implementation of these 
policies which aim at addressing development and security  issues. Indeed, the significance of 
implementing SSR in a country where the majority  of its population of 1.6 million people live with 
29
1 The list of publications linked to the three case studies is the following:
Telatin, M. (2009) Armenia: a defence reform through the looking glass. In Central Asia and the Caucasus 2
(56) 65-72
- (2010) Questioning the EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau. In Portuguese Journal of International Affairs 2 
autumn/winter 27-35
- (2010a) The development-security nexus policies in Afghanistan: feasible or fashionable? In Croatian 
International Relations Review 15 (54-57) 37-51
less than two dollars per day  (IMF 2007) is self-explanatory. The Guinea-Bissau case study raises 
questions about the significance of development and security embedded in the design of these 
policies, focusing in particular on one of the stakeholders of these policies which is the EU.
Chapter VII gathers the findings of this research that include the analysis of the 
conceptualisation of the nexus between development and security  and how it is nowadays 
operationalised through SSR policies. In this regard, the three case studies question how this nexus 
is put into practice and how development and security concerns are framed within the SSR policy 
design. Nowadays the overarching policy  framework of SSR has become prominent when dealing 
with security infrastructure of states. I argue that, despite been publicised as addressing the nexus 
between development and security, SSR policies end up focusing only on selected state security 
issues, postponing the answer to the development question to an unknown future. Even if the nexus 
exists theoretically, exemplified by the concept of human security, when it is put into practice the 
fulfilment of the development promise is postponed, or so it  seems. This because addressing 
security in order to prepare the basis for development implies that these policies focus their 
attention on helping the state to develop its capacity to guarantee the human security of its citizens.
This absorbability of the ‘development slice’ of SSR into policy attention on state governance 
mismatches with the language used in the promotion of these policies that presents SSR as putting 
people, their security and their development at  the centre of their policy attention. Even if an 
analysis of the concepts of human security and human development reveals that the role of the state 
has never been dislodged from the development and security  discourses, this research highlights 
two main issues: the need to better elucidate the meaning of development and security  and the 
means and ends of their theorising and practices; the inadequacy of the statement ‘development-
security nexus’ considering that the theoretical merge between these two discourses is done at 
people-level through the concepts of human development and human security, but in practice this is 
done at state-level because security and development of people are regarded as passing through the 
state. This mismatch between the theory and practice of the nexus creates the perception that 
development-security policies such as SSR, while preaching their conceptual debt to the 
development-security nexus, have postponed the answering to the development question while 
focusing primarily on the security  question. This development exclusion has weakened the 
development-security nexus, undermined its human security conceptual base, and reinforced policy 
attention to the management of state security. The study of the implementation phase of SSR 
manifests the weakness of these policies, unable to bind together the conceptual richness of human 
security with states’ security interests, in an inclusive development policy discourse.
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II. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, security and development concerns were often raised in tandem and policy 
makers and scholars saw the discourse of security and development as interlinked in various ways. 
A conceptual shift in the early part of the 1990s in how theories of security and development were 
formulated facilitated as well as accompanied the convergence of their discourses. A key moment in 
this conceptual shift was the formulation of human development and human security. Since then, 
the development-security nexus trend has been a source of influence for the design of international 
development and security policies.
This chapter identifies the evolving debates on the concepts of development and security to 
understand how the nexus between the two emerged and became entrenched. It is divided into two 
main sections focusing respectively on human development and human security. The analysis of 
human development is preceded by an overview of theories and ideas of development2 because the 
elaboration of this concept  in the 1990s is part  of the theorising efforts since the birth of 
development studies in 1950s that saw a proliferation of interpretations about ends and means of 
achieving development. However, before investigating in the chapter the evolving significance of 
development, it is important to point out here that from the outset of the discipline in the 1950s a 
common denominator of its diverse theories is that development issues have been regarded not only 
as domestic issues but also as international ones (O’Brien &Williams 2007). In the 1950s 
development was primarily regarded as a domestic concern that anti-colonial movements and 
postcolonial states used as a mantra for claiming independence, for instance by the Non-Aligned 
Movement and the outcome of the 1955 Bandung conference (European Navigator 2004). During 
the years this concern acquired also an international character and shaped economic and political 
relations among states. The context of development was no longer simply “the study of policy 
choice in poor countries” (Krieckhaus 2006:165), but it became “a method of change that has been 
introduced in the former colonies to pull up standards of living of their people” (Dasgupta 1985: 
10). Therefore, development had a national and international sphere, and the theorising efforts for 
instance of Dependency and World System theories included the analysis of the linkages between 
these two dimensions.
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2  Throughout the chapter I will maintain the difference between the spirit, the concept, and theories of 
development. By the spirit  of development I mean the optimistic attitude, the feeling that inspired the 
development  decades. The concept  of development  is the abstract  or generic idea of development  used to 
formulate theories which have been set out to explain a particular situation. The theory is “a logically 
interconnected set of propositions about [the] empirical phenomena [of development]” (Harvey et al 
2002:136).
The internationalisation of development and the emergence of post-colonial states constituted a 
new terrain not only  for development theories but for the discipline of IR in general. Despite the 
emphasis that the discipline put on relations, it was recognised by Non-mainstream theories of IR in 
the late 1980s and 1990, many of them adopting a Post-Positivist approach, that  the discipline failed 
to adequately  elaborate on past encounters between Western and non-Western people, thus ignoring 
their major influence on the creation of states and their international relations (Krishna in Jones et  al 
2006:89; see also Anand 2007; Barker et al 1994; Darby et al 1997; Escobar 1995; Rist 1997). 
Furthermore, the analysis of the regimes of representation such as the Third World, the South or the 
Global South with their underlying imperial encounters and security considerations, created an 
opportunity of sharing a common ground of research for the disciplines of development, 
international relations and security studies (Doty 1996; Grant 1995; Krause et al 1997; Thomas 
1987; Thomas & Wilkin 1999, 2004).
Whether development is regarded as a shared concern among disciplines or as an expanded 
concept which has entered other disciplines’ remit, elucidating the past theoretical reading of this 
concept is however inadequate for understanding the contemporary  significance of the concept and 
practice of development. This inadequacy is because the current trend that highlights the 
interrelation between development and security  has made the analysis of the development (and 
security) problematiques more complex. This is why to understand the wider questions raised in the 
thesis, it is necessary  to outline the theoretical developments in the development and security 
domains. Thus I introduce the analysis of the concept of human development by an overview of 
“the chaotic history of development theory” (Trainer 1989:177) and this is followed by an analysis 
of security theories.
According to the literature on human development, this concept had two main implications: it 
highlighted the limitation of an economic approach to development centred on market led economic 
growth (Suhrke 1999); and it enlarged the fulcrum of development by affirming that  people are the 
subjects and objectives of development, but without rejecting economic growth as a development 
tool (Sen 1999). Human development entailed a ‘zooming out’, in the sense of moving beyond the 
narrow economic focus, of the development process by putting at the centre of this enlarged 
development context the human being. I argue that human development with its concerns about 
people’s choices and capabilities (Sen 1985, 1999) was a development statement, rather than a 
development strategy, despite being the basis for the formulation of the Human Development Index 
(Sagar & Najam 1998; UNDP 1990). Its questioning of the ‘development question’ was not so 
radical in the sense that it did not provide operational guidelines for an alternative to market 
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economic growth models. I contend that one attempt to overcome this weak policy  strategy and to 
operationalise the concept of human development was the merge of development and security 
concerns in the 1990s. Their nexus emerged to rectify  the weakness of human development as a 
development strategy but it also brought back the development discourse to talk about means and 
not only ends: security  came to be regarded as a mean to development, as we will see with one set 
of development-security nexus policies called Security Sector Reform.
The relevance for investigating the significance of human development is not because it is 
another addition to the development series which attempted to address issues linked to widespread 
world poverty, deprivation and unequal access to resources. If this was the case, human 
development should be considered as only the product of its time, and it would have been by now 
superseded by  other development trends more attuned with contemporary problems of international 
economic exclusion (Enloe 1989; Escobar 1995; Rahnema & Bawtree 1997; Saunders et al 2002). 
Human development facilitated the orientation of the discipline towards an integrative approach 
with other disciplines because of the need to frame a comprehensive conceptual picture of the 
human being, and to formulate a consequent policy response. This inclusive approach of 
development was also facilitated in the 1990s by the convergence of other discourses such as 
human rights, security, environment, democracy, debt relief as priorities on the agenda of policy 
makers. In particular, the international political climate of the 1990s decade increased the demand 
for concerted approaches when dealing with such issues as well as providing responses to the fading 
of the Cold-War apparatus which shook the fabric of Easters European and authoritarian states. 
Considering that the focus of this thesis is on one of these products, the development-security 
nexus, the second section of this chapter focuses on the emergence in the 1990s of a trend in the 
realm of security studies which shared with the human development approach the human being as 
the referent object of analysis: human security.
Human security provided with a new reading of security issues. It was promoted by the UNDP 
through the publication in 1994 of its report titled New Dimensions of Human Security (UNDP 
1994), but also by the Commission on Human Security (CHS 2003), the UN Secretary General 
(United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004) and the Human 
Security Centre (Human Security Centre 2005). The concept of human security  has benefited from 
many definitions which have enlarged its spectrum of applicability by expanding its realm of 
interests beyond state military  means (Chen et al 2003; Hampson et al 2002; Paris 2001; Thomas 
2000). Among those definitions, the one provided by the UNDP is significant in the sense that it 
allows the analysis of how human security  has embedded within its meaning the notion of human 
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development, paving the way for the investigation of the formulation of the development-security 
nexus. The relation between human security and development will be analysed in chapter III, and in 
particular why the fulfilment of security policies started to be regarded as dependent  on 
development related policies and outcomes. In this chapter I analyse the manufacturing of a 
perception of danger and security centred on the human being and how this relates to the role of the 
state. I do this by  addressing the question of ‘security  for whom’ which will reveal that human 
security is not de-linked from state security. The analysis of the reading of the role of the state by 
human security is relevant because I contend that the state is still part  of the human security 
analysis; and it still maintains its primacy in the implementation of security  policies even when they 
are formulated in a holistic manner following a human security approach.
The human security perspective offers a vision of security  which focused more on security 
relations within the state rather than between states. As we will see, this concept puts the emphasis 
on the need to investigate the security relation between the state and its citizens by ‘zooming in’, in 
the sense of focusing on people, the notion of state security and pushing for an analysis of state 
security governance capabilities.
However, in the 1990s, despite the launching of initiatives such as the ban of land-mines 
(International Campaign to Ban Landmines 1997) which drew attention to the humanitarian 
consequences of conflicts, overall, human security was not translated into clear security  strategies. 
Apart from an opening up of the discipline of security  towards other disciplines, the Critical 
Security Studies for instance (Krause et  al 1997; Lipschutz et  al 1995) argue that it is also a matter 
of questioning ‘the security question’ and the security  subject(s). Suffice to say here that the ‘zoom 
in’ of the security discourse towards the analysis of the management of state security  and its 
consequences on people, and the ‘zoom out’ of the development discourse towards an investigation 
of the impact that the economic management of the state has on people - thus sharing the human 
being as the same referent of analysis - brought to the search for a common strategy  that was sought 
to be provided by the development-security nexus policies, analysed in chapter III.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
The Theories of Development
After half a century of theorising efforts, development is still seen as “a slippery 
concept” (Edelman & Haugerud in Nugent & Vincent 2004:86), as a plastic word which has lost its 
specialised meaning (Poerksen in Rist  1997; Sachs 1999), and for which there is still no consensus 
as to what it means or requires (Gertzel in O’Brien & Williams 2007). From its etymology (des- 
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“undo” and -veloper “wrap  up”) it  implies to untie, to liberate something. However, what 
etymology allows development to do in principle, depends more on other variables than on its 
semantic capacities. The initial idea of development in the 1950s was included within the idea of 
progress, as stated by Post-Development theorists, that was labeled by a succession of different 
wording such as progress, modernisation, development, growth (Shanin in Rahnema et al 1997). 
Since then, the context and its reading, its subjects and objectives, its policy responses and 
outcomes have all undergone changes (for a history  of the evolution of development as a concept 
see Chari & Corbridge 2008; Jameson et al 1996; Rist 1997; Todaro & Smith 2009). Development 
became a discourse, a language “but also what is represented through language” (Grillo et al 
1997:12), and embedded a framework (Makki 2004) that evolved during the years leading 
development theorists to talk about “The making and unmaking of the third world through 
development” (Escobar in Rahnema et al 1997).
The beginning of the discipline of development studies is traced back to the middle of the past 
century, and it  became more and more institutionalised as politicians and theorists disseminated 
theories on how some areas of the world could change in order to enhance the living conditions of 
those people residing there (for the origin of development studies see Chari & Corbridge 2008; 
Corbridge et al 1995; Escobar 1995; Jameson et al 1996; Kingsbury et al 2008; Leys 1996; Rist 
1997; Sachs 1996; Tornquist 1999; Toye 1993). Since the birth of development studies in the 1950s, 
development theories privileged the economic vision of development probably  influenced by the 
need to “embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and 
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” as USA 
President Truman declared in 1949 (Truman quoted in Rist 1997:71).
The mapping of the world exercise done in the name of development was very much influenced 
by the previous scramble for Africa and the other continents during the nineteenth century under the 
banner of colonialism (Escobar 1995). With a clear geography of intervention in mind policy 
makers used the discipline of economics to delivery the promises of development and in particular 
Modernisation theories headed by  W.W. Rostow. His book The Stages of Economic Growth 
(Rostow 1960) mapped out the future of those countries identified as in need of development; what 
they  had to do was to follow the instructions, step by  step. Modernisation theories magnified the 
progressive nature of the idea of development. They  stated that this progress belonged to the 
Western world and validated its economic system because it was deemed capable to deliver a 
desirable standard of living. Western countries had to guide poor countries along this path and 
economic growth was regarded as the engine for allowing the economic “take-off” of poor 
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countries. Modernisation theories managed to secure the necessity of the idea of development while 
at the same time fossilising its image as a positive substratum for economic policies. Briefly, they 
sanctified both the idea of development and economic growth. All in all, economic growth policies 
were dominant during the 1950s and 1960s (World Bank 1990), and even during the following 
decades, economic growth concerns were always included in economic policies, even if only as the 
alter ego of development (Burki et  al 1997; UNDP 1990; World Bank 1989a). However, by blindly 
siding with economic growth without keeping a safe critical distance from it, the idea of 
development occupied a fragile position. A criticism of economic growth implied an automatic 
questioning of development as an idea and as a theory. By putting the idea of development into 
mainstream economics, Modernisation theories sanctified a framework of subordinate relations 
between Western states and those aspiring to development, opening up the possibility  of a future 
transformation of these international relations only when the latter would mirror the success of the 
former.
The first critique of Modernisation theories was put forward in the 1960s by Dependency 
theories which slashed the belief in the idea of development as a linear progress induced by Western 
economies (for a summary of these theories see Amin 1974; Amin et al 1982; Blomstrom & Hettne 
1984; Cardoso 1972; Frank 1966, 1977; Lall 1975; Love 1980). They claimed that the future of 
poor countries was hindered by the same economic mechanism which enriched some rich countries 
of the world. One term that was born and bred out of Dependency theories was underdevelopment, 
and they used it to explain the multifaceted concept of development. Their theorists contributed 
with a new insight on the relations between the core and the periphery  of the world, which 
represented the rich and poor countries respectively. Another dichotomy used was also the one of 
metropolitan and satellite countries. This geographical and conceptual division gave Dependency 
theories the context and tools to analyse relations within countries. They stated that there was an 
unequal relation linking the core and periphery which was responsible for the simultaneous 
production of wealth in the former and poverty in the latter, or rather for the production of 
development in the core and underdevelopment in the periphery. Underdevelopment was then 
considered as a result of the economic relations with the core countries and as a condition affecting 
those satellite countries which were at the receiving ends of this economic mechanism. This term is 
distinguished from the term undeveloped which Dependencies theories applied only to a pre-
capitalist Europe. The term undeveloped simply  implied that those countries at that time lacked 
development, and not that their condition was the result of their relations with rich countries (Frank 
1966). Therefore, Dependency theorists identified only  one economic engine producing 
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simultaneous wealth and poverty but in two separate geographical zones. The condition of 
underdevelopment was portrayed as a mixture of poverty  and more generally as the absence of the 
benefits enjoyed by the people in rich countries. However, it  was not simply development on 
reverse; it meant that there was an economic mechanism producing poverty, rather than an 
embryonic economic mechanism that will produce wealth in the future. However, shortly this term 
would be de-linked from the meaning received by Dependency  theories and used throughout the 
development age for describing countries that did not present the same economic patterns and 
achievements of Western countries. As we will see, in the 2000s it will also acquire a new fame. 
The idea of development portrayed by Dependency theories was quite different from the one of 
Modernisation theories. It had lost  its positive mystical allure and it became a more material one, a 
desirable fruit  that everybody wanted but that only few could taste. Development was no longer a 
sentiment which inspired the action of goodwill politicians; it  was a condition of living, a status that 
people in some rich countries enjoyed. The age of high mass consumption described by Rostow 
could not simply  be achieved with the support of the idea of development. The idea itself was 
transformed into something negative. In fact, it was trapped in the same mechanism that produced 
simultaneous development in rich countries and underdevelopment in poor countries. Dependency 
theories constituted the first voice coming from the South which questioned the idea of 
development, and the first to point out that the transformation of rich countries had to be included 
within the one of poor countries in order to change the framework of international relations.
This inclusive approach of development continued with the World System theories (see Amin 
1985; Amin et al 1982; Wallerstein 1974). From the negative dependency expressed by Frank 
(Frank 1977), these theories proposed an interdependent world, in which states were units relating 
to each other through capitalistic relations. These theories included the concept of semi-periphery 
within the Dependency theories discourse of core and periphery. Furthermore, they  made these 
three structural zones mobile: core, periphery and semi-periphery could mutate their positions in the 
world economic hierarchy, and this was seen as ‘development’ or ‘regression’ (Wallerstein 1974). 
The idea of development portrayed by the World System theories is no longer fossilised in an 
economic system with a dual productive capacity, because the existence of the semi-periphery  and 
world interdependence meant that the idea of development could still be used to unify the world 
under its banner.
This development effort was also marked by a succession of United Nations Development 
Decades. The first  Development Decade (UN GA 1961) was inaugurated in the 1960s, and was 
based on the belief that economic growth was the magic wand for making development and 
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modernisation coming true. The second decade, 1970-1980, opened with less certainties and more 
modesty, as shown by the Basic Human Needs Approach inaugurated by the World Bank President 
Robert McNamara (McNamara 1981). This approach opened the debate on the limits of economic 
growth (Hammarskjold Foundation 1975; UNCTAD 1975; World Bank 1975) but it also reduced 
the view of the condition of development to the satisfaction of biological needs which could be 
seen, for instance, as a daily minimum calories intake or access to healthcare necessary to keep a 
person alive (ILO 1977). Despite showing that the definition of human needs was a debatable 
exercise, the Basic Needs Approach showed that the condition of poverty was so deepening and so 
widespread in the world that first of all it was necessary to be preoccupied with the fulfilment of 
these essential human needs.
In this period, the idea of development was still a condition to aspire but it also became a basic 
need to satisfy. People, thus, needed development to stay alive. The spirit of development was no 
longer materialised in a good gesture coming from generous Western countries, but it was a need 
that had to be imperatively realised in order to guarantee the survival of the poor constituting the 
majority  of the world population. The title of a World Bank series Poverty and Basic Needs (World 
Bank 1980a) summarised the development orientation of the time and closed the second 
development decade. Also for the following decades poverty made the headlines of the World Bank 
Development Report  (World Bank 1980, 1990, 2000-2001). The tone of the 1980s decade is set by 
the World Bank statement “For many  of the world’s poor, the 1980s was a ‘lost decade’ – a disaster 
indeed” (World Bank 1990:7). The 1980s have been generally defined as a lost development decade 
for Latin American and Sub-Sahara Africa (Burki et al 1997; CEPAL 1996, 2002; Ocampo 2004; 
Ordoñez Cifuentes 1994; UNDP 1996; World Bank 1985, 1990, 1997). This decade was 
characterised by a decline in per capita income; deterioration in the terms of trade due to a fall in 
the price of raw materials; high inflation and an upsurge in the external debt of Latin American and 
African countries, deteriorating even further the living conditions of the poor. Economic indicators 
and statistics showed that:
The number of poor has almost doubled in Sub-Sahara Africa over 1981-2001, from 164 million 
to 316 million living below $1 per day. The share of the world’s poor by this measure living in 
Africa has risen from 11% in 1981 to 29% in 2001 (Shaohua & Ravallion 2004:20).
By the end of the 1980s, no much was left of the ancestral optimistic feeling linked with the idea 
of development. Reports dealing with global welfare made a widespread use of phrases such as 
fight against poverty  or eradication of poverty (World Bank 1990), creating an ambiguous 
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metaphor: poverty became an enemy to kill or a disease to eliminate. Therefore, the poor were 
either “poverty-prisoners” or had the “poverty-sickness”, in both cases they  were victims, waiting to 
be saved. Confronted with the human powerlessness characterising the world’s poor, the idea of 
development put on the shoulders of rich countries the development burden. The idea of 
development was then a need that the poor could not fulfil by themselves because they  were 
victims, and had to wait for the rich world to liberate them. The response of rich countries to this 
development burden which was exacerbated by the oil crisis, the debt crisis and the international 
recession, was to increase the pressure on poor countries to continue with the implementation of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) that came under the aegis of neoliberal economic policies.
The IMF and the World Bank, following instructions by their shareholder states, turned SAP 
conditionalities into an arm wrestling with bankrupt countries which could not afford any social 
protection to their citizens (for a review of these policies see Corbo & Fischer 1991). Economic 
growth was no longer left to the biological metaphor of a “natural” take off of countries as Rostow 
used to preach; it  became an “artificial selection” requiring the full and rapid implementation of 
structural adjustment economic programs. These policies, which were part of the trickle down 
theory  of economic growth of the neoliberal doctrine, aimed at stabilising the state economy before 
adjusting it to the dictates of the market economy. They included strategies such as fiscal 
liberalisation, privatisation, de-regulation. This market deregulation did not imply  an anarchical 
absence of rules but a new type of market-oriented regulations, a sort of re-regulations (Cerny et al 
1993). The implementation of these policies by the Bretton Woods institutions requested a 
consensus by their major shareholders, lately defined as the Washington consensus. The original 
meaning of this phrase indicated a package of economic policies considered by the World Bank and 
IMF but, as his originator admitted, it acquired a more sinister meaning:
Audiences over the world seem to believe that this signifies a set of neoliberal policies that have 
been imposed on hapless countries by the Washington-based international financial institutions 
and have led them to crisis and misery. There are people who cannot utter the term without 
foaming at the mouth (Williamson 2002).
The implementation of these policies was done against a background of street protests above all 
because of the negative social consequences of the privatisation of public services (for a summary 
of protests see Danaher et al 2001). The mainstream belief was that  once economic indicators were 
under control, poverty  alleviation would come. However, the balance of this certainty was drawn at 
the end of the decade, by the World Bank and by UNDP:
39
During the 1980s many developing countries had to cope with macroeconomic crises. Their 
experience drew attention to a new concern: the need to frame adjustment policies that give due 
weight  to the needs of the poor. In many developing countries a period of painful 
macroeconomic adjustment was unavoidable. In the longer term the economic restructuring 
associated with adjustment is perfectly consistent with the two-part strategy. In the short term, 
however, many of the poor are at risk (World Bank 1990:3).
The number of Africans below the poverty line rose by two-thirds in the first half of the 1980s – 
compared with an increase of about  a fifth for the developing world as a whole. Many countries 
recorded major reverses in the 1980s – with rising rates of child malnutrition and infant 
mortality, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Budget cuts greatly squeezed 
social spending. Some countries avoided reductions in social programmes through better 
economic management, but most  countries in African and Latin America paid a heavy social 
price during the adjustment period of the 1980s (UNDP 1990:18).
How did the idea of development manage to face the 1980s? It was presented with a dilemma. It 
was no longer possible to defend the old friendship  with the discipline of economics, especially 
after the social shock of structural adjustment policies. The good faith in the capacities of rich 
Western countries to eliminate world poverty was also gone, as revealed during the street protests in 
countries which adjusted their economies responding to the Washington consensus. Thus, after three 
decades the idea of development had to find new supporting actors, a new choreography where 
contextualising its strategies, and above all convincing the audience that the script, or the 
sentimentalist spirit, had not changed since the 1950s. When the actors were ready on the stage, the 
curtain opened and the act was titled Human Development.
Defining Human Development  
The 1990s decade opened with a negative development balance sheet, as stated by the UN “The 
goals and objectives of the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations 
Development Decade were for the most part unattained” (UN GA 1990). However, there was still 
room for optimism among policy makers that not only  the condition of development could be 
attained, but that the 1990s could be a decade of accelerated development “The principal aim of the 
strategy is to ensure that the 1990s are a decade of accelerated development in the developing 
countries and strengthened international cooperation” (UN GA 1990). Even if optimism and 
perseverance were still alive and kicking, after three development decades policy makers still faced 
huge challenges: the majority of the world population lived in poverty and this deprivation was 
exacerbated in the 1980s above all in Latin America and Africa (Van Der Gaag 1991) also because 
of the implementation of structural adjustment economic programs (World Bank 1990, 2005). The 
dissensus towards their implementation started to rise not only in those countries directly affected 
by them but also internationally. The publication of the UNICEF report on Adjustment with a 
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Human Face (UNICEF 1987, 1988) analysed the social effects of structural adjustment programs in 
countries under siege by these economic policies. With a posthumous assessment, the World Bank 
also recognised the limits of its approach:
But  when structural adjustment issues came to the fore, little attention was paid to the effects on 
the poor. Macroeconomic issues seemed more pressing, and many expected that  there would be 
a rapid transition to new growth paths. As the decade continued, it  became clear that 
macroeconomic recovery and structural change were slow in coming (World Bank 1990:103).
This dissent was towards the sanctity of a model that preached economic growth and dismantled 
social services in countries where the majority  of their citizens were, as Mark Duffield would say, 
“non-insured” (Duffield 2005:145). Despite the consensus among the major shareholders of the 
Bretton Woods institutions on this economic approach to development, there were economists such 
as Amartya Sen who during the 1980s rose concerns over the limitations of economic indicators as 
a measurement for social development (Sen 1984, 1985; see also Streeten et al 1981). However, it is 
only with the publication of the Human Development Report by  UNDP in the 1990 that a new 
consensus emerged around the need to regard development as a process centred on the human 
being, namely  as human development (UNDP 1990). Before analysing this international consensus 
it is necessary to elucidate the significance and novelty of this concept. The behind the scene work 
was orchestrated by  Mahbub Ul Haq, who defined human development “not just (as) another 
addition to the development dialogue; it is an entirely new perspective” (Haq 1995:11). In the 
report, human development was defined as:
Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. ....The term human development 
here denotes both the process of widening people's choices and the level of their achieved well-
being. It also helps to distinguish clearly between two sides of human development. One is the 
formation of human capabilities, such as improved health or knowledge. The other is the use 
that people make of their acquired capabilities, for work or leisure (UNDP 1990:10).
This new perspective was more articulated and contextualised in the opening statement of the 
report:
Not only political systems but economic structures are beginning to change in countries where 
democratic forces had been long suppressed. People are beginning to take charge of their own 
destiny in these countries. Unnecessary state interventions are on the wane. These are all 
reminders of the triumph of the human spirit. In the midst of these events, we are rediscovering 
the essential truth that  people must be at  the centre of all development (UNDP 1990:III 
emphasis added).
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The novelty of this perspective due to this proclaimed humanity in development and the 
“triumph of the human spirit” in the 1990s need investigation. Despite its formal introduction in the 
development trend in the 1990, the origins of human development are traced back to studies on 
economic inequality and poverty (Desai 1991). Human development stresses that the human being 
is the fulcrum of development, but also it  emphasises the importance of human agency, human 
capital and other economic means that sustain the process of enlarging people’s choices so that a 
dignified level of life can be achieved (Anand & Sen 2000). Thus it orients the discussion about 
development towards talking about people and the possibility for them to make choices which 
enhance their well-being. This pushes for a clarification of the human development slogan 
publicised by the UNDP which says that “human development is the end - economic growth a 
means” (UNDP 1996:1).
First of all, human development does not imply a rejection of a state economic growth as a tool 
to achieve an increasing standards of living, but it points out that the development process should 
not be reduced to this and should keep at the centre of its theorising the human being (Aturupane et 
al 1994). Therefore, the gist of the human development approach is not choosing between achieving 
economic growth and human development by  other means, nor having different types of economic 
growth (Ravallion 1997). What human development preaches is the necessity to read development 
issues, tailor development strategies and assess their effects by keeping people as the ultimate goal 
of the development success (Streeten 1994). In the words of the UNDP “The Human Development 
Report series has been dedicated, since its inception in 1990, to “ending the mismeasure of human 
progress by  economic growth alone” (UNDP 1996:III). If the purpose of human development was 
to end “the mismeasure of human progress by economic growth alone” it meant that it was an 
oppositional concept which called for an investigation of the link between economic growth and its 
effects on people (Ranis 2004). This meant that human development was a critique of the 
narrowness of the neoliberal framework that focused on the marked led economic growth model of 
development.
As UNDP asserted “Economic growth is essential for human development, but to exploit fully 
the opportunities for improved well-being that  growth offers, it needs to be properly 
managed” (UNDP 1990:42). As Post-Development theorists pointed out, development was a form 
of humanity management more than economic growth management which aimed at bringing people 
into the formal economic sector and under state control (Rapley 2007), but also as a “management 
of a promise” (Nederveen Pieterse 2000:176) that so far failed. As far as human development is 
concerned, it was a weak management tool. I argue that it was a statement about how development 
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issues should be conceived but it did not show a strategy about how to achieve this comprehensive 
people-centred model of development. The concept of human development did not tackle the 
growing economic gap  between rich and poor countries by proposing new development strategies. 
It was just delivering more rights to individuals who could not even meet their basic needs as 
recognised during the 1970s. 
Therefore, the novelty that characterised the publicity of human development was not much 
about the sudden inclusion of a concern about humanity within the development discourse, but a 
statement saying that people’s life and aspirations are not circumscribed by economic indicators 
which, however, need to be “properly managed” to deliver the promise of development. While it is 
left to economic growth the task to “improved well-being”, as preached by past economic 
development theories, it  sets a higher standards of development expectations without giving a 
policy strategy. While economic theories of development revealed different economic conditions 
between people living in poor and rich countries, by focusing on the ‘humanity  in development’, the 
concept of human development used the concern with humanity  to find a safe and unquestionable 
moral position. Consequently, after forty years, the proclamation of humanity in development puts 
back all the development discourse to square one: again, the idea of development, by emphasising 
its relation with the term humanity, became unquestionable. The concept of human development 
was the expression of this incontestability.
The problem with defining the humanity within human development “is that there has been too 
little focus on what the ‘human’ in human development should actually mean” (Sagar & Najam 
1999:747). When it appeared, the concept of human development was regarded as a positive 
novelty because of its interpretation of the individual as a human being. The use of the term human 
development instead of individual development had the purpose of enlarging and equating the 
development discourse to a universal concern for those unfortunate of the world who lack 
opportunities and choices in life, as development was lately  defined (Sen 1999). This change of 
focus was not a fortuitous change of lexicon, but it implied the will to provide every individual with 
positive rights contained in the definition of human rights. By adopting the concept of human 
development, the development discourse clearly positioned itself in favour of a vision of 
development which was person-centred, universal and focused on people’s capabilities which 
means, according to Sen, “the capacity to lead the kind of life that he or she has reason to 
value” (Sen 1999:87). The universalism embedded in the concept of human development also 
overlapped with the field of human rights, as shown by the debate on the Right to Development 
(Iqbal 2010; Raj Kumar & Srivastava 2006).
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The essence of development has always been the amelioration of living conditions of people. 
However, with human development it was no longer a matter of presenting economic growth 
models which would deliver development; the focus was now on the individual, on her entitlements 
which included also those not readily marketable such as life expectancy, and political freedom. In 
fact, this concept did not imply an expansion of the to-do list for achieving the development goals. 
It emphasised that income was not the panacea, and that  other conditions needed to exist to 
guarantee the well-being of individuals.
The emphasis on humanity in the development discourse was introduced to create a consensus 
for a new set of development-international relations after the failure of the previous one based on 
concerns for the economy of the state (McNeill 2007). As affirmed by the UNDP, “The 1990s are 
shaping up  as the decade for human development, for rarely has there been such a consensus on the 
real objectives of development strategies” (UNDP 1990:61). However, six years after the 
publication of the Human Development Report, the UNDP said that “The paradigm shift in favour 
of sustainable human development is still in the making”:
The paradigm shift in favour of sustainable human development is still in the making…. The 
central message of Human Development Report  1996 is clear: there is no automatic link 
between economic growth and human development, but  when these links are forged with policy 
and determination, they can be mutually reinforcing and economic growth will effectively and 
rapidly improve human development. Government  policies are vitally important. We now know, 
for example, the limits of trickle-down economics (UNDP 1996:III emphasis added).
However, why  was this so-called paradigm shift still in the making in 1996 despite the “triumph 
of the human spirit” (UNDP 1990) in 1990? Despite the empirical effort to measure human 
development with the Human Development Index (Sagar & Najam 1998) it was noticed that “There 
is no evidence that HDR’s [Human Development Reports] have led countries to rethink their 
policies, not is there any  convincing reason to expect it  to happen” (Srinivasan 1994:241). One 
reason for changing policies might be that the objectives have changed. In the case of development 
the World Bank stated a year after the publication of the first UNDP Development Report:
The overall goal of development  is therefore to increase the economic, political, and civil rights 
of all people across gender, ethnic groups, religions, races, regions, and countries. This goal has 
not changed substantially since the early 1950s, when most of the developing world emerged 
from colonialism (World Bank 1991:31).
So, what distinguishes the consensus about new development objectives that the UNDP pointed 
out in 1990 if, as the World Bank says, the development goals have not changed since the 1950s? It 
appears that policy  makers since the 1990s created a consensus for an international relations 
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approach under the aegis of human development which could continue the same development 
crusade by using the same boat but with a new flag. The reason why in the 1990s the concept of 
human development managed to hold a central position in the development discourse, so much that 
even if it was much criticised, i.e. its Human Development Index (Sagar & Najam 1998), it  was not 
totally  rejected might be that “The idea of human development won because the world was ready 
for it” (Sen 2000:21). This readiness could be interpreted in different ways, depending on the focus 
that we give to the variables of development: a change of context after the waning of the Cold War 
which opened up the possibility  of different policy experiments; the need to respond to the negative 
consequences of the faith in the neoliberal economic growth of the Washington consensus by 
providing new responses; and perhaps the will to abandon the straightjacket of economics and its 
dismal measurement of development by embracing a sanguine faith in humanity while questing for 
alternatives in development, or to development (Munck et al 1999; Ziai 2007).
There were also critics who questioned if human development was indeed a new model or a 
“reinvention of the wheel” (Srinivasan 1994:1). Others said that “The human development approach 
assumed the leadership of a pluralist world of multiple concerns” (Sen 2000:23). This latter 
definition of human development seems to capture the essence of human development and 
identified what  made the fortune of this concept through the analysis of development concerns and 
strategies:
Any development strategy for the 1990s will combine a number of objectives: among them, 
accelerating economic growth, reducing absolute poverty and preventing further deterioration in 
the physical environment. The departure from earlier development strategies lies in clustering 
all these objectives around the central goal of enlarging human choices (UNDP 1990:61).
The link between economic growth, poverty reduction and environment concerns also led to 
talking about a sustainable human development, expanding “the concern for human development 
from the present generation to those in the future” (Anand & Sen 2000:2040; Griffin & McKinley 
1994). Moreover, from the term “sustainable development”3  the concept of human development 
drew from the sustainability broadly  defined by the Commission the aspect of “sustainability of 
human opportunities” (Haq 1995:16). The concept of sustainable development influenced the one of 
human development in two ways: it facilitated the link between human development and security, 
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3 The Brundtland Commission Report defines sustainable development as “development  that  meets the needs 
of the present without  compromising the ability of future generations to meet  their own needs. It  contains 
within it  two key concepts: the concept of ‘needs,’ in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to 
which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and 
social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs'” (WCED 1987:43).
by stressing the necessity  to guarantee resources for future generations; and it defined “the type of 
development that is securitised in human security” (Duffield in Klingebiel 2006:19). While the 
concept of human development highlighted the target of development which included political 
freedom among the enlarged basket of choices that should be made available to people, the concept 
of human security highlighted the role and responsibilities of state(s) in achieving development. 
This complementary and mutual interdependence, as well as having the human being as their shared 
focus, signed the birth of the development-security nexus.
HUMAN SECURITY 
The field of human security has received increasingly attention by  scholars and politicians since it 
officially  entered the international relations domain in 1994 with the publication of the UNDP’s 
report titled New Dimensions of Human Security (UNDP 1994). The timing of the publication, the 
publisher and the title are per se issues for discussion before analysing the significance of this 
concept and the impact that it had and still has in theoretical and policy terms. The report came out 
amid a decade of geopolitical transformation that provoked the creation of a window of opportunity 
to reexamine international relations through different lenses. One of these was human security 
(Stoett 1999). In fact, the idea of human security  (Bajpai 2003) has influenced international 
relations (MacFarlane & Foong Khong 2006) so much that it  is now regarded as a sort  of new 
diplomacy, and “a central organising principle of international relations” (Axworthy in McRae & 
Hubert 2001:10). Furthermore, human security is seen as having introduced and made available “a 
language and a rationale for raising the concerns of the majority  of humanity on the diplomatic and 
scholarly international relations agenda” (Thomas 2004:354), as we will see in chapter III when we 
analyse Security Sector Reform policies.
It was a development actor, the UNDP, that presented this new security  concept to the press, and 
this was per se an indication that the fields of development and security  were no longer confined to 
their theoretical territorial trap (Agnew 1994), and that their concerns and strategies could be 
merged. The title is also indicative that human security  was far from being a straightforward easily 
defined concept. The UNDP talked about “new dimensions of human security” and not about 
“concept and measurement of human security” just to build on the same title used for its report on 
human development four years earlier. This perhaps meant that human security, in 1994, was not 
something radically  new but that the UNDP intended to highlight the existence of other security 
dimensions apart from the military, and their interlinkages. The unpacking of the components of 
security by the UNDP report brings out sets of questions about the different meanings of security, 
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which also implies that there seems to be no “common understanding of what security is, how it  can 
be conceptualised, and what its most relevant research questions are” (Hafterndorn 1991:15).
I focus my attention on the significance of ‘human’ in human security and what this security 
approach reveals about the role of the state in the security  domain. I approach this issue through the 
“security for whom” question, because searching for the answer to this interrogation will allow me 
to contextualise human security  within diverse theories of security and reveal its novelty, nuances, 
challenges as well as what remains unchanged or unquestioned.
The Meaning of ‘Human’ in Human Security 
When analysing human security  it is important to keep in mind that “There is no single definition of 
human security today” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy  2007:9) as also summarised in the book edited by 
Chen (Chen et al 2003). This might be because security is not a neutral concept (Booth et al 
2005:21) and how security  is conceptualised and the vision of the world that it offers is bound to 
nurture debates (Collins et al 2007; Lipschutz et al 1995; Ullman 1983). As pointed out by Bain:
There is no essence of security that awaits discovery. There are rival conceptions of security, 
each of which is authentic in its own right and on its own terms, just as there are rival 
conceptions of order, justice, equality, freedom, and happiness (Bain et al 2006:4).
If we agree with the above statement that security is not a mysterious concept that awaits 
discovery, human security  is then just another one among several interpretations of security 
provided by this field of literature (Hampson et al 2002; Krause et al 1997; Lipschutz 1995). 
However, if we agree that the elaboration of human security  has disclosed a new nature of this 
concept by  stressing the importance of relating security concerns to human beings, we might create 
different security  discourses each of these embedding a different fulcrum of analysis. While this 
interpretation shows how this concept has linked diverse issues such as individual well-being, 
human rights, conflicts, development and environment with a security  string, and included them 
into the realm of security concerns, the former interpretation recognises a plurality  of security 
discourses without challenging the one of state security.
The existence of many  interpretations of human security  also implies that it can be translated 
into political practice in different ways. Rather than judging the hierarchy of security discourse, I 
find relevant to consider human security  as a concept, and not simply  a problem, that has instilled 
into the domain of international relations the need to monitor state’s security capabilities because of 
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the responsibility  of the state to create an environment where human development capabilities can 
be enjoyed (Des Gasper 2005). 
The UNDP offers a broad definition of human security that was included in its 1994 report 
published few weeks before the Rwanda genocide. The UNDP includes development concerns 
within a framework of danger, threat and security, and defines human security  as “safety from such 
chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression … and protection from sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the patters of daily  lives” (UNDP 1994:23). Considering that the spectrum of this 
definition is vast, the UNDP points out seven areas which should be monitored not to threat human 
security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community  and political security  (UNDP 
1994:24,25). Its view also recognises that there are two broad dimensions of human security: the 
freedom from want and the freedom from fear (UNDP 1994:23). These expressions were first used 
half a century ago in different historical circumstances by  the USA President Franklin Roosevelt4 
(Roosevelt 1941) and had the state as their referent object. Sixty years later, the object of these 
combined freedoms shifted from the state to the human being, and into the concept of human 
security. The link between freedom from fear, freedom from want and the individual was also 
publicised by the Millennium Report of the UN (Annan 2000) and by the Commission on Human 
Security in its report Human Security Now (CHS 2003) requested by the UN Secretary General:
Human security means protecting vital freedoms…It also means creating systems that  give 
people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. Human security connects 
different  types of freedoms - freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action 
on one's own behalf… Human security complements state security, furthers human development 
and enhances human rights. It complements state security by being people-centred and 
addressing insecurities that have not been considered as state security threats. By looking at 
“downside risks”, it  broadens the human development focus beyond “growth with equity". 
Respecting human rights is at the core of protecting human security (CHS 2003:1).
Other reports such as the Human Security Report favours a narrower definition of human 
security and focuses on the violent threats to individuals, and analyses statistics of civilian deaths in 
situation of violence and forced migrations (Human Security Centre 2005). Talking about broad and 
narrow definition of human security (King & Murray 2001-02) does not take us far in the 
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4 To quote Roosevelt  “In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded 
upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression…The second is freedom 
of every person to worship God in his own way…The third is freedom from want - which, translated into 
world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for 
its inhabitants - everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear--which, translated into world 
terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that  no 
nation will be in a position to commit an act  of physical aggression against  any neighbour - anywhere in the 
world” (Roosevelt  1941). By appropriating this wording, the human security discourse shows its debt 
towards the one of state security, and opens up the debate about its differentiation.
discussion about its definition. In fact, the gist of the matter is not to zoom in or out the lens of 
security on only one issue such as the freedom from fear, avoiding the rest. It depends on what are 
the objectives of this theorising, and in particular on what is the meaning of ‘human’ in human 
security.
When we talk about human security it should be straightforward that we imply that we are 
talking about the security of the individual, and the gist of the matter should only be which 
dimension of her individual security we are talking about, considering the vast array of life 
situations experienced by a human being. However, the ‘security for whom’ question does not lead 
to a univocal answer. First of all, if we say that human security is about the security  of people, it 
means that not only it belongs to them intrinsically, but they  also own the right to manage it. Put it 
simply, if I own a car I can drive it, sell it, insure it  against accidents, or destroy it. Is the ownership 
of security any different? If individuals own their security, they  must have the possibility to enjoy it 
(i.e. by feeling free), to marketise it (i.e. as armed personnel when not compulsory  recruited by the 
state), but also to defend it (self-defence against a robber), and to destroy it, namely committing 
suicide.
However, according to the literature on human security, by saying that human security refers to 
the security of people, it means that they  have the right  to be secure (Ramcharan 2002), but not to 
manage their security because this is delegated to the state (High Level Panel on Threats Challenges 
and Change 2004). What people can do is to manage their own (and the one of others) insecurity 
but avoiding, for instance, behaviours that could compromise it, such as driving over speed limits. 
So, it  is a matter of half ownership and half tutorage, in which the individual own the right  to feel/
be secure but not to exercise directly the management of her security by, for instance, going to 
capture criminals, as it is the mandate of the state police. This give and take between the citizen and 
the state about security  rights and duties is part  of the difficulty in answering the question of 
security for whom. Furthermore, “human security should interrogates what makes people 
insecure” (Bellamy & McDonald 2002:374; see also Thomas & Tow 2002), but the individual is not 
isolated from the actor to whom she has to devolve the management of her protection. Therefore, it 
is not possible to leave out the state when we talk about human security.
This leads to a question whether we talk about secured individuals or states securing individuals. 
However, by including the state in the human security equation, we take for granted two issues: we 
contextualise the individual within a political territory called state, and therefore we talk about 
citizens rather than ‘abstract’ human beings; we take for granted the security  institutions of the 
state; and we introduce a doubt on the functionality of this apparatus which could also be used to 
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repress rather than to protect. As Buzan said, “The security of individuals is locked into an 
unbreakable paradox in which it is partly  dependent on, and partly threatened by, the state” (Buzan 
2007:283), and he privileged focusing on the tension between different levels of security  rather than 
only on the level of the individual. However, by  taking for granted that the management of citizens’ 
security is done by the state, we end up with the absorption of the individual within the institutional 
security fabric of the state - which is what the concept of human security  fundamentally wants to 
avoid. It was indeed this security trap exemplified by repressive state regimes that also pushed for 
the emergence of human security  as a security  statement that publicises the individuality of the 
security of people against the one of state (Des Gasper 2005; Fouinat 2004). I contend that human 
security is not a radical revision of security because it does not dismiss the state but it  scrutinises 
the management of its security functions. Therefore, it is not a matter to “dislodge the state” (Booth 
& Vale 1995:293) but human security aims at analysing security interactions between various actors 
contextualised in different political spaces such as cities, rural areas, states and so on (Muller et al 
2004) in order to fulfil its quantitative and qualitative aspects: the fulfilment of basic material needs 
and the achievement of human dignity (Thomas et al 1999:3).
Thus from the ‘security for whom’ question and its certainty about its subject of analysis, we are 
now catapulted into the broader picture of the international arena where insecurity  is not simply 
embedded there but, as Constructivist theorists say, it is constructed by norms, ideas, culture, 
perceptions so much that interests, concerns and identities of world actors are interlinked 
(Huysmans 2002; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). This posits human security within the 
“vocabulary  of international relations” (Acharya 2004:355) turning this concept into a tool used to 
investigate the world but also, as Critical Security  studies tell us, into “a signifier of shared political 
and moral values” (Mack 2004:367) of which we should be aware of “the play of signifiers” (Der 
Derian et al 1989:xvi) .
In fact, since the last few centuries, mainly in Europe, the face of security  has been the state, 
which has also been the face of potential threat: states’ armies were used to attack but also to 
defend, or to deter. For instance, the Cold War, rather than a war as such, was a mark of the century, 
a military architecture used as a backbone of the international order. The perceived order or security 
of the Cold War period was also a matter of deterrence while the perceived disorder or insecurity of 
the post-Cold War was a matter of finding new security  management tools. However, the difficult 
task that  states had to face was that it was not a matter of another type of state military/nuclear 
deterrence, but  to respond to the right/need of people to live in an environment conducive to peace 
by providing them with freedom from fear and freedom from want (Thomas 2000). If we accept 
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what Dillon says that politics is about  defining danger (Dillon 1991) or that “security  is a form of 
politics” (Kolodziej 2005:22), it implies that danger is the result of a political interpretation which 
is subject to change. As Campbell said, “The source of danger has never been fixed, neither has the 
identity  that it was said to threaten” (Campbell 1998:31). This means that  there is a need to re-
imaging “human subjectivity  so that  it is disentangled from the social contract  and ‘governmental’ 
forms of power” (Burke 2007:19), and investigate what Walker called “the aporetic distance that 
modernity establishes between our ‘humanity’ and a secure identity  defined and limited by the 
state” (Walker quoted in Burke 2007:31, see also Walker 1994). This is why it is important to 
explain how human security considers the role of the state.
Human Security and the Role of the State 
If we say  that the security  discourse in the 1990s was experiencing a crisis due to the changing 
geopolitical situation and that this crisis was “linked to the crisis of the role and the nature of the 
state” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007:76), then human security is seen as a possible response. The 
‘security for whom’ question led us to see individuals as subjects of security who devolve its 
management to the state. Etymologically  speaking, being subjects (of security) means to be 
“brought under” (the security umbrella of) the state, but also be “the element about which the rest of 
the clause (security discourse) is predicated” (Online Etymology Dictionary 2001). The human 
security view puts at the fore front this latter interpretation, contesting the vision of individuals as 
passive recipients of (in)security  and the state as the referent object of analysis (Pettiford & Curley 
1999: 119). However, even if “Human insecurity is understood not as some inevitable occurrence 
but as a direct result of existing structures of power that determine who enjoys the entitlement to 
security and who does not” (Thomas et al 1999:4), what remained unchanged is the significance of 
the state we talking about security.
What is challenged is that human security rejects a narrow view of security  considered as the 
monopoly  of the militaries, and one in which threats, solutions and agents are to be found in the 
military domain only. Human security gives to individuals the thermometer indicating the arising 
and lowing level of threats to their dignity. As stated, “Poverty is conceptualised as a human 
security threat – not because it can induce violence which threatens the stability of the state, but 
because it is a threat to the dignity of individuals” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007:9). The above 
definition changed the components of security: tools of security are not weapons but freedom(s), 
agents are not soldiers but  politicians, development workers, individuals, and threats are not nuclear 
weapons but hunger and diseases. The aim is not to protect the national interest but individuals, 
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wherever they live. However, new and old components of security  are not  considered mutually 
exclusive, for instance human security  does not deprive the state of its sovereign power and military 
capacity. The paradox with this concept is that defining what it is, is as important as defining what it 
is not. This double necessity is because this concept a priori appears to be utopian, even 
revolutionary and anti-state.
The literature focusing on human security seems to privilege the reading that sees concerns 
highlighted by this concept complementing those related to state security (Biekart et  al 2005; Buur, 
et al 2007; Fouinat 2004; Klingebiel et al 2006). However, it leaves aside the analysis on how both 
these concerns are addressed, namely if it is in an environment of conflict; of compromise; of 
autonomy and reciprocate reinforcement; or if both issues fall under the umbrella of state’s 
concerns. The human security literature only  acknowledges that a) state security without people 
security is precarious and inadequate (Des Gasper 2005; Gasüer & Truong 2005); b) that there is a 
mutual reinforcement of these two concepts by stating that human security is “the ability to protect 
people as well as to safeguard states” (Heinbecker quoted in Thomas 2000:5); and that there is a 
need to defend people from the imposition of state’s security interests (Kerr 2007). However, it was 
the inclusion of concerns raised by human security in the wider framework of human rights 
underlined by the Commission on Human Security (CHS 2003), and democracy, (Thomas 2000) 
that oriented the discourses and practices of human security towards a clearer focus. In particular, 
the focus was the capacity of democratic states to guarantee the sustainability  of human 
development entitlements in a political climate characterised by the respect of human rights. This 
orientation implied a shift from individual liberties to a human rights approach to be implemented 
thanks to an internationalisation of individual concerns which are no longer the exclusive national 
domain of states. Security concerns, like development ones, became internationalised. This 
approach propelled human security  right into the foreign policy  of Western states, as development 
was, and this merging of human development-security concerns created a base for shaping foreign 
policies. However, the way  out to avoid clashing against the international legally sanctified rule of 
non-interference was to make state sovereignty conditional to the respect of human rights by  the 
state (Newman 2004).
I contend that  this made the concept of human security even more political, or politically 
manipulated, than the one of state security. In fact, it called for the reinforcement of political 
identities (citizenship rights and human rights) by national and international policy imperatives. The 
individual defined by human security is a citizen of a state demanding protection from threats, and a 
human being demanding respect of her human rights (Dodds et al 2005). Perhaps this is the 
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revolutionary  aspect of human security: giving the individual the possibility to move in and out the 
state-box in order to have her human rights guaranteed. What human security did was to de-link the 
citizen from the state when her human development entitlements are not protected. Therefore, the 
respect of human rights, as doubling the security net of citizen rights, was included in the human 
security sphere.
Human security  does not imply that state security has to be primarily inward looking, leaving 
aside international relations concerns. In fact, it accepts business as usual for international relations 
up to when the human development of citizens in a particular state is respected. Furthermore, 
human security allowed its proponents to start  a dialogue with the state that did not exist before. It 
stressed that state policies have to guarantee and secure the human development of its citizens. 
Thus, the state has never been taken out from the human security scenario. This is why it could 
more explicitly  be called a human state security. Human security implies a much closer 
investigation of the capacities of the state, asking for a balance sheet of state’s capabilities, 
achievements and failures. It is awkward that a concept that is publicised for putting the individual 
at the centre of state’s polices, ends up by  showing that a new theory of the state is necessary  (Del 
Rosso 1995). In fact, while the interpretation of security has changed throughout time, the one of 
the state has not benefited from the same theoretical elasticity. It could also mean that a new 
concept of security has clashed against the old one of the state, shaking it. This state inadequacy 
could be explained by  the fact  that citizens have gained more (human) rights and therefore the state 
has to work harder to meet its social contract with its citizens.
When analysing state capabilities, automatically different categories of states appear: there are 
states fulfilling their obligations vis-à-vis their citizens and they are simply called states, with no 
adjectives attached; those not fulfilling their duties or doing it partially are instead defined by  a 
plurality  of adjectives such as failed, quasi-state, weak, and fragile (Rotberg 2003). Whatever 
degree of incapacity  is pointed out by  these adjectives, the consequences at domestic and 
international level are worrying (Kaldor 2007). The analysis of state’s responsibilities highlighted 
by human security shows two main issues: one is the urgency of addressing state security 
management through security policies that target state security  actors while framing them within a 
people-centred vision of security; the other is the need to investigate the contextualisation of the 
human security paradigm as a product of the waning of the Cold-War, and if after two decades we 
have absorbed that change. This means that if human security was only a response to a geopolitical 
change, after the emergence in the last  two decades of new geopolitical equilibria with the rise of 
China, India, Europe, we could expect the rise of other security  paradigms able to guide policy 
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makers in dealing with the insecurity  in contemporary  international relations. One attempt of 
providing this guidance is the development-security  nexus but it  keeps the human security insight at 
the centre of its analysis. This means that not only human security remains a security paradigm for 
which there is an international consensus, but that it is necessary  to investigate the relation between 
development and security.
CONCLUSION
The chapter has analysed the changing discourses of development and security and in particular 
it has focused on the significance of the formulation of human development and human security  that 
emerged in the 1990s. The analysis shows that while both concepts share the human being as the 
referent object of their analysis, human development and human security still include within their 
discourses respectively  the importance of economic growth as a means to people development and 
the role of the state as a means to people security. Both concepts focus their attention one on 
economic and the other on state management, leaving unchanged the primacy of market led 
economic growth and state security within their respective discourses. The novelty  of these two 
paradigms is that they  constitute a statement about the preeminence of the individual which implies 
that success and failure of development and security strategies are measured according to the 
enjoyment of freedom from want and from fear of individuals. However, while both human 
development and human security are powerful policy statements, in the 1990s they were not 
translated into powerful policy  strategies. This will occur with the international consensus on the 
development-security nexus trend that is analysed in chapter III.
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III. THE EMERGENCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS
INTRODUCTION
The evolving significance of development and security has shown that there is a perpetual need 
to analyse the world we are in to better shape our existence and master our future. By the 2000s, 
development and security have both benefited from a long and complex course which accustomed 
policy makers to regard them as multifaceted concepts with manifold possibilities and usages. 
Historically, interrelations and overlaps between development and security were always recognised 
but they were mostly  seen as disparate until the 1990s when the formulation of human development 
and human security brought policymakers to acknowledge that there is a nexus and interdependence 
between development and security.
Both development and security issues have been part  of states’ domestic and foreign policy  for 
decades (Buur et al 2007; Duffield 2001; Klingebiel et al 2006; Tschirgi et  al 2010). The Marshall 
Plan, for instance, had the purpose to accelerate the reconstruction of Europe so that it could 
become a market for USA products; these economic ties would also reinforce the political closeness 
between the USA and some of the European countries, and later guarantee their participation in the 
NATO in 1949. A united Europe, whose embryo was the Treaty  of Rome in 1957, and sided with 
the NATO military forces, was a clear sign of the power and successful outcome of development 
assistance when used as a foreign policy tool. The establishment in 1961 of the USA Agency for 
International Development (USAID) was indeed the consequence of this interventionist foreign 
policy that saw development assistant used as an auxiliary  to international security concerns. The 
waning of the Cold War in the 1990s seemed to have opened the way for the de-politicisation of aid. 
However, at the beginning of the new millennium, the Bush administration officially  included 
development, together with defence and diplomacy, in the USA National Security  Strategy in 2002 
and 2006 (White House 2002, 2006) by stating “Development reinforces diplomacy and defence, 
reducing long-term threats to our national security” (White House 2006:33).
This trilogy is not a novelty  for the USA political discourse because security and development 
have been constitutive elements of their foreign policy  for decades, and the search for better 
clarifying their link is still on, as it is demonstrated by a conspicuous literature (Broad & Cavanagh 
2008; Clarke et al 2007; Collier et al 2003; Datta 2008; Dinello & Shaoguang 2009; Dodds et al 
2005; Kingsbury et al 2008; Klingebiel 2006; Krieckhaus 2006; Mavrotas et al 2009; Picciotto & 
Weaving 2006; Rapley 2007; Willis 2005). The novelty  of the current debate about the interlinkages 
between development and security is that it focuses on their “convergence in conceptual and 
practical policy terms” (Klingebiel 2006:1). Thus the current development-security nexus is a 
55
product of changing discourses and practices that see development and security concerns as 
interdependent and their policies are used to reinforce each other.
I contend that there is the need to analyse the development-security nexus that emerged in 1990s 
and 2000s facilitated by  the formulation of the concepts of human development/security which 
share some common features such as the centrality of the human being when addressing 
development and security concerns; their interdependence and mutual reinforcement in relating 
development and security issues to people, but also their need to have common strategies to 
implement these new development and security statements. Despite the development-security nexus 
public validation in policy terms by  OECD, DfID, UNDP, World Bank (Collier et al 2003; DfID 
2000; OECD 2007; UNDP 1994) the fact that both development and security are multifaceted 
concepts implies that “behind the current security-development nexus proposition, there are 
multiple layers of confusion, contradictions and policy dilemmas” (Tschirgi in Klingebiel 2006:39).
In theoretical terms this nexus means that development and security  are no longer disjointed and 
have been de-territorialised. What I contend is that with the development-security nexus vision, 
development studies have a field of applicability  which is no longer confined to distant  (from 
Western states) territories. In the past, the places where the phenomenon of underdevelopment was 
seen as happening or where development was needed were too distant from the West, and 
development and security issues were framed according to the dichotomy in vogue so far: namely 
West/developed/secure vis-à-vis the Rest/poor/unsecured and, I would add, distant too. Indeed, it 
was the distance that was felt between the West and the Rest of the world that was one of the factors 
that hampered the earlier inclusion of development concerns within the discipline of IR. The 
development-security nexus theoretical trend is an opportunity to breach this gap  and to reformulate 
the development and security problématiques with discourses and practices that encompass the 
division of the world built around patterns of power and polarisation of wealth. This opportunity 
deserves investigation.
I start  my  analysis by  focusing on the evolving significance of the relation between development 
and security  issues embedded in the concept of human security. The attention of human security 
towards securing the development entitlements of citizens, called the developmentalisation of 
security, led towards a debate on security entitlements of people, and responsibilities of states. The 
developmentalisation of security means that “a number of basic human needs have been suggested 
as being indispensable for the survival of the individual” (Buur et al 2007:10). However, human 
security does not  only mean the definition of a level of subsistence for people but also “the absence 
of severe threats to them of an economic or political kind” (Stewart 2004:262). With this view 
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security is not only a feeling, a process, an action, but also it is contextualised within a political 
space characterised by the opportunity to enjoy a dignified standard of living without threats. From 
this we can see that the state is included in this new security discourse as an agent of security for its 
citizens, a security provider more than a security  receiver. This is why I argue that the most 
important contribution of the developmentalisation of security trend to the development and 
security literature is the appropriation by the concept of human development of the language of 
urgency belonging to the field of security, while contextualising both human development and 
human security within the political space of state’s responsibility.
In the years 2000s the interpretation of the development-security  nexus has been characterised 
by another interpretation of the relation between development and security  called the securitisation 
of development. It is regarded as a response to the challenges of the international scenario which 
presents issues of economic exclusion and war as interlinked and coexisting (Picciotto 2004), in 
particular since the beginning of the new millennium when new patterns of international insecurity 
emerged such as international terrorism and internationalised civil wars. Despite no clear link 
between poverty and terrorism (Beall et al 2006:53), the vision of “underdevelopment as 
dangerous” (Duffield 2001:159) requested a new significance of the development-security nexus: 
development acquired conflict  prevention objectives and was shadowed by  security  concerns. The 
recognition of the validity of the securitisation of development trend by  policy makers happened 
despite a weak conceptual base, and they created a consensus for the implementation of policies 
such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) that address together development and security concerns 
under the assumption that there is no international peace and security without development and 
vice-versa (Sachs 2005; UN 2004, 2005a, 2005b).
While the concept of human security  provided with a conceptual base merging development and 
security concerns, creating de facto the development-security  nexus, the creation de jure of this 
nexus is exemplified by SSR policies (Fitz-Gerald in Klingebiel 2006:107). Their complex 
conceptual architecture tends to symbolise an inclusive policy discourse in which security  and 
development concerns are dealt. From a theoretical point of view, SSR policies exemplify the 
securitisation of development trend and contextualise it within a wider development discourse, the 
developmentalisation of security. This double theoretical architecture, the securitisation of 
development and the developmentalisation of security, has created a situation of nestled dolls which 
requires investigation. In this chapter I focus on the task of defining these policies through the 
academic contribution to the SSR field of study that reveals that the development-security nexus 
provides SSR with a multiplicity of definitions and objectives. SSR is regarded as a foreign policy 
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tool for donor states and a national policy tool for SSR actor states (Helly 2006; Hendrickson 2005; 
Schnabel & Ehrhart 2005) that aims at strengthening the governance of the security  sector of the 
state so that its institutions can guarantee the freedom from fear to its citizens. However, when we 
contextualise SSR within foreign and domestic policies it is necessary  to take into account that 
“Security relations are power relations and security sector reform changes power relations, among 
political actors in developing countries, and among foreign assistance bureaucracies in donor 
countries” (Brzoska 2003:48). The agreement about the need for this change and the expectations 
that it raises can be seen, for instance, by the reorientation of working methods of ministerial 
departments in the UK and the USA,5 and the creation of the SSR unit in the UNDPKO (United 
Nations Peacekeeping n.d.) that is devoted to create an appropriate operational framework for these 
policies.
The 1990s transformative decade also saw a change of theories and practices of international 
development assistance (Brzoska 2003). The analysis of the meaning of SSR includes the important 
contribution that DfID and OECD have brought  to the SSR above all through their analysis of the 
interrelation between development and security (DfID 2002; OECD 2001, 2007). The speech by the 
ex UK Secretary of State for International Development Claire Short in 1999 is regarded as the 
beginning of the SSR era (Short 1999). On the other hand, the OECD has been very vocal in putting 
SSR among the agenda of member states, pushing for the creation of an SSR climax among donor 
states while not necessarily narrowing down the field of applicability of these policies.
Considering the internationalisation of development and security issues, I would rather define 
SSR as a select set of policies aiming at transforming the security sector of states perceived to be 
conflict prone and with which donor states expect to create international security  through national 
security policies, and national development. This definition includes not only  the four issues that  I 
contend to be key in the understanding of these policies, namely: selection, transformation, 
expectations and perceptions, but also it  situates SSR policies as part of the dialogue between 
political actors in the international arena that use SSR policies to frame development and security 
international assistance (Brzoska 2003; Le Roux & Kidane 2007).
What raises expectations about SSR is their flexibility to respond to a case-by-case target 
contextualised within a selected scenario of insecurity  defined as pre or post-conflict, transition to a 
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5  In 2001 in the UK, the government  created the Conflict  Prevention Pool managed by the Foreign Office, 
Ministry of Defence and DfID, as well as the Security Sector Development Advisory Teem (SSDAT) (DfID 
2003a; Ministry of Defence UK 2009).
In 2006, in the USA, the ex Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice appointed as a Director for Foreign 
Assistance Randall Tobias who is also USAID Administrator, reporting directly to the Secretary of State (See 
Rice 2006).
democratic regime, and so on. Moreover, the fact that  these policies talk about reforming and 
transforming but not  inventing something from scratch, the objectives are perceived as attainable. 
Indeed, perception seems to be another certainty of SSR, because perception influences the 
selection of the problem and the strategies to adopt by donor and recipient countries; the evaluation 
of success about the transformation of their institutions; the design of these policies by SSR actors 
and coaches; and the availability of resources and commitment of those involved in implementing 
these policies. Moreover, perception influences the vision that international security can be created 
by the construction of national security  using SSR as a policy tool. This definition includes the 
interrelation not only between development and security, at  national at  international level, but also 
between national and international actors as we will see in the case study chapters IV, V and VI that 
address how the development-security nexus is operationalised.
THE DEVELOPMENTALISATION OF SECURITY
In the 1990s, the theoretical power of the human development discourse is shown by the 
developmentalisation of security and exemplified by the concept of human security (Buur et  al 
2007; Clarke et al 2007; Picciotto & Weaving 2006). This is identified as a theoretical shift 
compared with the management of development and security issues since the birth of development 
studies in the 1950s and the time when state security reached its zenith during the Cold War period. 
Developmentalis-ation implies the transformation of the term development into an action: -ation is a 
suffix that, when it is added to a noun, it makes it  into a noun of action, having the same meaning, 
for instance, of the verbal substantive in -ing. Developmentalisation indicates that development 
achievements must be secure and sustainable. The significance of the developmentalisation of 
security is that development and security concerns must be addressed together because security 
imperatives prepare the ground for development and/or protect development achievements. This 
concomitance and interdependence of development and security gives the impression that there is a 
circular argument in which there is no more difference between the two (Suhrke 1999:271). 
However, the UNDP pointed out that there are linkages but also differences between the two when 
it said that:
In defining security, it  is important that  human security not be equated with human 
development. There is, of course, a link between human security and human development: 
progress in one area enhances the chances of progress in the other. But  failure in one area also 
heightens the risk of failure in the other, and history is replete with examples (UNDP 1994:23). 
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The difference, as academics and policy makers pointed out, is that human development is 
regarded as ‘growth with equity’ while human security  as ‘downturn with security’ emphasising the 
need to protect people when facing adverse situations (Anand & Sen 2000; Haq 1995; CHS 2003; 
Sen 1999; United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security 2009). Despite this difference, the danger 
to see them as “co-conditionalities” seems to diminish by emphasising the nexus between the two 
rather than questioning which one comes first  (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007:116). In any case, both 
were regarded as a response to the challenges, that unfortunately  have not changed even today, that 
policy makers faced during the 1990s decade “Behind the blaring headlines of the world’s many 
conflicts and emergencies, there lies a silent crisis – a crisis of underdevelopment, of global poverty, 
of ever-mounting population pressures, of thoughtless degradation of the environment” (UNDP 
1994:ii). This composite view called for a comprehensive response where development, security, 
people, the environment, the present and the future were all intermingled.
The developmentalisation of security evolved from the emphasis on humanity that emerged in 
the development discourse in the 1990s which led to a) the creation of the concept of human 
development; b) the introduction of the concept of sustainability in development; c) and the security 
discourse embracing the humanism of development to tackle its referent object  of analysis, the 
state, by a different angle.
When Haq formulated the concept of human development, it listed four components: equity, 
sustainability, productivity  and empowerment. He meant that individuals needed to have equitable 
opportunities in life which must be sustainable also for future generations; that it is important  to 
invest on people to enhance their standards of life, but also that they have to be able to make 
choices about their life freely (Haq 1995:16). When he talked about future generations, he included 
the concern for the environment and its future, but also the necessity to have a type of growth that 
sustains the human being. This sustainability  of “human opportunities” is also reiterated by 
academics such as Duffield who says that the meaning of development embedded in the definition 
of human security is the one of sustainable development (Duffield in Klingebiel 2006:19; WCED 
1987).
However, I contend, while the concept of sustainable development looks at future generations, its 
link with human security accelerates the urgency to secure the development entitlement in the 
present tense. Even if Qingxin Wang and Curley  said, “poverty  is a security issue in IR” (Qingxin 
Wang & Curley in Thakur, et al 2004:73), it is not only a matter of linking the IR literature that 
focuses on space and territory with the one of development studies focusing on time, i.e. the stages 
of economic growth by  Rostow, or the development vocabulary that talks about backward and 
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modern states (Pasha 1996:640-1). I argue that human security is also about time and not only about 
space. It implies the need to defend the dignity of the human being in whatever territorial state she 
lives, but also the urgency that sees the intervention (in various forms) to tackle her insecurity now, 
at the present moment. Security  shares with poverty a concern about  time, or better about the 
urgency to save lives in order to close the gap  between life expectancies of people living in different 
parts of the world. This is why the UNDP said that:
human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, 
an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident  who was not silenced. Human 
security is not a concern with weapons-it is a concern with human life and dignity (UNDP 
1994:22).
When the UNDP talked about the strategy to tackle this urgency it proposed an international 
relations model that required “mutual interests, not charity; cooperation, not confrontation; 
equitable sharing of market opportunities, nor protectionism; far sighted internationalism, not 
stubborn nationalism” (UNDP 1994:4). This statement highlights the ambition to have an 
international scenario which legitimises neoliberal economic policies by emphasising the validity of 
a free market economy worldwide. This quote shows the centrality that the developmentalisation of 
security interpretation gives to the market and to the state that supports these economic views 
(Dodds et al 2005). This consensus on the international neoliberalism for responding to 
development and security concerns centred on people could explain why the concept of human 
development was not subjected to diverse interpretations and critiques as for instance the one of 
human security.
Human development was based on enhancing people’s capabilities, freedom of choice, and it 
was contextualised in a political environment that  supposed a democratic framework (UNDP 
1990:16) and an economic one characterised by an “opening of market system” this to achieve 
equitable growth (UNDP 1990:62). The formulation of human development does not propose a 
different role of the market and of the state in the economy that differs from the existent neoliberal 
models for which there was already a consensus above all among Western states. The concept of 
human security, in this respect, was much more contested because even if it paid lip service to the 
neoliberal economic model, it  scrutinised the role of the state not as an economic actor but as a 
political actor in its domestic domain. However, the developmentalisation of security does not 
represent such a radical change as it claims to be even if it introduced some novelties.
First, its study on the security governance capacity of the state called for the need to open up  the 
state military box and see how it affects citizens. Second, it amplified the discourse of human 
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development and related it to the one of human rights and democracy, as the UNDP did when it 
looked “at human rights as an intrinsic part of development – and at development as a means to 
realizing human rights” (UNDP 2000:I), and when it affirmed that “Democracy is the only form of 
political regime compatible with respecting all five categories of rights—economic, social, political, 
civil and cultural (UNDP 2000:56). I argue that the developmentalisation of security  did not make 
such as a radical change because the degree of urgency of solving the development question created 
a consensus about the need to tackle development and security issues together, but policy makers 
did not translate the concern for securing the development achievements of people into a political 
strategy used by states for shaping their national and international relations.
The developmentalisation of security  trend was a statement, although powerful, about the 
urgency of addressing development. This urgency does not mean that it made the development-
security nexus trend theoretically more robust: human development expanded the definition of 
development by framing it within a democratic and market oriented state which should also 
guarantee the freedom from fear of its citizens. The nexus between these two discourses appears to 
be the state rather than a direct  link between development and security. This implied a business as 
usual for policy makers which could continue to use their development and assistance schemes 
because so far these were not  contested. It will be at the beginning of the new millennium when 
state security faces new threats that the development-security  nexus will receive a new 
interpretation. The urgency of answering the international security question led policy makers to 
privilege an interpretation of the nexus called the securitisation of development. This created a 
proliferation of policy literature despite a more cautious academic view on this subject (Duffield 
2001) which focused on the side effects that the re-appropriation of this urgency by the security 
concerns might have on the urgency to answer to the development question.
THE SECURITISATION OF DEVELOPMENT
The interpretation of the development-security nexus through the lens of the 
developmentalisation of security responded to a state of the world where the majority of its 
population lived in poverty, as they still continue now. It set the targets – measured by the Human 
Development Index (HDI) – of development achievements to be securitised, and it designated the 
state as the agent responsible to guarantee the human development of citizens. While it clarified 
why development and security had to be addressed together, it  left unclear where and how to 
intervene, above all considering the widespread dire living conditions of the world population. This 
was solved by  an interpretation of the development-security nexus that provided the answer not 
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only to those questions but also to those that emerged in the 2000s, following new international 
threats which this time were felt  by  the “secure” developed world rather than by the “insecure” 
Third world (Beall et  al 2006; Buur et al 2007; Nef 1999). This new theoretical interpretation is 
called the securitisation of development (Buzan et al 1998; Duffield 2001, 2007; Lipschutz 1995), 
and proposes the usage of development as a security strategy preventing conflicts.
By talking about securitisation6 instead of security, we mainly refer to security as an action, as a 
speech of act, as something that  we create by  calling it a security  issue (Buzan et al 1998). If the 
meaning of security  that  is included in the development-security merge is the one of an action, it 
may  also mean that security  is regarded as a process rather than a product (Doty in Chafetz et al 
1999). However, it also implies that development has been affected by this new conceptualisation 
whose constitutive elements are urgency, threat, fear. In fact, the development-security  nexus trend 
reiterates the mutual dependence between development and security, as the UNDP affirmed 
“Without peace, there may be no development. But without development, peace is threatened”; 
however it is also based on the assumption that security “lies in development, not in arms” (UNDP 
1994:iii,1). This implies that fulfilling development achievements is seen as a preventive action to 
attain human security; and security  is essential to sustain development and peace. This creates the 
so called conflict-trap (Collier et al 2003).
The analysis of the capacity of the state to guarantee the development entitlements of its citizens, 
through the eyes of human security, found that development efforts were hampered by what was 
defined by  the UNDP as an evolving “geographical pattern of conflict” in which poverty is read as 
the catalyst for war:
The geographical pattern of conflict  has changed over time, with a clear shift  in security risks 
towards the poorest  countries. During 1946-1989 low income developing countries accounted 
for just over one-third of all conflicts. Over 1990-2003 low income countries accounted for 
more than half of the countries and territories that  experienced violent conflict. Nearly 40% of 
the world’s conflicts are in Africa… (UNDP 2005:154).
This geography of conflict sees 22 out of 32 countries at the bottom of the HDI having 
experienced a conflict since 1990s (UNDP 2005), even if there has been a slight overall reduction in 
the number of conflicts in the last  ten years (SIPRI 2009). The exercise of overlapping the mapping 
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6  When talking about the securitisation of development  I do not include in its analysis the militarisation of 
humanitarian action (Duffield 2001; Hoffman & Weiss 2006) because I draw a difference between 
humanitarian assistance and development assistance. While development and humanitarian assistance 
overlap in the realm of “classic” development  activities (health, food, education, shelter), humanitarian 
assistance and related issues such as armed escort for humanitarians do not belong to the security apparatus 
reinforcement realm which is how the development-security nexus is mainly interpreted nowadays.
of wars and poverty  is not per se a novelty, considering for instance the poverty level and 
destruction in Europe at the end of World War II. That wars cause poverty  was then an easy 
statement to prove with post-conflict statistics on levels of wellbeing; the reverse was more 
controversial. The gist here is not to express causality between poverty  and war as with the relation 
between development and security. The securitisation trend affirms that development should be 
included within a larger security assistance effort to prevent, or deal with, a situation of conflict on 
a case by case basis.
Since the 2000s, not only the geographical spectrum of development assistance has evolved but 
also the terminology linked to a geopolitical division of the world. This is shown by  the almost 
disappearance of the term Third World from policy papers addressing the challenges linked to the 
fulfilment of human development and human security. This is because the usage of a big apparatus 
for representation and self-identification as was the case with the term Third World is at odds with 
human security  and development concerns which focused primarily on people within states rather 
than states themselves. If security is what we define as such, it means that  there is the possibility to 
securitise diverse issues such as the environment, migration and so (Lipschutz 1995). Thus 
securitisation reveals the “politics of security” (Patomaki 2008:17) linked to the freedom to choose 
what is and is not a security issue.
An example is that post Cold-War states no longer needed to accept the “geographical Third 
World” and other blocs of states as fixed domains of insecurity, but were able to identify threats to 
their national security by directing their foreign policies on selected war/trouble spots. The danger 
with this selection is that “securitisation can thus be seen as an extreme version of 
politicisation” (Buzan et al 1998:4). War spots were not  only located in the Third World: in every 
continent, Europe included, there have been conflicts in recent times. However, conflicts in the 
Balkans and in the Caucasus region, for instance, were considered to be linked to a disappearing 
Deuxième Monde, (Hovhannisyan 2004; Woodward 1995), while other situations of violence such 
as in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country  were managed as domestic law issues. The 
geographical selection of war spots was done together with an analysis of poverty, or rather of this 
new type of poverty  imbued with conflict capabilities which required a combined development-
security response.
In the 2000s, policy papers related to poverty used this term together with the one of 
underdevelopment (DfID 2005; ECHO 2006; Raddatz 2005; Rajan & Zingales 2000; UN GA 2001; 
UNHCHR 2001) giving to the latter a new fame, but this new publicity did not present it  with its 
radical meaning. Policy  makers started using this term as a synonymous of poverty and they took 
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for granted that Dependency theories lost  their validity  in theorising issues of development in the 
contemporary  period, considering that the world division into core and periphery  no longer 
corresponded to the new interdependence and neoliberal scenario. Therefore, they thought that the 
term underdevelopment as well had hollowed its meaning, and that they could appropriate it for 
describing a mechanism of war production rather than a result of a wealth mechanism production 
characterized by  unequal relations between the world core and periphery. However, it has not been 
demonstrated that wealth production does not produce war, nor that underdevelopment is an 
economic or social mechanism producing war. Currently this term is simply used by policy makers 
as an attribute that adds a tone of tragedy to the description of poverty.
The shift from the developmentalisation of security to the securitisation of development is not 
simply  a matter of reversing the relation between these concepts, from security to be 
developmentalised to development to be securitised. It  is a matter of interpreting a different usage 
of development and security  issues in international relations. Through the securitisation of 
development trend, the development discourse is included within the one of security. This can be 
seen as a response to an international security  question as it is shown by the foreign policy selection 
of aid by states such as the USA and UK which, for instance, increased considerably their aid to 
Pakistan after the military  invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 (Aljazeera 2009; Clarke et al 2007). 
However, the securitisation of development has a weak interpretation of the link between 
development and security, how these issues relate to war, but also the limits of the policy arena of 
this nexus are not clearly spelled out, “creating tremendous conceptual as well as policy 
confusion” (Tschirgi in Klingebiel 2006:43).
In fact, the presence of war does not  per se guarantee a foreign response under the aegis of the 
development-security nexus. For instance, conflicts such as the one in Somalia, Colombia, Sudan, 
Philippines don’t benefit  from as much attention by Western states as other conflicts included in the 
Western security equation such as Afghanistan. So, even if the securitisation of development 
includes development issues within Western foreign concerns, it is underpinned by a Western 
interpretation of events from which the West benefits (Chomsky 2006). However, the securitisation 
of development has opened up and legitimised new opportunities for intervention in the 
international arena through a changing attitude towards the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention conditioned by the fulfilment of human development/security/rights. Thus, the 
combined rationales of the developmentalisation of security  and the centrality of the state in 
guaranteeing human security/development rights with the securitisation of development and its 
emphasis on the usage of development as conflict prevention, sanctified the development-security 
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nexus as the conceptual backstage of policies addressing development and security concerns. One 
example of a policy response that deals with national security  through a comprehensive human 
development and security approach is Security Sector Reform policies.
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM POLICIES 
The changing nature of development and security as well as their evolving interrelations could 
only have resulted into transformative policy responses. One of this came under the banner of 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) policies (OECD 2007). These policies are defined as “the 
development-security nexus policies” (interview with Dylan Hendrickson from the Conflict, 
Security and Development Group, 15 April 2010) and are included, as Ann M. Fitz-Gerald said, 
within the “‘joined-up’ thinking on security  and development” (Fitz-Gerald in Klingebiel 
2006:107). Together with SSR there are other policies which are regarded as addressing 
development and security concerns such as justice programs, policies addressing institutional 
change and accountability  (interview with Robin Luckham Institute of Development Studies 
14.05.10), and DDR, peace building, conflict mediation (interview with Rory Keane, Team Leader 
of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility at OECD, 7 June 2010).
Since the 1990s, when searching for responses to the national and international security and 
development questions various intergovernmental organisations and individual donor states started 
endorsing that there is a link between development and security (CHS 2003; Commission of the 
European Community 2003; DfID 1997, 2009; NATO 2003; OECD 2001, 2004; UN 2005b). As we 
have seen, this link was contextualised in different ways: the developmentalisation of security 
pointed out that the changing significance of development and security  led to the formulation of 
human development and human security which centred both their concerns on the human being and 
in particular on the linkages between her “freedom from want and from fear”. The securitisation of 
development focused more on the “freedom from fear” and thus gave a conceptual orientation to 
policy maker to work on the security sector of those states prone to or emerging from conflicts.
By defining SSR as one of the policy approaches that addresses the development-security nexus, 
(OECD 2007) it means on one hand opening up  these policies to many interpretations on what 
development and security mean, what political actors, processes and structures - national and 
international - can contribute to them. Moreover, it is an attempt to overcome the gap between the 
need of people to experience development and security  and the elusive nature of these processes. 
On the other hand, the development-security nexus propels SSR into the agendas of political 
stakeholders as the most comprehensive policy tool for which there is an international consensus. 
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From the statements “Without peace, there may be no development. But without development, 
peace is threatened (UNDP 1994:iii) to “lack of SSR was one of the root causes of conflicts or their 
recurrence”, by Jan Kubiš, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic talking about the role 
of the UN in SSR (UNOG 2008), SSR have been recognised as a viable policy tool addressing 
development and security  concerns. Indeed, various political actors use SSR to achieve broad 
targets such as regional security  (EU), development (DfID, OECD), national security and post-
conflict reconstruction (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004), international civil-military relations 
more attuned to democracy (NATO).
This consensus is “not so much about what  SSR is, but about the need to initiate the process of 
SSR” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010), this 
because of the normative weight of SSR. In fact, a norm is defined as a “standard of appropriate 
behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Fluri & Cole in Dokos 2007:145). The normative 
character of SSR is reflected in their contextualisation within the scope of promotion of democracy 
and human rights, good governance, accountability, democratic governance of the security  sector 
(Edmunds 2007; Hanggi in Bryden et al 2004; Kinsey 2006). According to Fluri and Cole, this 
means that those “who deplore the absence of a clear definition of SSR and clear norms for its 
implementation fail to acknowledge its nature” (Fluri & Cole in Dokos 2007:165). This because “If 
SSR is a transfer of norms, then it is not to be mistaken for a rigid system of rules aimed at 
homogenising a nation’s values in order to better integrate and control it” (Fluri & Cole in Dokos 
2007:165). Thus, according to them, SSR is a norm to which states are invited to subscribe, and it is 
the acceptance of the norm what counts “how they are going to meet the requirements of the norm 
is left to themselves, as long as they  stay within the statistical field of good practice” (Fluri & Cole 
in Dokos 2007:165). 
This view of SSR as one of the norms that regulate state governance management, blurs the 
definitional boundaries of SSR. Moreover, if SSR are seen as a policy tool that orients states 
towards the acceptance of a set of international norms it implies that, according to Nicole Ball “the 
term SSR is not helpful anymore, as an organising concept it might be useful, but in policy  terms it 
is devoid of meaning because it has become whatever you want it  to be” (interview with Nicole Ball 
from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010).
From various definitions of SSR that will be presented in this chapter, the general trend is that 
SSR are regarded, for instance by OECD, as a means to achieve long-term objectives such as 
development, security, democracy, peace. When we look at their practices, however, SSR policies 
have broken down the fulfilment of these ultimate targets in a series of narrower ones such as the 
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reform of the army and police forces; judicial and prison system reforms; IHL training of the armed 
forces; promote civilian management and accountability of security  forces, and so on (Ball 1998; 
Ferguson & Isima 2004). I argue that the conversion from an ideal multi-pronged policies to a 
narrow sector-based approach is not simply due to ‘pragmatism’ as if this is the only way in which 
SSR can be made practical. I see it as a flaw in the development-security nexus itself because SSR, 
despite lofty  proclamations of addressing both concerns, have never been anything more than a 
renewal of state security.
By having multiple narrow and broad objectives it implies that each of them can be attributed to 
a particular SSR actor, SSR policy space, SSR financial contribution and SSR agenda. Like the 
idiom “all roads lead to Rome”, those roads that  so called responsible states (United Nations High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes 2004:2) should use or endorse all converge to 
SSR. While the narrow targets illustrate the most immediate response that these policies aim at 
delivering, their conceptual source as well as the leitmotif and the ultimate goal of these policies is 
the development-security  nexus (OECD 2007) which is, as we have seen, characterised by the same 
elusive nature of development and security and their interrelations. Consequently, as there is no 
one-fit-all definition of SSR there is not one way of doing SSR, or a unique way of assessing this 
process, its end, success and failure. This means that exploring the multifaceted nature of SSR 
requires taking into account that there are different  perspectives that look at  this set of policies 
which is increasingly framing international security and development relations within and between 
states.
There is not a unique “Big Bang theory” that explains the origin of SSR policies. When facing 
with the task to explain why we talk about SSR, each academic, consultant, practitioner working on 
SSR cites a series of historical events, posterior interpretations, or backs up  current reading of world 
poverty  and insecurity with policy  reports and quotes dating back a decade ago, showing that 
despite the current novelty  of discourses and practices around the development-security nexus the 
view of the OECD that “SSR is a relabelling, a more effective repackaging that leaves the 
governance at the centre stage” (interview with Rory Keane, Team Leader of the International 
Network on Conflict and Fragility  at OECD, 7 June 2010) should not be dismissed. A sample of the 
anthology of SSR voices illustrating diverse perspectives on these policies is listed below:
There are lots of origins [of SSR], but  the core lies in an evolution from study of civil-military 
relations (Jackson 2008). 
The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy stated that the goal of U.S. statecraft is ‘to help create 
a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and 
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conduct  themselves responsibly in the international system.’ SSR can help achieve that 
objective, reinforce U.S. diplomatic, development, and defense priorities, and reduce long-term 
threats to U.S. security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies beyond our 
borders (USAID & DoD & Department of State 2009:2).
An unreformed security sector may cause, or may not be able to prevent, a relapse into violent 
conflict. Without  reforms in the security sector, public expenditures may be diverted away from 
reconstruction efforts, leaving the way open for corruption and further delegitimization of the 
state. These new challenges have stimulated a variety of development actors to pay more 
attention to issues related to security and the reform of the security sector (World Bank 
1999:12).
The development rationale for security sector reform, and for engagement  with the conflict  and 
security agenda more broadly, is clear and compelling....Why security sector reform matters for 
development: first  and foremost, security is a priority concern of the poor themselves. ... An 
accountable, appropriately structured and trained security sector can help to provide a safe and 
secure environment for poor people and communities...Second, the world’s poorest countries 
will not  make progress in development unless we do get better at  conflict  prevention, conflict 
resolution and peace-building... Third, bloated security sectors constitute a serious barrier to the 
type of economic reforms necessary to reduce poverty (Short quoted in DfID 2000a:24).
The nature of the issues raised by these quotes is complex. To analyse them Brzoska, for 
instance, identifies four dimensions of SSR such as the political, economic, social and institutional 
(Brzoska in Wulf 2000) in which he includes respectively issues related to the civil control of 
security institutions; their appropriate allocation of resources; citizens security; and the 
professionalisation of security  sector’s actors. Another attempt to organise a reflection on this issue 
has been done by Hanggi who points out three SSR contexts such as development, post-
authoritarian and post-conflict context (Bryden et al 2004:11). The perspective taken in this thesis is 
the development-security nexus and how this is theorised and implemented through SSR. It has to 
be pointed out that the analysis of the Civil-Military Relation (CMR) literature and the way SSR 
have been framed by the development and security literature greatly contributed to addressing the 
research question. In fact, the insight from these bodies of literature that try to “make sense of SSR” 
has been used to approach the case study chapters on Armenia, Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau.
Defining SSR
The initial challenge with SSR policies consists in defining them because of the multifaceted 
relation between development and security. Understanding these policies by looking just at  their 
name reveals that they deal with security concerns, and in particular with a ‘sector’, which implies a 
distinctive and separate domain of competence. Therefore, a narrow definition of SSR could be a 
set of policy aiming at reforming the branch of the state dealing with security issues, and this has 
been done in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia, 
Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Timor Leste, and so on (for a list of UK funded SSR see GFN SSR 2007). 
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The vision of security that is embedded within SSR found an echo in the definition of national 
security given by Truman more than sixty years ago:
National security does not consist only of an army, a navy, and an air force. It  rests on a much 
broader basis. It depends on a sound economy of prices and wages, on prosperous agriculture, 
on satisfied and productive workers, on a competitive private enterprise free from monopolistic 
repression, on continued industrial harmony and production, on civil liberties and human 
freedoms-on all the forces which create in our men and women a strong moral fiber and 
spiritual stamina (Truman 1947). 
Despite this similarity with a larger view of security promoted nowadays (Fitz-Gerald & Lala 
2003), the approach of SSR has come a long way  from the 1950s interpretation of development and 
security issues. In those days they were indeed part of the wider picture of national security, 
together with democracy, the market economy and civil liberties, but they kept independent 
conceptual basis. On the contrary, SSR policies regard security  “as an explicit development 
objective” (Damian quoted in Chanaa 2002:27). These policies recognise that security needs 
development and vice versa, and their strategies must be integrated (Lilly  et al 2002): with SSR the 
merge of development with security is no longer an option but an imperative, following the novelty 
of the current development-security nexus view that regards them mutually interdependent.
 SSR are broadly considered as “good to structure our thinking about development and security, 
but weak as a policy response” (interview with Dylan Hendrickson from the Conflict, Security  and 
Development Group, 15 April 2010). Considering the various conceptualisations of development, 
security and their interrelations, if SSR can structure how we approach development and security 
problems and how we respond to them, it is a welcoming step. One definition of SSR is that it is a 
“conceptual umbrella, recognising that security issues cannot not be excluded from development 
strategies” (Lilly et al 2002:1). What is new here is not these concerns gathered under this 
conceptual umbrella such as good governance, public sector reform, but the fact that they are 
grouped together, that more attention is paid to their interlinkages, and that they are seen through 
the development lens (Brzoska 2003; Hills 2000; Kinsey 2006; Smith 2001). This development lens 
embedded in the development-security  nexus means that the emergence of SSR is indeed the 
recognition that the realm of security cannot be seen narrowly but it has to include how state 
institutions affect the individual and her enjoyment of development (Born et al 2002).
This implies that the definition of these policies has to take into account the broad meaning of 
development and security. However, a broad view of SSR casts some doubts about the feasibility of 
their implementation. As Nicole Ball said, “At the conceptual rhetoric level, SSR has become big, 
but in terms of actually doing anything positively  on the ground SSR policies are small” (interview 
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with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010). However, the question 
here is whether any policy ever lives up to its rhetoric and if this is the correct benchmark for 
judging SSR policies. This is why  “It would be preferable to talk about the objectives of SSR, what 
these policies do rather than what they are. However, there is no clarity  on the objectives, this is 
why there are different definitions of SSR” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for 
International Policy, 21 April 2010).
When analysing some of the objective of SSR, it  seems obvious that they  aim at reforming the 
security sector of a state, as the title of these policies indicates. However, the definition of security 
sector, the spectrum of this reform and how it is contextualised within state governance, its 
objective(s), and above all if it  is the adequate response to the selected problem, are some of the 
questions addressed by scholars, as we can see by the following sample of academic contributions 
to the SSR debate:
The two major objectives of SSR are to establish good governance in the security sector and to 
enhance a country’s capacity to develop systems of economic and political governance that 
benefit society as a whole and foster the creation of a safe and secure environment  at the 
international, regional, national, and local levels (Ball 1998:20).
SSR promises to assist  the process of building democratic peace by fostering armed forces that 
reflect and promote liberal democratic values (Bellamy 2003:107).
SSR is about  the transformation of security institutions so that  they can play an effective, 
legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for 
their citizens. SSR has been conceptualised as a constituent part of good governance, 
democratisation (Lilly et al 2002:4).
SSR aimed at  establishing the efficient  and effective provision of state and human security 
within the framework of democratic governance (Hanggi in Bryden & Hanggi 2004:3).
SSR focuses on the challenges states face in using the instruments of force in a manner that is 
consistent with democratic norms and supportive of human development goals (Hendrickson 
2005:6).
The security-development  nexus has been perceived predominantly in terms of establishing , or 
re-establishing, public monopoly of security (Abrahamsen & Williams 2006:3).
Security sector reform can be understood as an attempt to connect, in one concept, the 
opportunities of expanding development  assistance into security-related fields and the 
challenges of new demands on development donors, and to provide both with a common vision 
(Brzoska 2003:4).
The overall aim of SSR is the transformation of security institutions so that  they play an 
effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal 
security for their citizens (Groenewald et al 2002:1).
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The majority of the above mentioned quotes centres the objective of SSR on the ability of the 
state to exercise good and democratic governance of its security  sector to achieve national and 
international security. First of all, it is necessary  to clarify  what the security sector of a state is. 
There is a general agreement among academics, but also among policy  makers such as DfID, 
OECD, EU (Commission of the European Community 2006; DfID 2000a; OECD 2004a), that it  is 
constituted by the following sub-sectors and bodies:
“- defence and intelligence bodies: armed forces, intelligence services, coast guards;
- public security bodies: police, judiciary, correctional services;
- security-sector management and oversight bodies: such as ministries of defence, internal affairs;
- non-core security institutions: customs;
- non statutory security force bodies: private security companies, political party militias;7
- civil society: NGO, religious organisations, advocacy and research organisations” (Ball et al 
2003:265, 2001:47; Bellamy 2003:11; Chanaa 2002; Greene quoted in Born et al 2004:19; Lilly et 
al 2002).
By linking the objectives of SSR with their spectrum of action, namely the security sector, one of 
the main challenges lies with the key word ‘democratic’ that appeared many times in the quotes 
listed above. This because we find ourselves in a catch-22 situation. Namely, do SSR create a 
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7 Research is needed to analyse the role of non-state actors in the security sector of a state and in particular of 
Private Military Companies (PMCs) (DfID 2002; OECD 2007). It  has to be noticed that  SSR literature 
distinguishes between PMCs and Private Security Companies (PSC)s. This distinction is a commercial label 
and not based on a legal definition, thus each company, state, scholar has a choice about which name to use, 
until a more appropriate set of definitions is formulated.
The OECD says that the definition of security sector, which also includes these companies, “has become 
established internationally” (OECD 2007:5), which means that nowadays the inclusion of PMCs within the 
security sector of a state is official. In this regard, SSR literature says that “Non-state actors are playing an 
increasingly important role both in assisting security sector reform, generally as part of an effort  supported 
by a bilateral or multilateral actor” (DfID 2000a:4).
Despite their official and increasing role within state security, this topic is still under-researched. A sample of 
the need to have a further investigation on this issue is the analysis by Bryden and Hänggi of the contexts of 
SSR. In post-conflict settings they include PMCs together with other “key external actors” such as 
multinational peace troops (mostly UN-led); Western donor countries, and so on (Bryden & Hänggi 
2005:30). PMCs are also included in transitional countries context  together with EU, NATO, OSCE, 
governments, etc. (Valasek 2008:18). However, these scholars do not  include PMCs as part  of developing 
countries and developed countries settings.
Thus, if PMCs are external actors in post-conflict and transitional contexts, it means that they are housed in 
stable countries which include them as part of the SSR support operations in countries having a security 
deficit due to conflict or instability. Therefore, the absence of PMCs under the ‘developed countries’ context 
raises the question about the “home” of PMCs.
Furthermore, when the link between these companies and SSR is analysed, for instance in the OECD 
handbook on SSR, these companies are seen as a subject of reform rather than as partners in these reforms 
(OECD 2007). This sample of research on PMCs involvement in SSR indicates the need to extend the 
analysis on the role of PMCs as subjects and partners of SSR in contracting states and states where they 
operate. This to clarify their influence within the security sector of their home state, and their contribution to 
the reform of the security sector in states where they provide their services.
democratic environment or do they need it in order to reform the security sector? Also here, there 
are opposite views: some says that “Solving the security problem is perceived to be a prerequisite 
for development and democratization” (Brzoska & Law 2006:4), while others say  that “The 
political context that the SSR agenda envisages requires a democratically elected government with 
the ability  to exercise control and oversight of the security sector (Chanaa 2002:29). In the 
following chapters I will address the question about the environment that SSR require or the 
environment that SSR policies aim at creating through three case studies of countries that have 
engaged in different terms with SSR, despite having different political scenarios and each of them 
aiming at changing it according to the need/will of the state.
Another set of words that appears in the definitions about SSR objectives relates to citizens and 
their security, human security and human development. This shows the will to unpack the concept 
of security  following the analytical path initiated by the concept of human security and the need to 
make sure that while SSR focus on the state ability to govern its security actors, the result of this 
governance will be made visible by the degree of human security  and human development enjoyed 
by the people. As far as governance is concerned, it is interesting to analyse the policy literature of 
SSR by DfID and OECD, both big promoters of these policies, and in particular how they address 
the governance of the security sector following the centrality that good governance acquired in the 
development discourse since the 1990s when it was promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions 
(Stoker & Chhotray 2009).
One issue that needs clarity is why only one of the above definitions, the one by Hendrickson, 
mentions human development as one of the objectives of SSR. If SSR are conceptualised within the 
development-security nexus which is, in turn, the expression of the merge between development 
and security facilitated by the sharing of a people-centred approach, it should be obvious that SSR 
have as their main concern people’s development. If development, and in particular its 
interpretation as human development, does not have a prominent position within SSR objectives, 
this puts into question what type of development is promoted by  development donors. This is why 
the search for defining SSR also includes the view of DfID and OECD to understand how they 
interpret the weight and role of development in SSR.
While the academic contribution to SSR reveals that the development-security nexus which 
underpins the elaboration of these policies is multifaceted and allows for many interpretations, it 
has to be considered that the “links between security and development policies is the centrality  of 
politics – both for problem identification and policy response” (Tschirgi in Klingebiel 2006:61). In 
this regards, the conceptual background of the development-security  nexus and the multiplicity  of 
73
its interpretations mean that it  can only  be the source of an adjustable policy product that policy 
makers can adopt and adapt according to national and international political decisions.
One important aspect to be taken into account with SSR is that despite the current proliferation 
of SSR experts (DPKO 2010) and institutional expertise publicised by donor states, 
intergovernmental organisations and NGOs, SSR policies represent a political process which is 
directed to change the political organisation, structure, orientation of a state (Brzoska 2003:48). 
Considering the “importance of local ownership in SSR so much that their future is regarded as 
depending on it” (interview with Rory Keane, Team Leader of the International Network on 
Conflict and Fragility at  OECD, 7 June 2010), the only actor that can say to be doing SSR is the 
state where the SSR process takes place. All the external actors intervening in “its SSR” as donors’ 
states, advisers and so on can only  fund and/or accompany the process as SSR-coaches, but cannot 
say “to be doing” SSR. This raises the issues of the ownership of SSR, or better of the ownership of 
development and security. While the concepts of human development and human security centred 
this ownership on the human being and delegated its promotion and protection to the state, we will 
investigate in the case study chapters if the ownership question about SSR highlights that 
development and security are just a framework for donor SSR-coach states, a political mantra for 
the SSR-actor state, or an illusion for its people. 
Indeed, considering the interpretation of the development-security nexus as the 
developmentalisation of security and the securitisation of development, one could see that both 
development and security are recognised as means and ends, but each SSR stakeholder chooses the 
most appropriate one within the multiple-choice of strategies and objectives of SSR. This allows for 
a flexibility  that can take into account the needs and demands of a specific context. However, we 
might also face the “SSR-lottery” which will add more uncertainties to this policy tool because 
policy makers, and above all beneficiaries, will no longer know what to expect when the term 
security sector reform is pronounced.
The validation of SSR as a policy tool addressing development and security was also recognised 
in 2005 when the OECD countries agreed to make SSR activities eligible for Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) (OECD 2005a) this due to the fact that “donors’ support for SSR over the last 5 
years have increased substantially” (interview with Rory Keane, Team Leader of the International 
Network on Conflict and Fragility  at OECD, 7 June 2010). If this extension of development 
cooperation to include SSR should not be a surprise, after all SSR are presented as fulfilling the 
development-security nexus, when the European Commission mentioned this extension it  regarded 
it as an extension of ODA funds “to the area of security”  activities (Commission of the European 
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Community 2006:6). This perception of SSR as a set of security policies that  should be financed by 
development funds (Bellamy 2003) will be analysed in particular in the Guinea-Bissau case study. 
The problem is not lack of proportionality between development and security funds used to finance 
SSR, as these concerned are merged according to the development-security nexus which 
conceptually sustains SSR. The question is about the significance of development in SSR policies 
and about the recognition by development actors of the validity of SSR to fulfil also development 
objectives.
The DFID View on SSR
The genesis of the interest of DfID in SSR is dated 1997 when in its White Paper it stressed that 
conflicts hamper development, and that it is important to promote political stability and responding 
effectively to conflicts in order to reduce poverty (Ball at  al 2007; DfID 1997). DfID stated that 
“Political stability both within and between states is a necessary pre-condition for the elimination of 
poverty”  and that “Half of the world’s low income countries are suffering, or have just emerged from, 
serious conflicts”  (DfID 1997:70). In the same document, among the initiatives proposed by DfID to 
address the root causes of conflicts, it offered to help “countries to develop democratically accountable 
armed forces” but also it  raised concerns about “excessive military expenditure in developing 
countries” (DfID 1997:70). 
Since then, DfID has produced a vast literature on the need for development actors to get 
involved in the security  sector and on SSR as a policy  tool to help advancing the development 
effort. In 1999, the then UK Secretary of State for International Development Claire Short said in 
her speech at the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London titled Security Sector Reform 
and the Elimination of Poverty that “I believe that a security  sector of appropriate size, properly 
tasked and managed, is a key issue. We are therefore entering this new area of security  sector 
reform in order to strengthen our contribution to development” and that, “Security sector reform is 
now firmly on our development agenda” (Short 1999). 
The fact that  it was the UK Secretary  of State for International Development promoting SSR 
meant that these policies were seen as directly  answering the development question. The link that 
she saw between the security  sector and the development agenda was constituted by the necessity to 
defend and secure development entitlements from internal and external state threats, to prevent 
conflicts and human rights violations, and to have an allocation of state resources which responded 
to development needs. In this regard she affirmed that:
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The overall objective is to help to promote stability and peace through making the security 
sector more transparent, accountable and subject  to proper civilian control. Our aim is to make 
the security sector better able to play their legitimate role - defending against internal and 
external threats - in a way which complements our development  and poverty reduction 
objectives (Short 1999).
Short’s conceptualisation of SSR is useful in reminding the development roots of these policies, 
and the development fruits that these policies are supposed to bear. This link with development was 
also included in DfID’s attention to the military expenditure in poor countries and how this 
influences development returns. As DfID pointed out, “Development expenditure in the social and 
economic sectors may not bear fruit unless the security sector fulfils its legitimate functions 
relatively efficiently  and effectively” (DfID 2000a:3). The involvement of DfID in the security 
sector of a recipient state is permitted by the International Development Act (OPSI 2002) because 
DfID has stressed the link between SSR policies and poverty reduction. Indeed, this link and the 
support of DfID for SSR have been pointed out in its numerous publications during the last decade 
(DfID 2000a, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2003a, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; 2009).
This literature recognises a link between development and security concerns and the challenge 
for DfID was how to implement the development-security nexus. DfID made several statements 
about what SSR policies are, offering broad definitions such as “SSR is a broad concept that covers 
a wide spectrum of disciplines, actors and activities. In its simplest form, SSR addresses security-
related policy, legislation, structural and oversight issues, all set within recognised democratic 
norms and principles” (FCO, DfID, MoD 2002:3). It also said that SSR “help governments of 
developing and transition countries fulfil their legitimate security functions through reforms that 
will make the delivery of security more democratically  accountable, as well as more effective and 
efficient, thereby reducing the potential for both internal and external conflict” (DfID 2004:6); or 
narrow definitions such as “Security  sector reform (SSR) describes the process for developing 
professional and effective security structures that will allow citizens to live their lives in 
safety” (DfID 2003:2).
What the literature on SSR by DfID tell us is not its search for the final definition of these 
policies, but the existence of possibilities for donor and recipient states to frame development and 
security assistance according to selected agreed concerns within the gamut of development and 
security. Therefore this means that the limits of SSR do not depend on the definition(s) of these 
policies, but on the definition of their context, namely the development-security nexus. The 
multifaceted definitions of development, security and their interlinkages result in different 
interpretations of this nexus as it can be seen by policy initiatives taken as samples by DfID in its 
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literature. In 2000, for instance, DfID financed in Ghana a meeting on Security Sector Reform and 
Democratisation to bring together civil society, politicians, and actors from the security  sector to 
discuss security  matters (DfID 2000:21); in 1998 DfID financed a study of the defence budget of 
Uganda to maximise the efficiency of defence spending (DfID 2000:33); in Russia it funded a 
program to put in place non-custodial alternatives with Russian Civil Society Organisations 
supervising non-custodial sentences (DfID 2002a:21). Another example is when DfID, together 
with Transparency International, funded “a group of 10 Chief Justices from Australia, Canada, 
India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania and Republic of South Africa to 
develop concrete action programmes to reduce corruption within these jurisdictions” (DfID 2002a:
24).
However, by  the variety  of these examples it is obvious to expect that the strong promotion of 
SSR policies by a state development actor creates the expectation, among SSR beneficiaries, that 
development is indeed what SSR policies are all about (1999). Thus, the meaning and the size of the 
‘development slice’ within the development-security nexus as well as how many  and how well 
people will benefit from it is a central question that the development lens addresses when looking at 
the SSR policy design. Before doing this in the case study chapters it  is also important to see how 
SSR policies and their links with development are seen from an international perspective: the 
OECD 
The OECD View on SSR
The OECD is one of the most authoritative voices on SSR and has enhanced the promotion of 
these policies among its member states (OECD 2001, 2001a, 2004, 2004a, 2005, 2005a, 2007). Its 
literature is taken as a point of reference by policy makers working on SSR (Commission of the 
European Community 2006; Council of the European Union 2005, 2006; Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 2007; Républic of Guinea-Bissau 2008) as well as by  providing a definition of these 
policies:
The overall objective of security system reform is to create a secure environment that is 
conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy. This secure environment rests 
upon two essential pillars: i) the ability of the state, though its development  policy and 
programs, to generate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which its people are 
exposed; and ii) the ability of the state to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to 
prevent or address security threats that affect society’s well-being (OECD 2005:16).
This definition is conceptually  rich because it spells out SSR objectives namely development, 
poverty  reduction and democracy, and it clarifies that the agent responsible for achieving these 
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targets is the state. In fact, the state is asked to mitigate the vulnerabilities of its citizens and to 
prevent or address security threats. This approach echoes the one of human development and human 
security, with an emphasis on citizens’ vulnerability and state’s responsibility as far as addressing 
concerns related to development and security. Thus this definition, while talking about the centrality 
of the state in SSR, frames state’s actions within the policy concerns of human security. The 
centralising attitude of SSR towards the state is not at odds with the human security approach. In 
fact, what human security and SSR have in common is their critical view of the role of the state as a 
security provider (Law 2005). This OECD definition provides the basis for a discussion not only 
about the main features of SSR, but also about the OECD conceptualisation of these policies taken 
from its extensive literature on this subject.
The starting point for this analysis is the OECD interpretation of the concept of security and how 
it has influenced its view on the significance of development and the development-security nexus. I 
claim that the OECD proposed notion of security is presented as inclusive and conciliatory in 
character but is actually  misleading in terms. The OECD asserts that the notion of state security is 
inadequate and that it must be complemented by the notion of human security. In its words, “The 
conceptualisation of state security  has been expanded therefore to include peoples’ security (or 
“human security”, as coined by the United Nations Development Program). Discussions of security 
systems and security actors have broadened as a result” (OECD 2001:33). It continues by saying 
that “state security and human security are seen as mutually supportive and necessary” (OECD 
2001a:34).
This view of complementarity  recalls the definition of human security by  the Commission on 
Human Security  in 2003, which also stresses the necessity of “creating political, social, 
environmental, economic, military  and cultural systems that together give people the building 
blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood” (CHS 2003:4). Therefore, the view that states and 
citizens have different but interlinked security  concerns and that there should be systems addressing 
these concerns is nothing new, and derives from the human security discourse. This is why OECD 
also acknowledges that “SSR is a key component of the broader ‘human security’ agenda” put 
forward by the UNDP (OECD 2005:11). The conceptual debt that OECD seems to recognise 
towards human security is the one of having complemented the notion of state security.
However, this view contains an antinomy which is not defendable in conceptual terms, also 
considering the centrality of the role of the state in the concept of human security. It implies that the 
task of SSR policies is to build a framework which would work as a bridge between these two 
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security concerns. However, this security collage is a very simplistic portrayal of the conceptual 
background of the notion of security (and development) carried out by SSR policies.
While state security is a concern that has grown together with the birth of the state, and which is 
still an inherent preoccupation of governments which manage it together with their defence 
department, the concept of human security has a shorter chronology. The conceptual novelty  of 
human security is the inclusion, in the security equation, of human development. In fact, human 
security implies that the state has to guarantee individuals’ development entitlements, putting 
together the “freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own 
behalf” (CHS 2003:10). This definition of human security  bridges the gap not only between state 
and citizens’ security concerns, but also between security and development concerns. The vision of 
security put forward by the OECD is framed within the dichotomy human security  vs. state security, 
and does not articulate an in-depth analysis of how to address the development component included 
in the UNDP’s vision of human security; it simply affirms that the state is in charge of it 
(OECD2005). The OECD uses the concept of human security  to validate and justify  its attention to 
the state security  system of governance, and it shows proclivity towards the development discourse 
without assuming it as a policy responsibility. For the OECD, development and poverty reduction 
are built on the democratic governance of the security sector (OECD 2005:12). This link, however, 
has to be extrapolated more explicitly  to attract development actors to get involved in SSR such as 
DfID and UN agencies (DfID 2002; UN GA 2008). A simpler view about the development and 
security vision embedded in SSR, is that OECD member states want:
to get value for money for development aid. They don’t want to finance a bridge if this bridge 
will be destroyed the following day. Donors’ money should be spent  wisely, ensuring that  the 
security architecture of the country enables development money to be spent  in a way that is 
value for money (interview with Rory Keane, Team Leader of the International Network on 
Conflict and Fragility at OECD, 7 June 2010).
The OECD says that SSR policies are a response to a new concept of security which takes into 
account not only the mere militarised security management provided by armed and security  forces, 
but it also includes other sectors of governance with the duty of guaranteeing the freedom from fear 
of citizens, such as the judiciary  and electoral bodies, rule of law, prisons, and those institutions 
supporting the democratic oversight of the armed forces. The OECD also says that the aim of SSR 
is to create “accountable systems of security” (OECD 2001a:35). It is then necessary to investigate 
the link between the latter statement related to the target of SSR policies with the one when OECD 
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says that the aim of SSR is “to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, 
poverty reduction and democracy” (OECD 2005:16).
This investigation starts with elucidating the presence of the term democracy within SSR 
objectives (Bryden et al 2004). The inclusion of this term could imply that SSR not only aim at 
securing the state’s means of force, but also at creating a democratic state. This is in line with the ex 
USA Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s transformational diplomacy credo "We want to see well-
governed democratic states. We don't want to see well-governed dictatorships, and we don't want to 
see poorly governed democracies" (Rice quoted in Harris 2006). However, I argue, SSR policies 
aim, initially, at a targeted democratisation, as they focus on the governance of the security sector of 
the state. Namely, SSR endeavour to have a state where there is a democratic oversight of security 
issues which should, thanks to a whole of government approach, makes the democratic echo audible 
in other state’s departments (Abrahamsen & Williams 2006). Surely, this objective is not feasible 
without having the whole state structure functioning democratically, but SSR use the security  sector 
as an entry point to achieve the democratisation of the state. In this regard, SSR cannot impose a 
regime change but  in the short term they can help  stabilising a country through a much closer 
attention to the working methods of its security apparatus. In the long term SSR can only aspire to 
support a country towards building institutions which function in a democratic way  for the security 
of people (Hills et al 2008; Knight 2009).
This attention to state governance is not new, considering the campaign on good governance by 
the World Bank during the 1990s and its inclusion in the stream of political conditionalities put on 
development aid to recipient  states (Stoker & Chhotray 2009). This emphasis on governance is also 
not at odds with the holistic and people-centred approach to security professed by OECD (OECD 
2005:58) and with the notion of human security/human development. In fact, the OECD stresses 
that the pillar responsible to create an environment conducive to development is the state. Indeed, 
SSR policies are directed toward state institutions; in the words of OECD, SSR is “a question of 
governance” (OECD 2001:41). By addressing the governance of the security  sector, these policies 
allow the opening up to international policy makers’ scrutiny this once secretive state sector. 
However, more than this, it shows what the OECD means by the development-security nexus.
The OECD says that  in SSR policies security and development are “inextricably linked” (OECD 
2007:13) and that these policies maintain the validity  of the development-security nexus (OECD 
2001, 2001a, 2005, 2007). According to the OECD, SSR fulfil the nexus between these two 
concepts through the democratic governance of the security sector: it is the way in which security is 
governed and managed by the state that creates the condition for development, poverty reduction 
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and conflict prevention. In its own words, SSR should help  the state in “developing a clear 
institutional framework for the provision of security  that integrates security and development policy 
and includes all relevant actors” (OECD 2005:13).
The emergence of this focus on state governance is not a surprise. As we have seen, the 
designers, the interlocutors, the implementers and donors financing these policies are all states. The 
apparatus of a state dealing with foreign issues (diplomats, specialised civil servants, state agencies 
dealing with international development, foreign office, ministry of defence, and so on) has been 
created to deal with its states’ counterparts. However, what has differentiated the promotion of SSR 
policies from other states’ policies is that they  aim at making a difference not only at  “state-level” 
but also at “people-level”, as indicated by their emphasis on the need to guarantee human security. 
This is why SSR programs include human rights training to security forces, police and prison 
reforms, respect for rule of law and so on (DfID 2003a; FLASCO 2007; GNF-SSR 2008). Despite 
having this human approach towards security, SSR focus on state’s capabilities and responsibilities 
and not directly on securing and fulfilling people’s development entitlements. What these policies 
aim is to “create a state that can address issues of human development and human 
security” (interview with Dylan Hendrickson from the Conflict, Security  and Development Group, 
15 April 2010), and this is why they focus on how states design their (security) governance.
Thus, by regarding the governance of the security  sector as a development issue, SSR policies 
are interpreted by OECD as addressing the development-security  nexus. This view went a long way 
from the humanistic spirit that led to the elaboration of the concepts of human development and 
security and the effort  to design policies that  take both concerns into account. The significance and 
interlinkages between human development and human security, how they are translated into policy 
objectives, as well as how the impact of their implementation is measured, are part of a political 
process of which many citizens of countries in need of SSR risk to be excluded. This is why it is 
necessary  to analyse the designs of SSR policies to see if they replicate a pattern of exclusion of 
(human) development and security needs whose urgency  was vividly expressed, for instance, in the 
Voices of the Poor report (World Bank 1999/2000) which highlighted the importance of keeping a 
people-centred approach when talking about development and security.
CONCLUSION
The chapter has analysed the formulation of the development-security nexus, and in particular of 
two trends that consider development and security as interlinked: the developmentalisation of 
security and the securitisation of development. This analysis shows how various interpretations of 
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the links between development and security inform the conceptual backstage of Security Sector 
Reform policies. These diverse interpretations of the nexus hamper a clear definition of the 
conceptual boundaries of these policies, leaving to policy makers the opportunity  but also the 
challenge to translate into practice the development-security nexus.
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IV. ARMENIA: A DEFENCE REFORM THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
INTRODUCTION
Armenia can be considered as the Switzerland of the Caucasus, both having a mountainous, 
lacustrine, and landlocked territory, and sharing one of their international frontiers with a peninsula. 
Armenia’s current borders have been unable to contain the marvels of its ancient civilisation, of its 
scattered nationality and its historical heritage. The solidity  of its culture has clashed during 
centuries with an unstable surrounding environment, as the Caucasus has been an area of 
confluence and contrasts (Libaridian 1999; Payaslian 2007; Suny 1999; Tololyan 2007; Zurcher 
2007). Historically, Armenia has been a country located between empires such as the Romans and 
the Parthians, the Arab and the Byzantine and recently  the Soviet and Europe, and found itself “as a 
vessel of fragile earthenware, obliged to journey in company  with many vessels of iron” (Manzoni 
1827:20). Thus, Armenia has been a country between empires, but also a country linking empires; a 
nation between clashing cultures, but also a nation linking cultures, and people. Perhaps that is why 
mountain Ararat, once the fulcrum of Armenia’s settlement, is said to be the place where Noah’s 
Ark landed. Armenia, then, has been a launching pad for a new beginning. In this regard, this case 
study investigates if Armenia also marks a new interpretation of current policies linking 
development and security.
The background of what makes Armenia into a case study  is the management of its national 
security strategy permeated by its foreign policy of complementarity, which implies that Armenia 
has expressed the will to maintain friendly relations with all political actors in the region, 
overlooking their historical Cold-War divisions (Kapidze et  al 2007). This 360 degree foreign 
policy means that its national security  strategy  and the orientation of its defence department bear the 
influence and the balance of power between the different players in the Caucasian region. This 
might be why, in recent years, security imperatives have led Armenia to choose a path of defence 
reforms which are supported by NATO. The aim of this case study is to analyse the language 
adopted by Armenia in designing its defence reform in order to clarify how this language relates to 
the one currently used in development-security nexus policies such as SSR.
The case study is divided into four sections: the first section summarises the history of Armenia 
and how historical events are still politically  alive and influencing its foreign and domestic policies. 
This historical overview is necessary because it  explains the historical origins of its current foreign 
policy of complementarity which also informs its defence concepts, strategies and reforms.
While the first part of the case study  addresses the domestic settings of this reform, the second 
part addresses the political bridges that  Armenia has built with intergovernmental organisations on 
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issues of state reforms such as NATO, EU and OSCE. From an analysis of the cooperation 
documents between Armenia and these organisations, I show that Armenia is not formally doing a 
SSR if for SSR we mean those policies currently understood to implement the development-security 
nexus (OECD 2007). This despite a series of SSR style-policies that Armenia is implementing such 
as: army reform (with NATO support); police assistance programme (with OSCE support); a reform 
of the judiciary and prison system (with EU and OSCE support). These separate reforms, while 
representing some of the constitutive elements of SSR, are not linked under an official, 
comprehensive, co-ordinated and crosscutting ministerial framework centred on the governance of 
the security sector. Among these reforms, I focus on the defence reform of Armenia and I question 
the language used to write it, and what this says about the novelty of contemporary SSR policies.
The third part shows one way of looking at SSR which is through the Civil-Military Relations 
(CMR) literature. In fact, as stated in an interview, “each set of literature or actor involved in SSR 
views SSR from different lenses” (Dennis Blease, Brigadier General, retired, Centre for Security 
Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK, 8 June 2010). The CMR lens highlights that the 
language and therefore concerns of SSR are not a novelty  because they  were in vogue before the 
SSR-boom of the 2000s under the promotional launch by development actors such as DfID. The 
expanded meaning that SSR has acquired with the adoption of the development-security nexus 
perspective puts into question the language and concerns of contemporary state defence reforms 
carried out outside the formal SSR umbrella.
The fourth section focuses on the language used in these documents. The one adopted in the 
defence reform of Armenia is not included accidentally  but it is linked to the reading of its national 
security, to the need to harmonise with the language used by democratic political actors in the 
international arena, and to have a document which is politically acceptable by NATO in its capacity 
of military adviser. The terminology used in the design of this defence reform with the support of 
NATO does not reflects a borrowing of the SSR-ism lexicon because this language and the concerns 
that it addresses existed before the current strong promotion of SSR policies especially by OECD, 
DfID and the UN. This language shows that there is a relation between what is now conventionally 
framed SSR by the OECD and previous policies addressing issues such as governance, 
democratisation and democratic control of the armed forces that had at their disposal only some of 
the language that is now used by SSR. As an academic pointed out, “a lot of the paradigm of SSR 
were things that were taking place without the language of SSR, before the language came 
in” (interview with Robin Luckham Institute of Development Studies 14 May 2010).
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By focusing on the language of the defence reform of Armenia and showing its relation with the 
terminology  adopted by  SSR policies, this chapter raises questions about the novelty of SSR 
policies and their underlying concerns. This investigation needs to be compared with ongoing and 
legally  framed SSR policy settings and this is done with the other two case studies on SSR 
Afghanistan and SSR Guinea-Bissau in the following chapters. This comparison will help in 
investigating the current expansion of the pre-existing language of SSR due to the introduction of 
the development perspective in 2000s, and how this new expanded SSR vocabulary addresses the 
development-security nexus in countries raged by poverty, war and insecurity.
ARMENIA: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Locating the state of Armenia is easier than locating the Armenian nation which extends beyond 
state borders and includes few million of its citizens scattered around the world (Marsden 1994; 
Walker 2005). Moreover, the historical calendar of Armenia does not correspond to the political 
calendar of this country, which in different centuries named Armenia with a different title: Persian 
Armenia, Byzantine Armenia, Arab Armenia, Western Armenia, Russian Armenia, Transcaucasian 
Armenia, Soviet Armenia, Independent  Armenia. While the homeland went through different 
political labels and forms of oppression/government, Armenians have maintained their distinct traits 
which were transformed, in modern times, in political consciousness and led them towards 
demanding a political recognised homeland (Panossian 2006). The history of the Armenians is more 
than a succession of invasions, battles and scrambles for their land between the great powers of the 
time. Among various historical related issues, it is interested here to point out few elements that in a 
subtle or more striking way seem to have influenced the current Armenia state and how it organises 
the governance of its defence sector.
One element is the location of the Armenians settlements. The area where the Armenian 
dynasties structured their governance overlaps parts of the current states of Iran, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Eastern Turkey. This region is usually  referred to as Historic Armenia, in which 
dynasties such as the Urartu, Yervandunis, Artashesian, Arshakunis, Bagratuni exercised their 
power. This centralised power dates back 870 BC with the Urartu living near lake Van, but the 
people of Armenia were mentioned living in this area since the second millennium BC. Like today, 
history was made up of wars and invasions, but also of resistance and compromise. From the time 
when their governance structure started to be recorded, the Armenians’ realm bordered with empires 
which did not manage to wipe out their cultural distinctiveness. Not only Armenians resisted 
cultural assimilation, but also their political domination was only done through compromises rather 
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than direct rule. In fact, during the Roman and the Parthian period of influence over historic 
Armenia, the Armenian ruler came from the Armenia/Persian dynasty, but received its crown from 
Rome; during the balance of power between the Arabs and the Byzantine, the Armenian king 
received his crown from both of them, plus from the Catholicos of Armenia. This third crown on the 
head of the Armenian king is because Armenians were the first to adopt Christianity  as their official 
religion of their kingdom probably before the Edict of Constantine in 313. This choice marked the 
distinctiveness of the Armenians not only among their neighbours but also, since the sixth century, 
within the church itself: the Armenian Apostolic Church became a unifying symbol which was 
strengthened by the invention of the Armenian alphabet in 404.
The creation of an Armenian literature served not only religious purposes but also permitted the 
transmission of the history and legends of this people to future generations. This history-saving was 
above all necessary at the beginning of the new millennium, when the equilibrium between empires 
in the region underwent a change. At that time, the expansions of the Byzantine and Turks 
dominions towards orient, of the Arabs and Persian northbound and the Mongols westbound, all 
converged on the city  of Ani. Once the centre of the Armenian kingdom and crossroads of the Asia 
commercial routes, it was destroyed in 1045 by the Byzantine, in 1064 by the Turks, in 1236 by  the 
Mongols, and included within the Ottoman Empire in 1579. This city was not only famous for its 
one thousand and one churches, and for having been the birth place of Shiragatsi, the famous 
Armenian scientist who centuries before Galileo put forward his ideas in the field of astronomy. The 
defeat of Ani and of the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia in 1375 marked the end of the political 
Armenia homeland. Only  in 1918, due to an empire reshuffling, the Armenian nation succeeded in 
having a state.
In the sixteenth century, the scramble of homeland Armenia between the Turkish Ottomans and 
the Persian Safavids, was one of the causes which pushed the Armenians into what it can be called 
the merchant diaspora (Marsden 1994:135; Panossian 2006:75). It was during this migration to 
India, the near East, Eastern Europe, Italy, that language, literature and religion became 
fundamental in keeping a unifying consciousness about their distinctive identity as a group. This 
became even more so at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, when 
the massacres of about one million Armenians living in current Turkey caused an exodus of the 
survivors of the executions ordered by the sultan Abdul Hamid first  and by the Young Turks later 
(Movsesian 2010; Nichanian 2006; Walker 1990a). These atrocities found in 1944 their linguistic 
translation in the term genocide which defines, which means it expresses but also it delimits, a 
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nation deprived of their relatives and their intellectuals: the deaths are voiceless, but their silence 
made history.
Nowadays, one of the many consequences of these acts of killing, acts of dying, and acts of 
surviving, is that their centripetal force tends to polarise and encircle diverse Armenian issues which 
are not directly  affected by it. This might be because genocide, as the Armenian religion and 
alphabet in the past, entered into the political consciousness of a people who became a nation, and it 
has become embedded in their identity, creating political categories such as Armenians and 
Diaspora Armenians. This human tragedy has become a laboratory  of identity  for the Turks too: 
unable, unwilling to be part of a dichotomy perpetrator/victim, their denial of the acts committed 
almost a century ago might become, in a paradoxical way, a two-bladed knife, and cutting a part of 
their history which they cannot avoid coming to term with (Akçam 2004). Being unable to pick 
their memory cards, the current Turkish government controls a territory which includes much of the 
homeland Armenia and symbols, such as Mountain Ararat and Ani. The troubled relations between 
these two countries are not just a heritage of the twentieth century: it  is still very  much alive in their 
current relations and defensive strategies. Indeed, politics is the present tense of history.
The declaration of the existence and independence of the Armenia state in 1918 was the dawn of 
another era for the Armenians and, finally, for homeland Armenia too. This new political day lasted 
less than three years, the time needed for a revolution and a civil war in Russia to swipe out the 
empire and laying the foundations for the Soviet Union in 1922. In 1920 Armenia was declared an 
Independent Socialist Republic, in 1922 it entered the Transcaucasia republic which was soon 
included in the USSR, and it became a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936 (Panossian 2006; Walker 
1990a). Despite its short-life, this first Armenia republic was a political rehearsal for the Second 
Republic in 1991, and perhaps even for the events in 1988. In fact, Armenia’s First and Second 
Republic have one major common denominator: the armed fight for the independence from 
Azerbaijan of the territory named Nagorno-Karabakh, or Mountainous Karabakh, or Mountainous 
black garden or, as the Armenians call it, Artsakh, stressing the Armenian historical roots of this 
land with the Armenian nation state (Hovhannisyan 2004:12). The common start of the two 
republics under the banner of claiming the area of Mountainous Karabakh not only implies that the 
history of this conflict should be dated far back than 1988 when the authorities of Stepanakert 
adopted a resolution to be included with Armenia, but that in 1991 when both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan became independent states, the status of Mountainous Karabakh could no longer be in a 
political-limbo, or an autonomous oblast, as it was called during the Soviet period.
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In 1991 the creation of the Armenian state was declared and soon endorsed by  the international 
community. This state did not include territories and symbols of the homeland Armenian which 
were lost during a long series of treaties in the 1920s. However, even if Ani and Ararat became 
Turkish soil, for the Armenians the land which hosted the first library  after the invention of the 
Armenian alphabet in 405 was inextricably part of the Armenian state: the Mountainous Karabakh 
became a full fledged war between Armenia and the people of Mountainous Karabakh, against 
Azerbaijan. The frontline of this unresolved conflict has been fixed since 1994, with the Armenia 
military in charge of Mountainous Karabakh which is now linked to Armenia by  the Lachin 
corridor, and of a part of Azerbaijan territory surrounding Mountainous Karabakh.
One of the elements which stands out when studying this conflict is that in Armenia the National 
Armenian Movement (ANM), a political party from Nagorno-Karabakh, gained in 1991 the 
majority  in the Soviet  Armenia and led the country towards its declaration of independence. Its 
leader, Levon Ter-Petrosian, was its first president until 1998, when he resigned. The other 
successive Presidents, Robert Kocharian and the current Serzh Sargsian are all from Nagorno-
Karabakh. This emphasises how embedded this conflict is in the political life of Armenia. Serzh 
Sargsian, of the Republican Party of Armenia, was elected president in February 2008. These 
elections were contested by the opposition and violence spread in Yerevan causing the dead of eight 
people and numerous arrests (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008). The system of government in 
Armenia is à la française with a mixed parliamentary and presidential system in which the 
president’s actions are limited by the parliament: if the majority party in parliament is not the one of 
the president, the room of manoeuvre of the latter is very much reduced (Libaridian 1999, 2000).
Thus, the complexity of Armenia national security is due to manifold issues, both internal and 
external (Ministry  of Defence of Armenia 2007). First of all, there is the conflict between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh area which dates back since the Russian empire and 
Soviet time. A military  stalemate has been maintained since 1994 and a political solution, linked or 
not to a new military  confrontation, is still out of sight (De Waal 2003; Hiscock et al 2003, 2007a, 
2008a; Libaridian 1999; Mehtiyev 2005). Adding to this is lack of diplomatic relations with Turkey, 
despite latest developments (Republic of Armenia & Republic of Turkey 2009); lack of energy 
sources which makes Armenia depending on Russia and Iran; and a need for economic partners to 
promote national economy and raising citizens’ standards of living. These are some of the issues 
which brought Armenia to pursuit a foreign policy  of complementarity which aims at avoiding 
taking side between Eastern (Russia) and Western (European Union/USA) partners and having 
relations with them all. This policy is rooted in the country’s decision to use its geographical and 
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geopolitical position to get the best  from the military and political vestiges of all sides of the Cold 
War. Armenia’s national defence strategy, the subsequent defence reform and military doctrine are 
shaped by this panoptic view of its national security.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE DEFENCE REFORM
The independence achieved in 1991 managed to partially  solved “the Armenia question”, but 
raised the “Armenia security  question”. National security is an inherent preoccupation of all 
countries, and how they respond to it permeates the orientation of their domestic, foreign, and 
security strategy policies (Giragosian 2005, 2006). The defence department is the one in charge of 
the military defence of the territory of a state and of any other targets relevant for national security. 
Defence policies are then born and bred out of the wider foreign policy of a state, of its relations 
with other states, and of its analysis of vulnerability, domestic and international. The choice of 
Armenia to implement a defence reform with the involvement of NATO is an example of the 
political links that this country has built with other states and intergovernmental organisations as 
part of its international relations. To do so, Armenia needed to use a common language with its 
political international stakeholders. Before analysing if the language used by Armenia aims at 
bridging a Cold War military  divide or a policy divide, namely between a defence reform and 
current more holistically designed SSR policies, we need to investigate the legal framework of its 
defence reform. The search for sources about  Armenia’s defence reform stretches across various 
political, economic and military agreements that Armenia has signed with some major actors, in 
particular Russia, European institutions, and NATO.
Soon after having acquired political independence from the Soviet Union, Armenia started a 
policy of integration into various international and intergovernmental organisations, taking 
advantage of the opportunity to have become a member of the international community  of states. 
Firstly there was the inclusion within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991, 
followed by  the inclusion with the UN in 1992, and in the same year with the Collective Security 
Treaty which was named Collective Security  Treaty  Organisation (CSTO) in 2002. Once Armenia’s 
sovereignty rights and military backup were all guaranteed, the country  initiated a diversification of 
its foreign policy stakeholders.
The road leading towards a dialogue with the European Union started in 1996, when Armenia 
signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) (European Union & the Republic of 
Armenia 1996), followed by the adhesion in 2001 to the Council of Europe. A more prominent 
engagement with the institutions of the European Union was its adherence to the European 
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Neighbourhood Policy  in 2006 (Commission of the European Community 2005; European 
Commission 2007; Government of the Republic of Armenia 2007; Hovsepyan & Khudaverdyan 
2006). This policy engagement was marked by the redaction of a country report (Commission of the 
European Community 2005a) and an Action Plan for reforming Armenia’s institutions in order for 
them to achieve European standards (European Commission 2006, 2006a; European Commission’s 
Delegation to Armenia 2008; European Commission & the Republic of Armenia 2006). The 
objectives of this plan are to strengthen national democratic structures and respect for human rights; 
the rule of law; reforming the judiciary; fighting corruption; enhancing poverty reduction and 
sustainable development. These objectives are also reiterated in the Armenia Country Strategy 
Paper 2007-2013 (European Commission 2006); in the Country Program 2007-2010 (European 
Commission 2006a), and in the progress report of the implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission 2007).
Since 1992, Armenia has also held a parallel dialogue with OSCE (OSCE Office in Yerevan 
2007). Since 2000, OSCE has opened an office in Yerevan and initiated a fruitful collaboration with 
Armenia in a plurality of fields such as: training of the National Assembly expert staff; police 
assistance programs; armed forces and legislative reform; human rights awareness; promoting 
media freedom; promoting economic development in distant and rural areas of Armenia and so on 
(Council of Europe 2003; OSCE Office in Yerevan 2007, 2008). Despite the promotion of these 
programs there is no mentioning in these documents that Armenia has initiated a SSR program with 
the support  of OSCE, as also confirmed by an OSCE official (private email correspondence with 
OSCE official 24 July 2008).
These programs in the field of security have not affected the military alliance that Armenia has 
with Russia, also considering that Armenia does not intend, for the time being, switching its 
military patron and joining NATO. However, the Western-looking foreign policy  of Armenia and 
the Eastern-looking expansionist policy of NATO have led to the signing of a Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) agreement in 1994 which was followed by the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 
2005 and other collateral agreements such as Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Partnership 
Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIP) (Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2005, 2007). The IPAP contains sets of broad orientations for 
reforms in many institutional spheres such as political-security  issues, defence, civil emergency 
planning, public information and so on. The aim was to set the tone for the type of state functioning 
institutions that Armenia had to develop to facilitate its institutional dialogue not only with NATO 
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but with the European Union. In fact, the type of security-management recommended by NATO is 
implemented and guaranteed by the type of state-democratic-management recommended by the EU.
These agreements with NATO have constituted an opportunity for Armenia to take advantage of 
NATO expertise in the domain of defence, without forgetting that the ultimate objective of NATO’s 
recommendations for defence reforms is linked to international stability and to the availability of a 
pool of military personnel with adequate military  standards for participating in NATO’s mission 
(Fluri & Lunn 2007; NATO Parliamentary Assembly  2007). The national security  concerns rest 
with the country itself. These agreements also constitute supporting documents of the legal 
framework of the Armenia defence reform (NATO 2006) which includes the national security 
strategy, the military  doctrine and defence legislation (Ministry  of Defence of Armenia 2007, 
2007a, 2007b), as confirmed by the Armenian military representative at NATO (personal 
communication with the Armenian military representative at NATO 7 July  2008). However, the 
echo of the construction of a national legal framework for a defence reform is only heard within the 
Ministry of Defence. In fact, in the elaboration of other national policy papers for implementing 
institutional reforms there is no mentioning of this defence reform, or how its implementation might 
affect or indeed necessitate the involvement of other ministries.
One example is the Poverty  Reduction Strategy  Paper (PRSP) formulated in 2003 by  the 
government of Armenia (Republic of Armenia 2003) and which has been monitored by  the IMF 
(IMF 2006, 2008a). The PRSP opening page identifies poverty and inequality  as threats to national 
security, and lists a series of national reforms to reduce poverty. However, it  does not mention the 
need for adopting policies which address the development-security nexus and this is also why 
Armenia has not  updated its PRSP by including comments related to the new National Security 
Strategy, as we will see in the case study on Guinea-Bissau. The document which says to bring 
together priorities and concerns of both the National Security Strategy and the PRSP is the latest 
Armenian government’s program for 2008-2012 (Republic of Armenia 2008). However, it does not 
specify  how the reinforcement of the army’s fighting capacity  relates to poverty concerns. This 
separation between national defence and poverty reduction concerns demonstrate the policy 
isolation of this defence reform, in stark contrast with the current SSR approach. Despite the 
difference between these two policy approaches, their sharing of a common language makes 
necessary  an investigation, through the lens of the Civil-Military Relations literature, into the 
significance of bridging this policy divide by their adoption of a mutual technical wording.
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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS LITERATURE PERSPECTIVE ON SSR
The 1990s can be regarded as a transformative decade in the sense that  there was a reshuffling in 
the way  political relations were manufactured within and outside state’s borders. With the waning of 
the Cold War and the opportunities of regime change that it originated (Beall et al 2006), it became 
even more important to study the relation between democratic institutions and democratic politics, 
or between the political framework which should sustain SSR and how SSR can create this 
framework (Brzoska & Heinemann-Gruder in Bryden et al 2004; Luckham et al 2000). In 
particular, in the 1990s there was the enlargement of NATO and the vision that future member states 
had to reform at national level their civil-military relations, so that they could be part of this so 
called military alliance of liberal democracies (Williams 2001:543). The opportunity  for a new set 
of political and military national and international relations led to the necessity to have a common 
vision about their orientation. This spurred policy  makers to promote democratic governance 
(Youngs 2001) as the political framework that guarantees peace and respect of human rights, and to 
include SSR concerns, if not SSR policies properly titled, within this set of political/military norms 
for which there was a consensus. In this context, the Civil-Military Relations literature 
contextualises SSR policies within the evolution of international political and military relations 
influenced by the geopolitical events of the 1990s.
The process to support this democratic governance has been defined in various ways, i.e. defence 
diplomacy, security  sector reform, democratic control of the armed forces (Forster in Born et al 
2002:29). Despite the label given to these political initiatives, they  all aim at altering the civil-
military relations both at national and international level and informed them by the democratic 
ideal. The literature on defence diplomacy  says that a shift has occurred in the military foreign 
policy of Western states in the 1990s due to the change of geopolitical equilibria in Europe and in 
the rest of the world (Cottey & Forster 2004; Carter & Perry 1999). The implication of this change, 
it is claimed, is that Western military assistance could started to be used:
to provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the MoD to dispel hostility, build 
and maintain trust  and assist  in the development  of democratically accountable armed forces, 
thereby making a significant contribution to conflict  prevention and resolution (Ministry of 
Defence UK 2001:2). 
Within this new set of tasks also defined as “other defence diplomacy  activities”, assigned to the 
ministry of defence, SSR is included (Hills 2000:47).
The wind of change that accompanied the 1990s was sustained by the credo that democracy was 
the only  legitimate form of governance and that global security could be “based on shared 
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democratic values”  (Cawthra & Luckham 2003:3). The enlargement of the EU and NATO and the 
democratisation process that it entailed are seeing as the validation of these values (Chanaa 2002; 
Mac Ginty & Richmond 2009; Slocombe 2007; Spence & Fluri 2008). The reform of the security 
sector of those states aspiring for EU and/or NATO membership was included in this process 
(Kummel in Cole et al 2005:195) despite the lack of a thorough analysis of the impact of the 
political conditionalities for their adherence to these new institutions (Edmunds 2003). This wave of 
democratisation was a complex political process which implied a process of recognition, by the so-
called “liberal-democratic security community”  exemplified by NATO (Williams 2001:543), of the 
democratic-degree of the political structures of aspiring member states. However, when talking 
about reform of state structures it should be taken into account that “any process of reform must 
take place within - and interact with - the transforming political, economic and societal realities of 
the society in which it occurs”  (Edmunds 2007:10). This is why the 1990s transformative decade 
saw an increased interest in civil-military relations whose essence “lies in the ideological 
perceptions of what a political system, or regime, should be” (Edmonds 1988:136).
The literature on Civil-Military Relations is vast and embraces all sets of relations between the 
civil component and the military  forces within a political community, national or international 
(Forster 2006). This includes not only how to guarantee a democratic control over these forces, but 
also how to use them to “sustain democratic values” (Burk 2002:22). The democratic control of 
armed forces includes “the non-involvement of the military  in domestic politics; democratic control 
of defence policy…and democratic control of foreign policy” (Cottey et  al 1999:3). These aspects 
emerged as a central question for those states aspiring to shift military alliance in the 1990s; but 
also as a central question to which NATO was brought to the fore to support these states in this 
process. This pushed for the expansion of the civil-military relations focus from the state to the 
international.
This set  of literature regards the democratic control of armed forces “in terms of political control 
of the military by legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state” (Cottey et  al 2002:6). 
However, democratisation is a process of reforming state’s structure, and this is why the narrow 
focus of the democratic control of the armed forces should be replaced by a focus on the 
“democratic governance of the defence and security sector” (Cottey  et al 2002a:31) in order to give 
a comprehensive policy framework to countries in transition from authoritarian states or conflicts 
which are engaged in this process (Baker 2010; et al 2006; Vankovska et al 2001).
The literature on Civil-Military  Relations, which devotes to the study of the reforming of states’ 
security sectors in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s, prizes the role of NATO in the 
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construction of the political framework of SSR. In particular, NATO enlargement is seen as the 
launching pad of SSR in Europe, so much that it  is said that “It is difficult to see how SSR would 
have appeared in the Euro-atlantic region absent the enlargement of the alliance” (Law 2007:111). 
This statement takes for granted that NATO’s rules for memberships and the type of civil-military 
relations that aspiring states were required to achieve were synonymous with the SSR norms (Law 
2007: 107). This assumptions, however, does not take into account the evolution of the significance 
of SSR since 1990s, in particular since when SSR have been part of the development domain as 
well as the security domain. As Hendrickson said:
SSR are not  a new version of civil-military relations. Civil-Military Relations only address one 
component, the military, while SSR give a broader concept  to these relations. We can say that 
SSR address the limitation of Civil-Military Relations (interview with Dylan Hendrickson 15 
April 2010). 
Nowadays we talk about these limitations because the development-security nexus perspective 
regards as inadequate a discourse on security which focuses mainly on the management of armed 
forces without underlying its links with state governance capacity in general, and the creation of an 
environment where human development/security/rights are respected. These limitations are now felt 
because the development-security nexus lens has enlarged the policy context by recommending a 
holistic approach to governance.
Therefore, while in the 1990s it was still possible, as academics did, to talk about NATO’s SSR 
and distinguish between first and second generation SSR (Edmunds 2007) now this distinction 
needs to be more contextualised due to the expansion of the meaning of SSR into the development 
field. This is what  has emerged from a discussion with military practitioners at NATO when they 
say that “NATO does not do SSR and that there are no countries doing SSR with NATO, but only 
defence reforms” (interviews with NATO military  practitioners 30 March 2010). As they  point out, 
“it  is difficult to find a definition of SSR in NATO”. According to them this is because NATO is a 
military organisations and cannot implement the holistic set  of policies that now constitutes SSR. 
They  say that NATO deals only with military  aspects of defence reform, but they  recognise that 
there is an overlapping between NATO defence reforms and SSR: for them NATO can do defence 
reforms inside the umbrella of SSR. One clear issue for them is that “the ownership of SSR must 
stay with the host nation, while NATO can only support the military  aspects of a state defence 
reform”. The distance that NATO is taking from SSR is that according to them now “SSR have 
become too broad due to the inclusion of development concerns”. When in 1994 NATO 
enlargement under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was established, the set of reforms for 
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the defence sector of aspiring member states was not called SSR. In fact, the interviewers say, SSR 
“was never included in the NATO language; what we talk is only about technical military support to 
defence reform”. Therefore, documents such as Individual Partnership  Action Plan (IPAP), Planning 
and Review Process (PARP), Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIP) 
are not considered to support SSR but only aspects of a defence reform which may or may not be 
under the SSR banner. As stated during another interview, NATO does not use SSR but talks about 
“military aspect of Security  Sector Reform” (Dennis Blease, Brigadier General, retired, Centre for 
Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK, 8 June 2010). This means that concerns 
and the language that now belong to SSR existed before the promotion of these policies in the 
2000s by development actors, and that they can still be addressed outside the current enlarged 
policy framework of SSR, as Armenia does.
THE LANGUAGE OF ARMENIA’S DEFENCE REFORM
Many people might question if Armenia is implementing a defence reform, a SSR, or a 
concoction of initiatives which goes untitled (Avagyan & Hiscock 2005; BICC 2005, 2005a). 
Sometimes, the same fact can be examined through “a looking glass”, and therefore “`The question 
is,' said Alice, `whether you can make words mean so many different things'” (Carroll 1871). 
Armenia is not implementing SSR policies if these are conceptualised in a holistic sense that 
incorporates the development-security  nexus as their mantra. It  is not under investigation here what 
the constitutive elements of Armenia state security  are or should be, according to Armenia’s military 
strategies. The reason the defence reform of Armenia is considered as a case study is that  it has 
adopted some of the language that is now used in the design of policies called SSR which have 
recently  acquired a more enlarged focus of applicability due to the inclusion of a development 
perspective within the security domain of the state. This raises questions about the significance, the 
compulsion, and the reason for using this language to addresses a narrower part of the 
contemporary  SSR policy framework. The choice between the narrower and broader policy 
framework is a domestic political decision that was not analysed here because the purpose of this 
case study is to analyse the language of the defence reform and not to do an assessment on security 
sector actors of Armenia and see if they should reform through a SSR framework.
The Armenia’s defence reform is the logical outcome of the National Security Strategy which 
was approved in 2007 by  the government. According to this document, some of the pillars upon 
which the national security strategy  of Armenia rests are an efficient system of governance; the rule 
of law; a consolidation of democratic values; an independent and impartial judiciary; 
95
comprehensive social justice. Besides, there are those pillars which are linked to the army’s 
capabilities per se, such as adequate fighting capacity of the armed forces, and efficient law-
enforcement structures (Ministry of Defence of Armenia 2007). The analysis of internal threats to 
national security lists as examples: an ineffective judiciary system which does not guarantee the 
rules of law; insufficient level of democracy within state structures; polarisation of wealth; lack of 
education. Therefore, what is said to constitute the Armenia’s security  question is not only  a direct 
military threat, such as Azerbaijan and Turkey, but also poverty  and an inadequate guarantee of the 
rule of law.
The Military Doctrine provides with a more in depth look at the principles and goals of the 
defence reform (Ministry of Defence of Armenia 2007a). Its reading shows an anatomised analysis 
by the Ministry of Defence of the national security  strategy to ensure an adequate and prompt 
response to those threats identified in the latter document. In the section titled “The Reforms in the 
Military Security  System” it is stated that the objective of these reforms is to have a “modern 
Military Security  System based on democratic fundamental principles of civil control”, and capable 
to protect Armenia’s national security. The document points out the need for the civilian control of 
the armed forces, and the civilianisation, wherever possible, of the defence department. These two 
issues, modernisation and civilian oversight of the militaries, were already included in the policy 
dialogue that Armenia has held with NATO since 2005 and are also reiterated in the public 
informing conception of the MoD which frames the presentation of the defence reform to the public 
(Ministry of Defence of Armenia 2007b).
For Armenia, defence reform was one of the items in the agenda which has shaped the dialogue 
with NATO (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2006). It has to be pointed out that as far as a defence 
reform is concerned, there is no agreed definition within NATO on what  precisely it  means. 
However, it usually implies:
defence restructuring and reform of defence management practices and institutions; 
development  of defence capabilities required to meet both new and traditional defence-related 
challenges; and actions that will increase countries’ ability to contribute to NATO-led crisis 
response operation (Katsirdakis in Gyarmati et al 2002:190).
The objectives of the defence reform of Armenia are “defence and wide-scale political 
institutional reforms, modernizing its security structures, defence and crisis management, ensuring 
military interaction with its Euro-Atlantic partners” (Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2007). The defence reform framework is outlined in the IPAP 
and in other documents such as PAP-DIP (Fluri & Bucur-Marcu 2007; Lunn 2000). After having 
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submitted the IPAP agreement, “In December 2005 NATO accepted Armenia's plan for defence 
reform” (Mher 2005; NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2006). In this document, Armenia stated its 
commitment to reform the defence ministry and it included training, modernisation of means of 
communication, improvement of planning, participating in NATO operations, and so on (Mission of 
the Republic of Armenia to the North Atlantic Treaty  Organisation 2007). The defence tout court 
objectives of this perestroika of the defence sector in Armenia is complemented by  others such as 
the amelioration of the democratic control of its armed forces, increasing civilian participation in 
the designing of defence policies for which seminars were organised (European Center for Security 
Studies George C. Marshall 2007; Ministry of Defence of Armenia 2007c; NATO 2006; PfP 
Consortium of Defence Academies and Security  Studies 2008). The government of Armenia has 
also included a section titled “Democracy, human rights, rule of law and fighting corruption” which 
contains a series of reforms of the electoral system, the judiciary oversight of the defence sector, 
and freedom of the press.
The usage of this choice of language shows two things: 1) this language makes politically 
acceptable the advisory support of NATO in a defence reform which is not to build the military 
capacity of state armed forces but to support their democratic governance (as pointed out during an 
interview with a UK civil servant from MoD on 12 May 2010). 2) This language does not belong 
exclusively  to contemporary SSR holistically  defined by the OECD, so there is no policy  perfidy  by 
Armenia in its defence reform. The language is confined to a defence reform without the holistic 
frame of SSR but it does not reflect a borrowing of the SSR-ism lexicon because the concerns now 
addressed by SSR policies were present also in the 1990s when they were not called SSR - a view 
also shared by Nicole Ball and Robin Luckham during their interviews. So this pre-existing 
language continues to be used nowadays even when it does not address the broad field of 
applicability constituted by the development-security nexus which supports the current promotion 
of SSR policies.
As far as the first point  is concerned, the involvement of NATO in the defence reform of 
Armenia can be seen as a “renaissance of the issue of the democratic control of armed forces” (Born 
et al 2004a:13) after the convergence of discourses on democracy  and governance in the post Cold-
War climate of the 1990s (Hänggi et  al 2003; Pevehouse 2002). During the time of major changes 
of international security  patterns, the issue of membership  to NATO and/or EU for countries 
formerly under the Soviet sphere of influence was one element that encouraged the democratisation 
process in Eastern Europe (Epstein 2005; Hodge et al 1999; Kernic et 2002; Wallace 1999). The PfP 
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program of NATO was one of the tools that NATO used to promote democracy, as stated in its PfP 
manifesto:
This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security 
in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. 
Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of 
freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership 
(NATO 1994).
The PfP objectives also included the promotion of the “democratic control of defence 
forces” (NATO 1994), and this objective of creating defence institutions that promote democratic 
civil-military relations is also stated in the PAP-DIP program that NATO launched in 2004 (NATO 
2004). As we have seen, Armenia signed for all these programs: the PfP, the PARP, PAP-DIP and 
IPAP. Considering the non availability  of some of these documents, as confirmed by an Armenian 
official at NATO who said that “PARP and some national plans are restricted and cannot be 
delivered to public” (personal communication with an Armenian military  representative to NATO 7 
July 2008), the document that could be investigated was the IPAP. In the IPAP NATO document 
(Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2005), the 
democratic control of the armed forces is the first objective to be mentioned in the section titled 
“Defence security and military issues”, despite having had a full section dedicated to it in another 
part of the same document. According to the National Security Strategy, the first pillar of national 
security is an “efficient system of governance” and it continues by listing the rule of law and an 
independent and impartial judiciary system. Without entering in a debate about the role of these 
pillars within the Armenian national security, it does seem awkward that in a National Security 
Strategy, which was also part of the NATO-package of defence reform, the armed forces are 
mentioned as a pillar of state security only after the judiciary system. While the pole position for the 
role of the army in the state security assets is by  no means an indication of an aggressive foreign 
policy, this listing in the Armenia security strategy, a country currently  at war with Azerbaijan, 
seems bizarre, especially if compared with the opening statement of the 2006 USA National 
Security which says that “America is at war” (White House 2006).
During the 1990s decade, several countries experienced a “transition towards democracy” which 
called for a more in-depth analysis of issues linked to the democratic control of the armed forces at 
national level (Kuhlmann & Callaghan 2000) which also had an international dimension 
considering the promotion by the United Nations of international peace and stability (Russett  1993; 
Vankovska et al 2001:9). One of the components for creating this democratic peace was that each 
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state should have a “well-governed security  sector, which comprises the civil, political and security 
institutions responsible for protecting the state and the communities within it” (Hendrickson & 
Karkoszka 2002:175). However, the relation between democracy and democratic control of the 
armed forces can be seen as a “cause versus consequence” in the sense that democratic control 
presumes democracy and democracy  presumes democratic control of the armed forces, and for 
democratising countries unravelling this dilemma is problematic (Born 2004a:19). Thus it is 
important to regard both issues, namely  the good governance of the security sector and the broad 
system of democratic management of the state (Cottey et al 2002, 2002a; Edmunds 2003a).
As far as the role of NATO in 1990s and 2000s in the promotion of the democracy-governance of 
the armed forces synergy  is concerned, Boonstra says that “While in the 1990s Civil-Military 
Relation was ‘the only show in town’, nowadays the concept has become somewhat blurred, even 
for NATO” and that:
the issue became more complex with the introduction of the holistic concept of Security Sector 
Reform (SSR), which has received widespread attention among both academic circles and 
international organisations such as the EU, OECD and UN, and includes, for instance, reform of 
police, intelligence and border control services.This concept  is often attributed to NATO to 
describe work done in the field of defence reform with the goal of strengthening democratic 
control. But  NATO is most  concerned with military-political affairs, and while involved in some 
aspects of SSR has its niche in the defence sphere and not  the various other parts of the security 
sector (Boonstra 2007:9).
This deepening and broadening of SSR policies, influenced by a deepening and broadening of 
the concept  of security  and its articulation as human security, imply the search for the meaning of 
the definitional boundaries of the pre-existing language of civil-military relations within the 
expanded definition of SSR.
As pointed out by Robin Luckham, “the language of democratic control was there before SSR 
policies. These policies grew out from these three objectives: ensuring that you don’t have a 
military reverse of the democratisation process; government accountability; controlling the public 
sector management of security military institutions”. Nowadays, he says, SSR is not merely an 
“expansion of civil-military  relations”, it is about transforming and not reforming the security 
structure of the state. The difference with past studies on civil-military  relations is that the matter 
“is not just more efficiency and accountable security sectors but also rethinking them in the context 
of development and rebuilding political legitimacy” (interview with Robin Luckham Institute of 
Development Studies 14 May 2010).
So, it is not surprising to find in the defence reform of Armenia wordings such as democratic 
control of the armed forces, rule of law, accountability, civilian oversight, included at the forefront 
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of each section despite having the modernisation of the army  as the key  topic of this document. This 
because the emphasis on the civilian control of the armed forces within a set of reforms aiming at 
having a more efficient army is a sign that these issues are intrinsic in the democratic structure of 
state governance and do not belong exclusively to the latest version of SSR policies (Born et al 
2004a; Fluri & Cibotaru 2008). Indeed the uniqueness of SSR, as we saw in chapter III, was to 
regard the interlinked issues related to governance and security  through the viewpoint  of 
development (Brzoska 2003; Hills 2000; Kinsey 2006; Smith 2001). Phrases such as democratic 
control of the armed forces, civilian oversight, rule of law are indeed part of the language of 
democracy  (Bruneau & Tollefson 2006; Pantev et  al 2005) that received a revamp when Western 
states and institutions supported the democratisation processes of Central and Eastern Europe in the 
1990s (Lambert 2006). However, it must be taken into account  that when this language is used in 
different national and cultural contexts, a linguistic confusion might arise, as the case for instance of 
the translation of civilian democratic control in the defence reform in Ukraine:
In the Ukrainian and Russian languages, the dictionary definition of the term 
‘control’ (translated as Kontrol) is ‘checking’ or ‘verifying’, which in political-administrative 
terms connotes ‘oversight’ at most. Only when Ukrainians are exposed to Western practices do 
they grasp that  our [Western]concept intrudes into other domains: upravlinya (direction), 
zaviduvannya (management), keryivinstvo (administration), naglyad (supervision), as well as 
kontrol (Sherr 2004:3).
Being able to ‘talk SSR’ has become synonymous of talking the language of democracy. The 
language of SSR in the Armenia’s defence reform tries to facilitates the recognition and the 
perception by  the international community of Armenia as a democratic-responsible state, thus 
defining and validating its positive state-identity with the international system of states. The 
inclusion of this language might be seen as a sort of reassurance that Armenia is making efforts to 
create democratic structures to manage its defence sector, while serving its national interests of 
having an army capable of facing military  threats. Ultimately, this is indeed the strength of the SSR-
language when it is not used to express the holistic SSR-framework: it becomes a policy sound of 
reassurance for Western-type democratic states. The challenge for SSR policies is not much to find 
support for this change of discourse, as the Civil-Military  Relations literature has shown, but to 
demonstrate that there is a change of practice that addresses the holistic dimension of state 
governance and its interaction with citizens’ freedom from want and freedom from fear.
I would also add that SSR policies are not the sum of their parts, as shown by the case study on 
Armenia. For instance, the existence of separate assistance programs in support of the judiciary, 
training of police, and destruction of the rocket fuel component stocks by OSCE (OSCE office in 
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Yerevan 2008) does not constitute the evidence that Armenia is officially implementing SSR 
policies. The vice versa is also true: considering the panoply of interpretations about SSR, it would 
be misleading associating a policy’s title with its content. However, there is indeed the risk of the 
perception among donors that the presence of a SSR-type of policy among many government 
policies might end up  scenting them all of SSR. Armenia defence reform has shown that sharing the 
language of SSR is not a sufficient element for implementing these policies because this language 
can be used to address issues within a narrower policy framework.
This case study reveals that policies dealing with state governance are not very clear cut. As a 
civil servant of the MoD said, “you should not boxed down the SSR as a term, it  is only important 
to help people understand interactions between the security system. The key usefulness of SSR is to 
conceptualise these complex interactions” (interview with a UK civil servant  from MoD on 12 May 
2010). According to this civil servant, “you cannot do SSR in one go. There is no such a thing as 
SSR programs. SSR is the vision, it just stresses the connections between issues and departments”. 
This view goes beyond the one of SSR understood not as a one-off action but as a process (Winkler 
2002:10). This means that even if we can “drag principles from one context to the other, we must 
modify  our action according to what  it is found on the ground” (Dennis Blease, Brigadier General, 
retired, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK, 8 June 2010). 
The view of SSR as policies addressing interactions between state departments blurs even more 
the line with past and present experiences with their focus on civil-military relations and defence 
reform policies, making it difficult  to define, frame, conceptualise this “web-reflex” of SSR. 
Moreover, the language that expresses this SSR “attitude” was built on the pre-existing one that 
belongs to concerns for good governance, democracy, state legitimacy and accountability. So while 
part of the language of SSR policies was there before and continues to exist, as we have seen with 
the defence reform of Armenia, its vocabulary was expanded by the inclusion of a human security 
perspective and a holistic vision taken from development actors. The expansion of this vocabulary 
has been favoured, it is said, “by a consensus among people in senior positions to have a holistic 
approach between government departments” (interview with a UK civil servant from MoD on 12 
May 2010). The promotion of these policies despite a state of disarray about their definition has 
turned SSR into a label that is used “more and more, but we don’t know the meaning of this label 
anymore” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010). To 
understand why the SSR label has become fashionable we have to investigate its terrain of 




The chapter has addressed the question of the novelty of issues raised by SSR policies through the 
insight provided by the Civil Military Relations literature. In particular, the contextualisation of the 
Defence Reform of Armenia within a composite historical international relation scenario, and the 
study of the language of this package of reform have highlighted the complexity to isolate and 
categorise concerns on security within a single, even if inclusive, policy discourse.
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V. SSR AFGHANISTAN: A POLICY THEATRE IN A WAR THEATRE
INTRODUCTION
Afghanistan has implemented SSR policies since December 2001 because they were regarded as 
part of the process of state democratic governance building8  (Participants in the UN talks on 
Afghanistan 2001). This case study investigates the meaning of the adoption in Afghanistan of this 
set of policies publicised as addressing development and security concerns.
From an analysis of the legal framework of these policies we can see that since the beginning 
SSR covered five main policy areas: military, police, judiciary, DDR, counter-narcotics (Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan 2005) and each of them had a donor state in charge, respectively the USA, 
Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK (Nixon 2007; Sedra 2003). The focus in this chapter is not on the 
assessment of progress and failure in these areas of intervention, but rather on questioning how SSR 
policies have been operationalised. Moreover, despite these diverse fields of action, the choice of 
policy makers of using the SSR heading for a set of policies having a strong focus on recruiting and 
training armed and security  forces calls into question the necessity of its usage vis-a-vis other policy 
packages. In fact, if we look at the history of Afghanistan, it is the fourth time in one hundred and 
fifty  years that this country  is rebuilding its military forces: once in the 1870s, twice following the 
second and third Anglo-Afghan war and nowadays following the civil war during the 1990s and the 
2001 military attack (Jalali 2002).
The singularity of this last state defence rebuilding exercise is that it has been done through a 
policy package, namely SSR, that embeds in its formulation the development-security  nexus. This 
means that development and security synergies should be reflected in the design, implementation 
and results of this policy intervention. Furthermore, there is another issue that should be considered 
in the SSR equation: Afghanistan is a country  at war which started in 2001 with the USA-led 
coalition attack. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate whether the significance, the objectives, 
scope and methods of implementing these policies have all been shaped by the events in the 
battlefield. Here I use the term ‘battlefield’ loosely  to incorporate different aspects of military, 
political, and social life in Afghanistan where there is a conflict between the coalition forces and the 
Taliban fighters. These events are not the concern of this case study  hence there is no detailed 
discussion of this because the focus is on the conceptual underpinnings of SSR in Afghanistan 
promoted by the lead-donor countries mentioned above.
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8  This case study examines SSR policies and not other initiatives which address security and development 
issues such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (For more info on this topic see Carp 2006; Katzman 2008; 
McNerney 2005-6; Rubin 2006).
Afghanistan is not new to a military encounter with Western states. For instance, eighty  years 
separate the last two UK attacks to Afghanistan: the Third Anglo-Afghan war (1919-1921) and the 
2001 war conducted together with the USA armed forces. The lesson learned from the penultimate 
war was of no use in 2001: in 1921 Afghanistan gained full independence from Britain at the 
negotiation table, despite a UK military victory. In 2001 the scenario seems to be reversed: the USA 
led coalition forces have been trying since then to gain a victory  at the negotiation table as a 
military victory  is still out of sight. The implementation of SSR policies in Afghanistan is included 
within the search for a military victory by other means. This means that the implementation of these 
policies is seen as having direct consequences on the result of the ongoing war in Afghanistan 
whose end is still out of sight, and vice versa.
I argue that it is this relation, between SSR policies and the battlefield broadly  defined, that has 
shadowed a discussion of the pertinence of using SSR in this policy theatre which is also a war 
theatre. If we look at the several studies on SSR Afghanistan, they focus their investigation on the 
progress and failure of these policies, on the lack of coordination among SSR lead-donor countries, 
and on the lack of the Afghan government capacity to support  these policies (Brzoska & Law 2006; 
Miller & Perito 2004; Sedra 2003b, 2004, 2006; Sedra & Middlebrook 2005; Simonsen 2007; 
Suhrke et al 2004; United States Institute of Peace 2001; Wilder 2007; Zenkevicius 2007). 
However, they do not question the reason, relevance and feasibility of adopting a set of polices 
whose aim is to address development and security concerns within a human development/security 
approach. My case study takes a different approach because it aims at investigating how these 
policies have framed security, development and their interlinkages in a war theatre, and what the 
conceptual underpinnings of SSR in Afghanistan are.
The case study is divided into three parts: the fist part  presents a brief background of SSR which 
is the conflict  that started in 2001. The reason for the implementation of these policies is not a state 
with a poor track record in development and security indicators which needs SSR to solve a 
development crisis. Thus this has made secondary the analysis of the economic, social and human 
security of the country because the rationale behind the adoption of SSR policies is the hope for the 
birth of new state structures (for a briefing about Afghanistan history  see Donini & Niland 2004; 
Orr et al 2004; Rotberg et al 2007).
The second part analyses the legal framework of SSR and it shows how development and 
security concerns are conceived in this policy design. The third section studies how the 
development-security nexus has been translated into practice by SSR policies in Afghanistan. This 
case study questions the mismatch between the promotion of SSR as the development-security 
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nexus policies and the meaning that this nexus has acquired since its implementation in 2002 in 
Afghanistan. In particular, it challenges the spectrum of applicability of these policies, namely what 
is the meaning of the security sector that they are focusing on, and the significance of putting into 
practice the development-security nexus in a country at war.
It is indeed the context where SSR are implemented that raises questions about the adoption of 
these policies. As we have seen in chapter III, these policies are part of the international 
development and security  assistance to countries experiencing a complex spectrum of insecurity, 
and it  was noted that “it is crucial that what is done in peace building is done taking into account 
local realities on the ground” (interview with Robin Luckham Institute of Development Studies 14 
May 2010). Through an analysis of the legal framework of SSR adopted in Afghanistan we will see 
how the massive recruitment of weapon bearers for a country  that continues to be at war was 
framed within a SSR design. In fact, increasingly SSR practitioners are questioning “if you can 
undertake meaningful SSR in an unstable contexts” (interview with UN officials working on SSR 
26 May 2010).
In this case study we see that the conceptualisation of security as human security with its 
inherent development concerns that  is embedded in SSR policies is challenged when these are 
implemented in a context characterised by conflict. This is why it is important not to take for 
granted the adoption of these policies in Afghanistan but to question the design of their objectives 
and implementation methods. This is not because there is a right way of doing SSR but because, as 
we have seen in chapter III, the only certainty about SSR was their aim of addressing the 
development-security nexus. The study of SSR Afghanistan investigates if the design of these 
policies has erased this certainty from the start, or if this certainty is part of a future that  is still in 
the making.
BACKGROUND OF SSR IN AFGHANISTAN 
The benchmark for SSR in Afghanistan is 2001, which is the starting date of the ongoing conflict 
between coalition of armed forces, NATO, USA, and the Taliban armed forces (Biddle 2007; Cyrus 
Hodes & Sedra 2007). This conflict was the international military response to the 2001 attacks on 
the USA Defence Building and the Twin Towers that  called for the application of article 51 of the 
UN Charter which allows the right of states to exercise self-defence (United Nations Security 
Council 2001). The reason for going to war against Afghanistan on 7th October 2001 was that this 
country  provided a safe harbour for individuals defined as “Terrorists (who) attacked a symbol of 
American prosperity” (White House 2001a, 2001b). When the USA-led military  response named 
105
Operation Enduring Freedom was organised, the USA president  himself did not know the 
framework of the conflict that was about to start. In fact, he stated that:
This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with its decisive liberation of 
territory and its swift conclusion. It  will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, 
where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. … 
Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have 
seen (White House 2001).
Facing the unknown, on 7 October 2001 the USA president informed about the beginning of the 
bombardment of Afghanistan (White House 2001a). Coalition forces managed to be in control of 
Kabul after one month of air strikes, while the majority of the country is still, after ten years of war, 
under Taliban control. The aim of this war was to defeat the Taliban who had the control of 75% of 
Afghanistan before the military invasion in 2001 (Katzman 2008:6), and to rebuild an Afghan 
democratic state. This objective was reiterated by the “Kabul winners”, namely some Western states 
and Northern Alliance, when they participated at the Bonn Conference in December 2001 which 
established, on paper, the foundation of new Afghan state structures (Participants in the UN talks on 
Afghanistan 2001).
However, state-building is a political exercise which requires among other things a political 
space and not a battle-space. The lack so far of a military  victory by Western forces and therefore 
the absence of a peace agreement between the parties in conflict, as war still continues, have made 
the national and international political effort of building the Afghan state a chimerical exercise, and 
SSR policies have been tasked to design it (Barnett & Hamidzada 2007; Nixon & Ponzio 2007; 
Ponzio & Freeman 2007). This design is part of the will of the coalition forces to have an Afghan 
state which is a guarantor of security and development for its own citizens but also a state that 
reflects this peace in the international arena. Therefore, two issues dragged the international 
community  towards their intervention in Afghanistan: the defeat  of terrorist organisations harboured 
in this country because they jeopardise national and international security.
These topics, namely what are the political conditions that  allow for the harbouring of terrorists 
and how to deal with transnational security issue such as terrorism are not the focus of this chapter. 
There is a vast literature covering these matters in particular the one on failed states and on 
democracy  as antidote to terrorism (DfID 2000, 2005, 2005a; Eizenstat et al 2005; Harris 2006; 
Litwak 2002; Logan and Preble 2006; OECD 1997, 2005, 2005a; Nixon & Ponzio 2007; Rice 2005, 
2006; Rotberg 2003; UNDP 2005; USAID 2005; Vaisse 2007; World Bank 1999). They  are 
mentioned here only because it might  have been the haste to tackle these issues - namely the view 
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of Afghanistan as a state that  has failed to respond to the human security/development of its citizens 
and that it harbours terrorists who harms national and international security  - that called for the 
adoption since the very  end of the airstrikes in Afghanistan of development-security  nexus policies. 
This because there was then “a broad consensus that state-building is the central objective in fragile 
states, and that effective donor programs require integrated approaches across the political – 
security-development nexus, fast and flexible responses and long-term engagement” (World Bank 
2005b:4 emphasis added). 
The focus of the chapter is not on the analysis of Afghan state structures preceding the start of 
the war in 2001 or on the adequacy and justification of the international military response. What it 
concentrates on is the adoption of SSR policies publicised as addressing development and security 
concerns, and the meaning that these policies give to development and security. It suffice to say 
here that “Empirically there is no causal link or pronounced correlation between failed states and 
the proliferation of terrorism or between democratisation and the negation of terrorism” (Hehir 
2007: 328). However, the exigency of the community of states to respond to an international threat 
was included in the text of the Bonn Agreement redacted in 2001 (see next section below), that 
specifies:
The Interim Authority [of Afghanistan] shall cooperate with the international community in the 
fight  against terrorism, drugs and organized crime. It  shall commit itself to respect international 
law and maintain peaceful and friendly relations with neighbouring countries and the rest of the 
international community (Participants in the UN talks on Afghanistan 2001).
Therefore, the vision informing the state building process in Afghanistan was that “capable and 
responsible States must be on the front line in combating today’s threat” (United Nations High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes 2004:2). In this regard, issues of national 
democracy, international security, state sovereignty and human security/development of citizens all 
became intermingled in Afghanistan, a country with a turbulent foreign relations.
The international relations of Afghanistan were heavily influenced by the dynamics of the Cold 
War and the country was almost cut off during the time of the Taliban regime which was not 
recognised by  the United Nations (Katzman 2008:5). This interruption of the political normality of 
a state, as the Taliban was regarded by the international community, is also reflected on the 
collective participation to the redaction of international reports. For instance, a look at  the Human 
Development Index reveals that since 1990 Afghanistan has figured within the bottom ten countries 
of the index, but at least it  was in (UNDP 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996). One of the 
consequences of the Taliban taking power in Kabul in 1996 is the disappearance of Afghanistan 
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from the HDI. However, not even the attacks of the coalition forces managed to put it back into the 
list when they took Kabul in 2001 (UNDP 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007-2008), or to get data from this country in the incoming years. However, the appearance 
of a separate National Human Development Report on Afghanistan compiled in 2007 (UNDP 2007) 
is an indication that something is happening in the country, as if Afghanistan has been having 
private tuitions in order, at least, to be listed as one of the world’s states in the HDI. These tuitions 
have been titled “state-reconstruction” and some of the lecturers are the USA, UN, and countries 
such as Japan, UK, Germany, Italy. Among these state-reconstruction tuitions, one of them was on 
SSR policies.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF SSR AFGHANISTAN
By the time the Kabul winners sat at the conference in Berlin with the agenda of transforming 
the Afghan state, about 4000 Afghan civilians had been killed in the war (BBC 2002; Conetta 2002; 
Herold 2002). Their hope of ending the war and its humanitarian consequences was linked with the 
need to have a mechanism in place to support the process of adapting the Afghan state structure to 
its new democratic orientation. The legal framework of SSR Afghanistan has been placed within 
this national and international effort, and therefore primary  sources related to SSR are included 
within documents which have marked the political path of the country since 2001. As stated in a 
World Bank report, “Constitution, budget, economic management, and security sector reforms. 
These core reforms underpin the state building agenda” (World Bank 2005a:49).
The storming of Kabul in November 2001 was followed by the Bonn Conference in December 
2001 organised by the Kabul winners. The outcome of this meeting was the document titled “The 
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions” and called the Bonn Agreement (Participants in the UN talks 
on Afghanistan 2001). In the Bonn Agreement it  was recognised the need for the state to have the 
monopoly of the armed forces within its territory:
Upon the official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the 
country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized 
according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces (Participants in the 
UN talks on Afghanistan 2001).
The document stated that this was to be achieved through recruitment, training and equipment of 
new armed and security forces, in particular “the participants request the assistance of the 
international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of 
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new Afghan security  and armed forces” (Participants in the UN talks on Afghanistan 2001). This 
document also signed the first milestone of building the Afghan state as it  established the 
Afghanistan Interim Authority  (AIA) (AIA 2002a, 2002b). This body  was put in charge of leading 
the country towards the elaboration of a constitution, the creation of state institutions, and 
presidential and parliamentary elections.
This first political phase was accomplished with the inauguration of the Afghan National 
Assembly in December 2005. Since the start, the term security sector reform has been mentioned 
and included within this state-reconstruction exercise. As affirmed by the Afghan Interim Authority, 
the “management of the security sector is the first and necessary  step to reconciliation and 
reconstruction; indeed managing this sector may be considered the first reconstruction project… 
Failure to do so could critically impede or even reverse the Bonn peace process” (AIA 2002:1). 
These first documents mention SSR without explaining how these policies fit with their 
development-security nexus base promoted by OECD, DfID and other policy makers.
From 2001 to 2010, more than twenty major international conferences have been organised to 
discuss the situation in Afghanistan (HM Government 2010; Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2007). Already in 2002, during the initial conferences held in Tokyo and Geneva, SSR policies 
appeared as one of the items in the agenda (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002; UNAMA 2002, 
2002a, 2002b). As pointed out by the UN representative during the conference in Geneva:
Security is the basic element  of this peace process, and therefore with this view the reform of 
the security sector, the establishment  of a national army, a police force, demobilisation and 
reintegration, the judicial system; these are keys elements that have to be tackled as soon as we 
can, and by ‘we’ I mean the international community along with the Interim Administration 
(UNAMA 2002).
This statement by  the UN is in line with the Afghan authorities, as it regards SSR as a tool to 
achieve peace. At this conference was decided how to implement SSR. Each component 
constituting the security sector of Afghanistan was coupled up  with a donor state: the USA took 
charge of the army; Germany of the police; UK of counter-narcotics; Italy  of the judicial system; 
UNAMA and Japan of DDR (German Embassy Washington 2005; German Federal Foreign Office 
2007; Gootnick 2005; International Development Law Organisation 2007; Istituto Affari 
Internazionali 2009; Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007a; Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2007; Ministero degli Affari Esteri 2007; Ministry of Defence of UK 2008; NATO 2006a; UNAMA 
2004; United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre 2006; UN 
GA 2002; United States of America Department of State 2006; White House 2005).
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A more detailed SSR plan was presented by  the Afghan government at the Berlin Conference in 
2004 (Relief Web 2004), as shown in the figure below:
(UNDP 2004a: 154) 
Three years into SSR policies, development concerns started to kick in. One document of this 
conference affirms that:
Security is a precondition for development in the short  term, while over the long term 
development  is the key to ensuring the sustainability of security and stability. Security sector 
reform is the vehicle that  can achieve the baseline of security needed to advance the 
reconstruction and development process (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004:83).
What the document does not say is that this short term period will be as short as, or as long as, 
the war in Afghanistan. The switch from a short  term emphasis on security  to a long-term emphasis 
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on development is peace. However, why is there no document which includes an assessment of the 
fighting on the ground to see when war ends and peace begins? The policies’ focus is on the present 
tense, while the policies’ promises related to development lay  in an unreported future. Policy 
makers wrote a SSR policy calendar which is clear, but what is unclear is in which year Afghani 
people will have their development entitlements guaranteed. Despite the above statement, the 
reason for the adoption of SSR in Afghanistan in 2002 is not mentioned in the these documents, nor 
how the development-security nexus is conceptualised in this context and implemented. When the 
World Bank, for instance, mentions SSR it regards these policies as linked to state security 
governance issues, without mentioning how they link with development concerns, or explaining 
their mutual support:
(i) Implement security sector reform and build up well-trained, disciplined security forces 
(national police, national army) under the control of the national government; (ii) vigorously 
pursue DDR to meaningfully disarm warlords’ militias; (iii) strengthen legal and judicial 
system; and (iv) improve security of property rights, building on existing informal arrangements 
(World Bank 2005a:xxix).
The London Conference in 2006 marked a second watershed in the state-building process 
(London Conference on Afghanistan 2006). With a state structure finally in place, Afghanistan was 
deemed capable, on paper at least, to exercise a political centripetal force and to assume the 
responsibility, or better the coordination, of SSR policies. Thus, the lead-donor SSR scheme was put 
under the umbrella of the Afghan government, but questions remained if this was sufficient to say 
that a whole of government approach was achieved, which is one of the cornerstone of SSR. 
Moreover, there were also coordination concerns linked to the funds of SSR, considering that “With 
so many countries and with so little coordination, it  is impossible to determine the total resources 
committed to Afghanistan” (Fair & Seth 2009:9).
The outcome of this conference was the Afghan Compact, which is the first document that the 
Afghan government produced following the national elections held in 2004 and 2005 (Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan & the International Community 2006:3). This document maintains the SSR 
framework with its five pillars and it  includes a request by the Afghan government to donor states to 
continue their engagement in training the armed forces (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan & the 
International Community 2006). This document also supports the Interim National Development 
Strategy (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan-Office of the 
President 2006) which says that:
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The SSR Strategy addresses how the capacity of the Afghan security sector can be built so that 
they can eventually take on full responsibility for all national security activities. Over the past 
four years, security sector reform has been coordinated across five pillars, as follow: (i) defence 
(ii) policing (iii) justice reform (iv) DDR and (v) counter narcotics (Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 2005:117).
The SSR five pillars approach fits in with the national security policy of Afghanistan as described 
below:
(Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005:116)
This SSR strategy maintains the vision of a security sector which includes the judiciary and other 
factors affecting security such as drug production and trafficking. However, this unity  is not kept for 
long because when in the same document the security  sector is mentioned it is interpreted narrowly, 
including only the armed and police forces, and it lists the judiciary in another sector. As illustrated 
in the graph below, instead of regarding the whole security sector as a crosscutting theme in the 
governance structure, which ought to be the orientation of SSR policies, only  issues such as gender 
and the environment are considered as affecting all state departments. This narrow meaning of the 
security sector and its lack of a crosscutting impact within the governance of the state, have 
prevented SSR policies from being the fulcrum of state-reforming initiatives, and they were 
relegated to deal uniquely  with some aspects of the security  sector interpreted as constituted by the 
army and police.
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ANDS - Programmatic Framework
(Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005:25)
Without  any clear explanation by the SSR leading nations about the meaning of these policies 
and how they differentiate from other policy packages dealing with state security  issues, years after 
the start of their implementation they are regarded as a training policy scheme:
In April 2002, the United States and other donor nations met  in Geneva, Switzerland, to help 
Afghanistan address threats to its security. At the Geneva conference, the donors established a 
security reform strategy for Afghanistan: the United States would lead the training of the 
Afghan army and Germany would lead the police reconstitution effort. (Government 
Accountability Office 2008:6).
This narrow interpretation is also shared by  other academics and organisations researching on 
Afghanistan:
Building Afghan national capacity to provide security requires the policies known as security 
sector reform (SSR), including both the dissolution of irregular armed groups through 
demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), and the creation or transformation of 
previous forces into professional units (Rubin 2006:5 see also International Crisis Group 2008; 
Nixon & Ponzio 2007).
The issue with these views on SSR is that the legal framework of SSR Afghanistan does not 
elucidate why this set of policies has been adopted in this country in 2001; it does not say  what  is 
the meaning of development and security in a country at war; and how these policies address the 
nexus between these concerns. This void of meaning is what causes the focus of the SSR literature 
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on the progress and failure of these policies without  questioning the adoption of these very policies 
since 2001.
Moreover, as time passes, the war continues and the number of civilian victims and dead 
combatants increases, it seems that states intervening in Afghanistan are experiencing a “war 
fatigue” in the sense that, for instance, in both the inaugural speech and in the final declaration of 
the conference on Afghanistan in Paris 2008, words such as war and conflict are never mentioned. 
From the speeches of the participants to this conference (The President of the French Republic, The 
President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
2008) the focus is more on the development needs of Afghanistan rather than on addressing the 
military efforts in the ongoing war. Terms such as army and military are only  mentioned once in the 
opening statement by the French President Sarkozy when he said that  “The military is not the only 
solution, but security is the precondition for development and reconstruction. They  are both 
integral” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes 2008).
Is this a sign that, also in rhetoric, the nexus between development and security is not there 
considering that politicians did not mention development when using SSR mainly  as a training 
policy scheme for the army and the police, and they  avoided mentioning security, war and conflict 
as their military withdrawal from Afghanistan is approaching? However, SSR policies are still part 
of the agenda of the Paris conference and these policies are mentioned in both the key documents of 
this conference, the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
(ANDS) (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007, 2008; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan & the 
International Community 2006). Both these documents are also endorsed at the final declaration of 
this conference (The President of the French Republic, The President of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, The Secretary-General of the United Nations 2008).
A novelty is that the ANDS pays respect to the OECD interpretation of SSR, and defends the 
importance of local ownership of these policies. It  also includes a link to the OECD SSR handbook 
(Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007:55; OECD 2007). This unexpected appearance of the OECD 
SSR guidelines after six years of SSR policies implementation in Afghanistan was highly due. 
However, did this SSR awareness change the orientation of these policies? It did not. The 
orientation, so far, is that SSR have been used as a set of policies dealing with a large number of 
state security issues and by a large number of uncoordinated donor states without a clear 
overarching policy framework that links development and security concerns.
Other conferences were held in 2009 and 2010 in The Hague, London, Kabul (Government of 
Netherlands 2009; HM  Government 2010; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Afghanistan 2010) but they 
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do not question SSR as the appropriate policy tool in Afghanistan. Rather, their focus is on the 
number of soldiers and police forces to be trained so that Afghanistan forces alone can continue 
fighting the war there “Conference Participants also welcomed the Government of Afghanistan’s 
stated goal of the ANSF taking the lead and conducting the majority  of operations in the insecure 
areas of Afghanistan within three years and taking responsibility for physical security  within five 
years” (HM Government 2010a). While this desirable objective is part of the accepted vision of 
international relations that each state is in charge of its own security  through military  means, the 
point here is that the focus when talking about security sector reform in Afghanistan is still on the 
progress that needs to be done in the army, police, judiciary, DDR, without questioning the meaning 
that SSR has acquired in Afghanistan, and how this has influenced the analysis of the strength and 
weakness of the development-security nexus policy approach in a country at war.
SSR AFGHANISTAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS
The implementation in Afghanistan of policies aiming at  rebuild the armed and security forces, 
reform the judiciary, dealing with drug production and DDR is a consequence of the state 
reconstruction process that followed the 2001 military  intervention. From the analysis of the legal 
framework of SSR, it is not clear why in 2001 the lead-donor states decided to title this set of 
policies dealing with state security issues as Security Sector Reform. If the decision to (re)create 
state structures in a ravaged country  is fairly obvious, it is under scrutiny the reason for adopting 
SSR policies. The point here is to analyse what SSR have become when they have been designed 
for Afghanistan. In particular, how in this context they define and implement the nexus between 
development and security.
One main factor that led to talk about SSR in Afghanistan has been the storming of Kabul by 
NATO countries and the decision to transform Afghan state structures while continue fighting. As 
stated, “SSR in Afghanistan is used by most to refer to the processes of building and reforming the 
Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police” (personal communication with a consultant 
working in Afghanistan 10 August 2010). From the legal framework it comes out that  despite a 
broad vision of the security sector that includes the judiciary  and counter narcotics, the adoption of 
SSR policies in Afghanistan was mainly devoted to respond to the country’s military necessities. 
This means that the need to fight a war that started in 2001 has been the driving force for using SSR 
as a policy banner under which gathering all the details about the recruitment of armed and police 
forces. This explains why the literature on SSR Afghanistan is to a large extent  a progress report on 
the transformation and reform of security sector actors (Fair & Seth 2009; Gootnick 2005; 
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International Crisis Group 2007; Murray  2007; Sedra 2003, 2003a, 2004, 20210; Seema & Ross 
2007; Suhrke & 2004). The overwhelming priorities of the battlefield took over the development-
security nexus vision that informs SSR, and focused the main effort, USA in particular, towards 
train and equip programs. It was noticed that:
Considering the situation in 2002 in Afghanistan, it  was premature to call these policies SSR, as 
they were essentially a train and equip program. Probably a better approach would have been to 
have a recruitment, train and equip program and later on or on a separate base starts talking 
about SSR. For SSR you need political commitment, the support of the people who must be 
protected, and with the SSR in Afghanistan there was a confusion among donor states between 
doing and helping the local to do. SSR was seen as a train and equip and exist  strategy (Dennis 
Blease, Brigadier General, retired, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield 
University, UK, 8 June 2010).
The SSR implemented in Afghanistan is not only a case of SSR under fire (Slocombe 2004), 
namely doing reforms in a policy theatre which is also a war theatre. Or, as Sedra wrote:
Contexts like Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the challenges of creating security forces and 
using them in combat at  the same time. As US General David Petraeus remarked when he 
commanded US forces in Iraq, doing so is “like building an airplane while in flight, and while 
being shot at” (Sedra 2010:19). 
The issues is not whether in this context you can do SSR, considering that the “fundamental 
principles of the SSR model are gradually sacrificed to meet the exigencies of the security 
situation” (Sedra 2010:21). It is why  a set of policies based on changing conceptualisations of 
development and security whose discourses merged through the language of human development 
and human security, has been chosen to title the scramble of state departments among lead-donor 
states. Above all, no attention was paid on how this fragmentation could have created or damaged a 
whole of government approach which is the fulcrum of SSR. Or, how it could have facilitated a 
communication channel which could cut  across all government ministries and favour local 
ownership of these policies (Giustozzi 2008).
The definition of security sector ended up including the armed and security forces only, so that 
SSR have lost their transversal impact on different states departments. The distribution among 
donor states of security tasks without an overarching framework resulted in having state 
departments running at different speed which has impeded their coordination and their reciprocate 
support (Ayub et al 2009; Centre for International Governance Innovation 2009; Gootnick 2005). 
This narrow focus is far from constituting a policy architecture in which development and security 
concerns of Afghan citizens are addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. As we saw, 
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for instance, the counter-narcotics program which was seen initially as one of the pillars of SSR, 
ended up as a crosscutting program, like gender equity and the environment (Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 2005:25).
Moreover, the issue with the strong focus on making progress on the military sector (Waldman 
2008; World Bank 2008d) is that  SSR is not simply a matter of disciplined armed personnel, is 
having a state system that can produce and embed within its structure the various state components 
in a manner which is respectful of the rule of law. It has been pointed out that “Security is not about 
having a strong army is about ensuring that your army is professional, that respects civilians, that is 
under a democratic control, but you need a good governance architecture to achieve this” (interview 
with Rory Keane, Team Leader of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility at OECD, 7 
June 2010). This was also underlined by another professional working on SSR that: 
Increasingly, practitioners are realizing the importance of tying in SSR to reform in the judicial 
sector, as SSR relies on a strong legal framework and institutions to make sustainable progress. 
The separation of these two processes has been a major problem in the past, but  this is changing 
quite quickly....In a sense, the new realization that  legal reform and security sector reform are 
intertwined reflects an increased focus on the development-security nexus.  This was not true 
for many years, though, and there is still a problem of focusing training efforts for soldiers and 
police too narrowly on counterterrorism efforts.  Police in particular need to be trained in civil 
policing, and many in Afghanistan have just begun to realize this in the last  year or two.  Also, 
police training is dominated by the U.S. military, and there are not  nearly enough trainers 
available who can teach civilian policing skills rather than paramilitary tactics (personal 
communication with a consultant working in Afghanistan 10 August 2010).
In 2002, when SSR policies were formally  adopted in Afghanistan, the lead of this country was 
taken by a transitional authority  in charge of forming the political structure that started to take shape 
in 2004 and 2005 with the national elections. If, it can be argued, “when you cannot do the reform 
straight up  you have to put some building blocks” (Dennis Blease, Brigadier General, retired, 
Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK, 8 June 2010), I argue that  this is 
true if SSR policies are regarded as they were in the 1990s with a more selected focus on the 
management of the defence sector. With the inclusion of development concerns within SSR and the 
validity  of the development-security  nexus as the rationale for adopting these policies, designing 
SSR policies to recruit soldiers to fill the ranks in the battlefield has hollowed the significance of 
the comprehensive vision of SSR currently publicised by donor states.
The meaning that security has acquired in the design of these policies is about supporting the 
state in achieving the monopoly of force which must be adequate to neutralise military threat within 
its territory. This narrow view of security is at odds with the broad one of human security and 
human development that  characterises the promotion of these policies in the years 2000s. Thus the 
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imperative to have the military personnel to fight the war seems to have narrowed the 
conceptualisation of security  of these policies. Considering that when SSR were proposed in 2002 
Afghanistan was at  war, more consideration should have been taken to analyse the rationale for the 
adoption a set of policies which has a broad spectrum of implementation informed by human 
security/development concerns that are regarded as mutually reinforcing each other.
The catch-22 situation of 2002 was that the need to have local military personnel to support 
NATO countries in the war against the Taliban depended on the creation of a political framework 
capable to support and orient this effort, which depended on having a peaceful environment where 
the political can be exercised (Mouffe 2005). Inserting in this complex dynamic a set of policies 
like SSR that requires a strong local political will to reform; a whole of government approach; 
addressing synergies between development and security  issues, without providing any  explanation 
on the benefits and challenges of this policy tool, hollowed the significance of using SSR in this 
context.
Furthermore, the development-security nexus vision which is embedded in current SSR policies 
was also devalued considering that this nexus was not even mentioned in any key document related 
to SSR, apart from mentioning once the OECD handbook on SSR in the Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy. As far as the meaning of development is concerned, after few years of 
implementing SSR in Afghanistan, the UNDP published the Afghanistan National Human 
Development Report (UNDP 2004a). This document introduces the section of Security Sector 
Reform emphasising how the concept of human security stresses the importance of addressing the 
freedom from fear and freedom from want of people. The UNDP affirms that the emphasis given in 
building a “strong central authority” in Afghanistan is justified by the need to address state security 
issues as a precondition for achieving human development (UNDP 2004a:152). This because UNDP 
regards SSR as “the transformation of a country’s security apparatus with the aim of ensuring that it 
is managed and operated in a manner consistent  with democratic norms and principles” (UNDP 
2004a:153).
The UNDP fully  supports the vision of SSR as policies addressing the governance of the security 
sector, without mentioning how and when the development question in Afghanistan will receive an 
answer by policy makers. In this document the UNDP segments the concept of human security in 
several components, such as economic security, health security, personal security, and so on. SSR 
policies are listed within political security, and their objectives are limited to training army and 
police forces (UNDP 2004a:244). No doubt that this report missed out an opportunity to pay 
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attention to the challenge to put into practice the link between development and security in a 
country at war.
According to SSR Afghanistan, security means the “management of the security sector” (AIA 
2002:1); development concerns are postponed to when armed forces will have “achieve the baseline 
of security  needed to advance the reconstruction and development process” (Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 2004:83); and how these policies address the link, the fulcrum, the nexus between 
development and security is left unanswered by  those documents constituting the design of these 
policies. Thus, development is regarded as a condition which will come after the creation of state 
structures; after a military victory in the conflict; after a political victory of strengthening state 
institutions. However, will the SSR echo still be heard that far?
SSR policies in Afghanistan are characterised by a narrow view of security, a development 
postponement and a lack of articulation of how these policies can be the bridge between a 
democratically governed security  sector and the provision of development entitlements to Afghani 
citizens. In Afghanistan, the conflict could be held responsible for breaking the SSR vision of a 
whole of government approach that addresses the governance of the security sector in order to 
create an environment where citizens can enjoy the freedom from want and freedom from fear. 
However, nobody  has questioned whether the advisory and soft approach of SSR was appropriate 
for dealing with military necessities at the front line in a state where state structures were to be 
redrawn from scratch. If with SSR policy makers included the war effort within the state building 
effort because these policies frame military necessities within a democratic and development 
imperative, in theory at least, in practice questions remain about the perception and expectations 
about these policies whose development-security nexus is, after ten years of implementation, still 
unquestioned by policy makers and longed for by people.
CONCLUSION
This case study has shown that while policy makers called SSR the set of policies to be 
implemented since 2002, in a continuing war context, the nexus of security  with development - the 
core of SSR - got weakened. In particular, this case study has highlighted the need to go beyond the 
narrow view of security  that has characterised the design of these policies from the start, as well as 
the inadequacy of this militarised vision of security  to support the implementation of development 
objectives.
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VI. GUINEA-BISSAU: AN IDYLLIC POLICY THEATRE
INTRODUCTION
The institutions of the European Union have adopted the development-security nexus as a 
guiding vision for some of their external foreign policy commitments. This orientation was included 
in a statement by the Council of Europe which also said that:
the Council has identified initial pragmatic actions for increased coherence in some of the areas 
spanning the security-development  nexus: strategic planning, Security Sector Reform, 
partnerships with regional and sub regional organisations, and humanitarian aid and 
security” (Council of the European Union 2007:1,2).
In 2006 the government of Guinea-Bissau requested the support of the EU for a project of reform 
in the areas of state defence, police and justice (interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head 
of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010; Républica de Guiné Bissau – Comité Interministerial para 
a Reestructuração e Modernização do Sector da Defesa e Segurança 2006). The EU responded by 
sponsoring a program, the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, to assist this country where the population’s 
needs about development, security, and good governance are far from met. This case study aims at 
showing how the development-security  nexus vision that underpins SSR policies is translated into 
practice in a recommended policy  scenario such as Guinea-Bissau. What is favourable about the 
implementation of SSR in this country is: a) the request for donors’ support coming from state 
authorities which means that there is a political engagement; b) a favourable donors’ response, in 
particular from the EU, even if SSR is also supported by  other actors such as UN agencies and 
individual states such as Brazil, China, USA, Senegal, France, Portugal, Angola, Nigeria 
(République de Guinée-Bissau 2006); c) the presence of a national development and security  deficit 
but an absence of war so that national and international stakeholders can frame and analyse the 
development-security problematics and implement a comprehensive policy response without having 
to consider extraordinary state’s efforts typical of wartime.
The object of this case study is to examine how development and security issues have been 
translated into the SSR policy design, and it questions whether presenting SSR as the development-
security nexus policies is appropriate considering that development concerns are not included 
within the main SSR framework of Guinea-Bissau. In the words of the Head of the EU SSR 
mission:
The starting point  of the EU SSR mission is that Guinea-Bissau needs stability to achieve 
development. Juridical insecurity and lack of solid institutions determine lack of foreign 
investments in development. The reform of the security sector has been identified as key to 
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achieve a political and economic situation that favours a development  takeoff of the country 
(interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010). 
The view that you need security  to have development, rather than vice versa, is also expressed by 
a UN agency that is giving a substantial support to SSR “The idea is that without the Security 
Sector Reform, there can be no Rule of Law and without Rule of Law, sustainable development is 
close to impossible” (personal communication with UNODC official 9 June 2008).
The case study is divided in four parts: the fist part focuses on the SSR theatre, namely the 
country, and it  gives a brief overview of the development and security situation of Guinea Bissau 
which highlights the lack of human development, human security  and the national political 
instability also linked to the militarisation of state politics. This scenario is what justifies the 
adoption of policies addressing development and security concerns. The second part introduces the 
main actors involved in the SSR Guinea-Bissau, and how they position themselves vis-a-vis these 
policies. The third part presents the legal framework of SSR policies, which is made up  of policy 
papers produced by the European Commission, the European Council and the government of 
Guinea Bissau. These documents provide the base for the investigation, in the fourth part of the 
chapter, of how the link between development and security  issues have been framed by these 
policies9.
It is beyond the scope of this case study to judge if the necessity  of Guinea-Bissau to restructure 
the management of its state security and solving the problem of its combatants for the homeland 
liberty is to be met within a SSR conceptual framework or not. The case study highlights the 
difficulties of addressing in policy  terms the fulcrum between development and security, but also 
that the theoretical merge of these two discourses is still fragile despite the widespread use of the 
development-security nexus banner in the promotion of SSR. I argue that one reason for this 
inadequate response is the mismatch between the theory  and the practice of the development-
security nexus. While at  theoretical level the merge between development and security was 
favoured by converging their discourses on the centrality of the human being, in practice a concern 
for the state as the actor in charge of state security  and development has pushed development and 
security into two separate tracks. This implies that security  concerns continue to address state 
security governance and development concerns are postponed to when the state is capable to create 
the conditions for it. This postponement of development can be regarded as one of the failure of a 
policy discourse publicised and funded to address the development-security nexus.
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9  Considering that this program is ongoing, a balance cannot be drawn by observing empirical results. The 
study of this SSR focuses on the conceptual framework of these policies: technical details related to defence 
and security forces will be referenced throughout the text.
GUINEA-BISSAU: THE SSR THEATRE
As a brief outline of the country  shows, Guinea-Bissau is beset with political, economic, and 
social instability and hence easy to be seen as a deserving recipient  of SSR. The birth of the state of 
Guinea Bissau goes back to the 1974, after a decade of war against the Portuguese colonial rule. In 
the aftermath of independence, a succession of coups d’état, a civil war (1998-1999), interim 
governments, have all marked the political scene of this current presidential democracy of less than 
two million people (Adebajo 2002; Economist  Intelligence Unit 2008a). Political instability started 
in 1980 when Luis Cabral, the first president, was overthrown by Joao Bernardo Vieira, the then 
prime minister and former armed forces commander. Twenty years after independence, and three 
attempts of military  coups in 1983, 1985, 1993, the second democratic pit stop  was the 1994 
elections in which Vieira and his party, Partido Africano para la Independencia da Guiné e Cabo 
Verde (PAIGC) was re-elected, gaining against Kumba Yala representative of the Party  of Social 
Restoration (PSR). A civil war erupted from June 1998 to May 1999 due to a deteriorating 
relationship  between President Vieira and the Chief of General Staff Ansumane Mane. Vieira 
dismissed Mane, accusing him of supporting the secessionist movement, the Movement of 
Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC), in Senegal. These accusations were lately dismissed 
by a parliamentary inquiry.
The intervention of foreign troops by Senegal and Guinea in support of Vieira was followed by a 
regional intervention of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) forces which included Benin, Gambia, Togo, and Niger, and a UN peacekeeping 
mission in 1999, the United Nations Peace Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). 
A Government of National Unity was charged of preparing the 2000 elections in which Kumba Yala 
won and remained in power until 2003 when a new coup  and a new election brought back Vieira as 
head of state. The tradition of coups and attempted coup continued up  to August 2008 when Viera 
dissolved the Parliament after an alleged attempt of a military  coup by the head of the Navy (BBC 
2008). The country’s elections in November 2008 and the victory of Viera put in doubt the 
feasibility of the implementation of SSR policies, considering the climate of political stability 
necessary  for undertaking government reforms (IRIN 2008). These challenges increased because of 
the political instability caused by  the murder on 1 March 2009 of the chief of staff followed few 
hours later by the murder of the country’s president, and new presidential elections in June-July 
2009 with the victory  of Malam Bacai Sanha of PAIGC against the ex-President Koumba Yala. 
Another sample of political instability happened in April 2010 when the Chief of the Armed Forces 
was overthrown by a coup and the Prime Minister temporary  detained (Gorjao 2010). A common 
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denominator of all these events has been the militarization of politics, and the failure of developing 
a civilian-military relation within a democratic framework. Nowadays, policy makers have 
identified in the weakness of the governance of the security sector a major cause of national 
poverty, and promise to address it with SSR policies (Republic of Guinea Bissau Inter-ministerial 
Committee of the Restructuring and Modernisation of the Defence and Security Sector 2006).
By different sources and statistics, it also results that the country  is in a dire state when it comes 
to delivering development to its own people. In line with the classification exercise of countries 
started with the World Bank in the 1970s (World Bank 2008c), the snapshot of Guinea Bissau using 
the lenses of human development indicators reveals a reality  of entrenched poverty for the majority 
of the population. According to the HDI (UNDP 2007-08), Guinea Bissau is 175 out of 177, before 
Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone. For the every day life of the 1.6 million people living there, it 
means that  at birth they  have 40% probability  of surviving to the age of 65 with the average life 
expectancy of 45 years. Guinea Bissau has the second highest fertility rate in the world (7.1 births 
per woman) which is also matched by one of the highest under-five mortality rate in the world (200 
per 1000 live births); 47% of the population is under 15 years. However, health expenditure per 
capita (PPP US$) is 28, compared with 6.096 in the United States. In 2004, 39% of the population 
was undernourished, only  half had access to an improved water source. The government response to 
this grim situation has been inadequate: GDP per capita between 1990 and 2005 had a negative 
annual growth rate of -2.6%; a mere 1.3% of the GDP was spent  on health in 2004; 5.2% was spent 
in education between 2002-2005, while in 2005, 4% was spent  on the military sector and 10.8% in 
debt service repayment to bilateral and multilateral creditors (UNDP 2007-08). The human security 
lenses see poverty as insecurity because it threatens the dignity of people. As underlined in the 
Human Security Now report, “Health security  is at the vital core of human security – and illness, 
disability  and avoidable death are ‘critical pervasive threats’ to human security” (CHS 2003:96). 
Human security is also concerned about access to education; in fact, the report says that, 
“Educational deprivations are particularly serious for human security” (CHS 2003:6). From this 
brief overview, the human development/human security situation of Guinea Bissau is a daunting 
one.
According to some economic development indicators, Guinea Bissau is classified by the World 
Bank as a low income country  under stress (LICUS) and as a highly indebted country (World Bank 
2008a). It is also seen as a conflict-affected country and as a failed state (Fund for Peace 2009). The 
chances to achieve in Guinea Bissau the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) are unlikely 
(République de Guinée Bissau & UNDP 2004; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group  2006). 
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The World Bank and IMF have responded to this social tragedy  using the Poverty  Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) form (Guiné-Bissau 2005). They created this policy instrument in 1999 to 
frame their lending to low-income countries and debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative (HIPC) (World Bank 2008a). At the end of the civil war, the government of 
Guinea-Bissau had to use this form to obtain foreign loans for rebuilding the country. An Interim 
PRSP was prepared in 2000, and in 2001 the government started the elaboration of a comprehensive 
one which was completed in 2006 and which relates to the period 2007-2010 (IMF 2007). The goal 
of the PRSP for Guinea-Bissau is to “overcome the challenges for sustainable human development” 
in a country where “64.7% of the population live with less than two dollars per day; 20.8% of the 
population live with less than one dollar per day” (IMF 2007:6,7). When the government revised 
this document in 2005, they added the reform of the security sector (IMF 2007:6). The IMF does 
not contest the inclusion of these policies, and it endorses the view that political instability and 
violence produce poverty:
 …it is evident that  a key determinant of poverty is instability and the recurrence of violence as 
evidenced by repeated coups d’état and armed conflicts. This situation has hindered the 
realisation of development programs and projects and continually weakened the already fragile 
institutions and infrastructure. Therefore, the prerequisites to make the poverty reduction 
strategy viable lie in the fostering of stability, good governance, reconciliation and peace 
consolidation in order to create the conditions to prevent  a return to armed conflicts (IMF 
2007:23).
The inclusion of SSR policies into the PRSP is a sign of the inadequacy of the policy response 
given so far to Guinea-Bissau, and the consensus of international policy  makers about the validity 
of using in this country policies addressing the development-security  nexus. Considering that 
nobody has questioned the choice of this policy theatre, it is timely now to analyse the coaches, the 
actors and scripts of SSR policies in Guinea-Bissau.
THE SSR-COACHES IN GUINEA-BISSAU
The OECD holistic approach for guiding the design and implementation of SSR spurred 
discussions among the EU, UN agencies and individual states willing to get involved in SSR 
(Commission of the European Community  2006; Council of the European Union 2005, 2007a; 
DfID 1999; GFN-SSR 2003; OECD 2001, 2004, 2007; United Nations Security Council 2005; UN 
GA 2008a; UNOG 2008). The EU and various UN branches started a reflection on which SSR 
aspects they could take charge according to their mandate, expertise and legitimacy (Law 2007).
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The EU, following discussions within the European Council and the Commission, has developed 
a policy  framework which is based on the OECD principles but it also takes into account the 
European Security Defence Policy (ESDP) concerns (Commission of the European Community 
2006; Council of the European Union 2005, 2007a). The reason for this EU involvement in SSR is 
that “The increased emphasis on human rights and democratisation in donor attitudes to ACP 
[African, Caribbean, Pacific] states also inevitably raised questions relating to the security 
sector” (Chalmers 2000:5). The EU has produced three main SSR documents: the European 
Council Concept for European Security and Defence Policy Support for SSR; the Commission 
Concept for European Community Support for SSR; and the EU policy framework for SSR which 
acknowledges the diversity of both orientations without creating a single EU position on SSR 
(Commission of the European Community 2006; Council of the European Union 2005, 2006):
Together, the two concepts (the concept for European Community Support  for SSR and the 
Concept  for ESDP support to SSR) constitute a policy framework for EU engagement  in 
security sector reform (SSR), stressing the importance of taking a comprehensive and cross-
pillar approach to SSR recognising the fact  that SSR is a holistic, multi-sector, and long-term 
process encompassing the overall functioning of the security system as part  of governance 
reforms (Council of the European Union 2006:1).
The different interpretations by the Council and the Commission, as highlighted by  Law and 
Myshlovska, indicate a diversity in mandate and expertise of both institutions. The Council focuses 
on reform of security forces, police reform, justice and rule of law enforcement, border and customs 
sector, DDR; the Commission is more concerned with the reform of civil management bodies, civil 
oversight mechanisms, justice reform, law enforcement (Law & Myshlovska in Spence et al 
2008:7). For the Council, SSR is a matter of “addressing issues of how the security  system is 
structured, regulated, managed, resourced and controlled” (Council of the European Union 2005:9), 
while for the Commission SSR goes “beyond the notion of effectiveness of individual services 
(including the military, the police, the justice institutions, etc.) and instead focuses on the overall 
functioning of the security system as part  of a governance reform policy and strategy of the public 
sector” (Commission of the European Community  2006:3). Moreover, according to the EU, SSR 
are not only part of a broader concern for governance, but part of the ESDP vision which sees SSR 
as the “exit strategy for international military forces engaged in a given theatre” (Permanent 
Representation of France to European Union 2006:10).
In the last few years the UN as well has debated its involvement in SSR (Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces & Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic 2006; 
UN GA 2007e, 2008, 2008a). The reason for this is the recognition that human rights, security  and 
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development are interdependent and that their fulfilment should be guaranteed by a legal framework 
which respects the rule of law (UN Security  Council 2005). Moreover, SSR give to the UN the 
opportunity to have a framework to implement a “shared vision of security”:
For the United Nations, the importance of security sector reform is that it  demonstrates that 
security goes beyond traditional military elements and involves a much wider range of national 
and international institutions and actors. … Equally, security sector reform underscores that 
effectiveness, accountability and democratic governance are mutually reinforcing elements of 
security. Thus, security sector reform offers a framework to assist  national actors, the United 
Nations and other international partners in implementing a shared vision of security (UN GA 
2008:6).
This UN vision of SSR reflects different aspects from the one of the OECD which is taken as a 
base by  the EU, due to the global composition of the UN and its different mandate. From an 
interview with UN officials working on SSR it emerged that:
the conceptualisation of SSR by the OECD is very much from the perspectives of donor states. 
What  is missing in the OECD vision is a framework that  provides recipient states with the 
opportunity to articulate their own vision. This is why the UN is working to help the African 
Union to get its own vision about SSR policies (interview with UN officials working on SSR 26 
May 2010; see also Alao 2000).
The implementation of the SSR framework by the UN requires a division of tasks between 
different UN agencies as it can be seen in the SSR implemented in Guinea-Bissau (for information 
about UNOGBIS involvement in SSR see UN GA 2004, 2006, 2006a, 2007, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 
2008b). The UN Security Council has supported the EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau as it  considers it as 
an initiative that strengthens governance and prevents drug trafficking (UN GA 2007d). According 
to United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), Guinea-Bissau is the epicentrum of drug 
trafficking between the Americas and Europe (IRIN 2007; UNODC 2007). The UN Security 
Council regards drug trafficking as a security problem which undermines the rule of law, and this 
justifies its inclusion within SSR policies. This is why Guinea-Bissau together with UNODC have 
drawn a plan aiming at combatting and preventing it. The UNODC is ready to:
support  the efforts of the government of Guinea-Bissau in reforming its security sector in order 
to stabilise the peace process and protect  the social development of the country against drug 
trafficking, organised crime, and crime more generally. Such a programme constitutes an 
integral part of the Security Sector Reform of the Government of Guinea-Bissau (Republic of 
Guiné-Bissau & UNODC 2007:5).
Another UN agency which has showed interest in getting involved in SSR is the UNDP 
(Gouvernement de la Guinée Bissau et le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement 
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2008). The UNDP interprets SSR as JSSR, namely as justice and security  sector reform (UNDP 
2003), focusing its action on the public sector delivery of justice and respect  for the rule of law. 
While this interpretation is nothing new if compared with the definition of security sector provided 
by for instance DfID and OECD, it indicates that there is a need to specify and distinguish between 
a development approach from a security  approach to SSR. Thus, this calls for a clarification of 
what constitutes the development-security nexus components of SSR.
THE LEGAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND GUINEA-BISSAU
The EU SSR Guinea-Bissau is situated within the wider cooperation framework between the EU 
and the African states. A brief description of the orientation of this intercontinental collaboration 
helps in better contextualising the meaning and objectives of the EU SSR initiative in Guinea-
Bissau. The starting point for illustrating the collaboration between the EU and African states is the 
latest Africa-EU Joint Strategy inaugurated at the summit of Lisbon in December 2007 (European 
Commission 2005; European Union 2007). This document states that:
This partnership should strive to bridge the development divide between Africa and Europe 
through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of sustainable 
development  in both continents, living side by side in peace, security, prosperity, solidarity and 
human dignity (European Union 2007:2).
A section of this document includes a specific area of collaboration titled ‘Peace and Security’, 
and it mentions that one of the activities which should be promoted is to “Strengthen cooperation 
and enhance dialogue on issues relating to the security/development nexus” (European Union 
2007:31). This statement can be regarded as paving the way for the introduction of SSR policies. 
The document specifies that SSR policies are a tool for supporting governance, while other policies 
deal with institutional development and human security (European Union 2007:7).
The EU-Guinea-Bissau relations are framed within the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 and 
revised in 2005 with the aim of reducing poverty; helping the integration of African, Caribbean and 
Pacific States into the global economy; and promoting sustainable development (Conseil de l’Union 
Européenne 2005; European Union 2007b). The financial instrument relating to this type of 
cooperation is the European Development Fund (EDF), an intergovernmental fund set up  by EU 
member states (European Commission 2002; European Union 2007c). The 10th EDF amounts at 
22.682 million euro and it covers the period 2008-20013 for implementing programs that recipient 
countries have detailed in their Country Strategy Papers (CSP) (European Union 2007a). This 
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document is the base for receiving assistance from the EU (European Commission 2006b, 2006c). 
According to the European Commission’s guidelines for strategy papers “Conflict  prevention 
should be presented as an integral part of poverty reduction and sustainable development 
policies” (European Commission 2006b:1). These guidelines contain also some examples of 
programs which indirectly  address the issue of conflict prevention such as those related to water and 
rural development; and those directly having a conflict prevention impact such as security  sector 
reform (including reform of police, border control, justice reform, parliamentary  and civilian 
control over the security services), DDR, small arms and light weapons projects (European 
Commission 2006b:2).
These EU guidelines inform the redaction of Country Strategy Paper by  recipient countries and 
therefore the type of cooperation projects and earmarked budgets that accompany them. The 
Guinea-Bissau Country  Strategy Paper for the period 2008 -2013 was signed at the Lisbon summit 
in 2007, paving the way for the implementation phase of the EU development assistance: 100 
million euro to be disbursed during this period, of which 27 million euro in conflict prevention in 
fragile states (European Union 2007c, 2007d). In the Country Strategy Paper, the government of 
Guinea-Bissau has listed SSR as one of the reforms considered indispensable for the country, 
together with the reform of the judiciary system, public administration and reform of public finance. 
It says that the purpose of SSR is to reduce the army and increase its efficiency to lighten the 
financial burden of the state (République de Guinée-Bissau 2007:12). This document offers a 
narrower view of the security sector. According to OECD, security sector should include the 
judiciary  and all those institutions working for providing freedom from fear to citizens. The CSP 
documents redacted by the government of Guinea-Bissau focuses on the army, and it  affirms that 
the aim of SSR is to downsize it and it excludes the judiciary sector and its reform from the SSR 
conceptual policy umbrella.
The PRSP that Guinea-Bissau produced to get loans from the Bretton Woods institutions 
includes this narrow view of the security  sector which centres on the army (IMF 2007). The IMF 
welcomes and validates the narrow approach of these policies. The IMF reading of SSR is that these 
policies aim at resizing and restructuring the armed forces, and make them respectful of the rule of 
law, this to create the condition for human development (IMF 2007:22,24). In its view, these 
conditions for development derive from a shorter salary list of armed and security  personnel which 
would make available resources for development projects (IMF 2007a:4; IMF 2008). The inclusion 
of SSR policies within the PRSP can be regarded as a sign of adopting a whole of government 
approach for their implementation. Moreover, having SSR policies crossed-referenced in various 
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policy papers open them up to different interpretations by various policy actors. The IMF and EU 
validation of a narrow definition of security sector presented by the government of Guinea-Bissau is 
not due to their nonchalance about the respect for SSR conceptual essence which praises 
interlinkages between state departments. This narrow approach might serve both the weak 
government institutions of Guinea-Bissau and international policy makers: the former might be 
unable to fulfil donors’ expectation to reform a state which cannot deliver services to its citizens – 
casting the shadow of state bankruptcy, while the latter might get a request to bail it out and the 
narrower the policy focus, the cheaper the bill.
SSR Guinea-Bissau: the EU Script
In a press release on 12 February  2008, the EU announced their involvement in supporting the 
security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) as part of the European Security 
and Defence Policy  (ESDP), as also pointed out  in a correspondence with the Council of Europe 
“The Mission EU SSR Guinea-Bissau is indeed an ESDP mission, based on Article 14 and the third 
subparagraph of Article 25 of the Treaty on the European Union” (personal communication with the 
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 9 June 2008. For a summary  of the legal 
chronology  of EU SSR Guinea Bissau see Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2008). The EU SSR 
Guinea-Bissau is legally framed by  the Council Joint Action (Council of the European Union 2008; 
EUR-LEX 2008; International Security Information Service 2008).
As stated by the Head of SSR EU in Guinea-Bissau, “The EU SSR is the first mission of this 
kind which covers army, police and the justice sector. In the Democratic Republic of Congo the EU 
also did a SSR mission but it only focused on the army and police” (interview with Gen. Juan 
Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010). The EU press release says that 
this EU mission will advise the government of Guinea-Bissau on reforming the security sector and 
it is willing to cooperate with other donors10 (Council of the European Union 2007, 2008a). What 
the press release means by  security sector is clarified in the Council Joint Action where it  is written 
that the EU team will advise the government in the downsizing and restructuring of the armed and 
security forces (Council of the European Union 2008:2). For this military advisory mission, a 
general, Juan Esteban Veràstegui, has been appointed as the Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 
(Afriquenligne 2008; Council of the European Union 2008; European Agenda 2008; Political and 
Security Committee 2008). According to him, the objectives of the EU SSR mission are: 
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10  Apart from UN agencies, there are also countries involved in SSR in Guinea-Bissau, such as Brazil, 
Angola, China, Portugal, France, UK, as emerged by interviews with policy makers working in SSR in 
Guinea Bissau.
restructuring and resizing of the army and putting it under the control of the democratic 
institutions of the state; reducing police bodies from eight  to three, Police Public Order, 
National Guard and Judicial Police; ameliorate the structure of the justice sector and its relation 
with the Judicial Police (interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR 
Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010).
From an analysis of the Council Joint Action document which presents the EU SSR mission, its 
rationale, objectives and structure, it emerges that this mission is a EU technical mission aiming at 
advising the government of the recipient country on military and related security  issues. However, it 
should be noticed that this document is ambiguous about many issues. Its opening line says that the 
promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa and Europe is a key priority of the Joint Africa-
EU Strategy. This statement missed out a key conceptual component of this strategy which is 
development. In fact, the aim of this EU-Africa strategy is to bridge the development gap between 
the two political areas with the promotion of sustainable development. This missing word cannot or 
should not be regarded as a “touch-typing error”; it indicates that the mission focuses on issues 
which relate to peace and security  only. The usage of terms such as peace, stability, Africa, Europe, 
implies that  the meaning of the concept of security, in this context, is more related to state security 
rather than human development/security. The second paragraph has also a missing word. It says that 
SSR is “essential for the stability  and sustainable development of that country”. Here the missing 
word is security, which should replace stability or be added next to development, considering that 
this paragraph is dedicated to SSR policies. These first two paragraphs are highly ambiguous: not 
only have they  missed out the concepts of development when talking about development policies, 
and the one of security when talking about SSR. They  have not provided any explanation on how a 
strategy introduced to deal with peace and security is linked to a policy titled Security  Sector 
Reform which, according to the text, deals only with the state army.
The European scribe tried to make up for this conceptual disarray by  stating, in the eighth 
paragraph, that a “European and Security Defence Policy (ESDP) action in the field of SSR in 
Guinea-Bissau would be appropriate, consistent with, and complimentary to, European 
Development Fund and other Community activity”. Thus this paragraph gives to the EU mission a 
security/defence identity  which fits within SSR concerns. How and why  this happens is left  unsaid. 
Moreover, development, here, is stated as part of a title for a financial fund from which money for 
the mission is withdrawn. How these policies are essential for sustainable development is not 
clarified. The only clear issue is that a development fund is used to finance a technical defence 
advisory mission in Guinea-Bissau (personal communication with EU officials working in SSR 10 
June 2008).
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The ambiguity about the EU role in the SSR of Guinea-Bissau is visible in the title and this 
might influence the perception of the people of Guinea-Bissau about the expectations of the EU 
involvement in this reform. The title of this mission “EU SSR Guinea-Bissau” should be instead 
“EU Defence Advisory Mission to Guinea-Bissau” this because in the Council Joint Act, it is 
written that the objective of this mission is to give advice and assistance on SSR “in order to 
contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy”. Thus, there 
is a discrepancy between the objective and the title of the mission: the former is to create the 
conditions, the background, for implementing these policies, while the latter might be perceived as 
if the EU is implementing those very same policies. It derives that a precise title for this mission 
should then be “EU Defence Advisory Mission Preparatory to SSR implementation in Guinea-
Bissau”.
In its role as an advisor, it  is obvious that the EU has got expectations about the engagement of 
national stakeholders and the positive results of this political process:
The EU expects that  Guinea-Bissau is responsible. The principle of local ownership forces the 
government to boost the SSR process within its own state institutions as any other state 
governed by the rule of law. The political bodies in charge of the SSR process is the Inter-
ministerial Committee presided by the Prime Minister, while the body that controls the process 
is the Steering Committee presided by the Minister of Defence and its Permanent Secretary and 
here is where representatives of foreign countries and organisations sit with an advisory and not 
an executive responsibility which lies with the national government. The very fine line that 
separates advising, taking responsibilities and initiative causes that  the timeframes of Brussels 
and Bissau collide creating frustrations in all sides due to the delays in the implementation of 
SSR (interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 
2010).
Together with the EU expectations there are also those of the government of Guinea-Bissau towards 
the international community supporting the SSR which are spelt out in the analysis of the SSR 
documents produced by the national government.  
Guinea-Bissau: the Government Script
The institutional framework of the restructuring and modernisation of the Defence and Security 
sector of Guinea-Bissau is Decree N.1 of June 2007 (Republic of Guiné-Bissau 2007:11). However, 
the starting date for “talking SSR” in Guinea-Bissau is 2006, when in a meeting in Geneva titled 
“Security and Development” its government presented two national strategy  documents: the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy  Paper and the Security Sector Reform plan. Out of 538 million dollar 
asked by the government, they obtained pledges for 262.51 million dollars (World Bank 2008b). 
The government of Guinea-Bissau formally launched the SSR program on 23 January  2008 (UN 
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GA 2008b:6) and soon after it presented it  to a donors’ conference (Républic of Guinea-Bissau 
2008). In this presentation, the government clarifies how development and security concerns find 
separate responses in separate policy papers: PRSP and SSR. It says that the PRSP of Guinea-
Bissau aims at alleviating poverty, and it is “based on a profound analysis of the human 
development situation in Guinea-Bissau” (Républic of Guinea-Bissau 2008:2). The key pillars for 
achieving this objective are: strengthening governance, economic growth, access to basic services 
above all for the most vulnerable people. In introducing SSR policies, the government says that “the 
SSR Strategy Document was based on different national and international documents, in line with 
the OECD guidelines” (Républic of Guinea-Bissau 2008:3), and that the key pillars of the SSR are: 
modernizing the armed forces; strengthening the security forces; and reforming the justice sector. 
The link between the two policy papers is given by their focus on governance, which includes the 
reform of security and defence forces. Within SSR, the significance of the reform of the judiciary is 
seen in relation with the security of the country. It is said that Guinea-Bissau needs a functional 
judicial system for fighting organised crime related to drug trafficking, a problem that affects 
Europe as much as Guinea-Bissau. In another SSR related document, the judiciary  sector is treated 
together with security, and focuses on the construction of prisons (Républica de Guiné Bissau – 
Comité Interministerial para a Reestructuração e Modernização do Sector da Defesa e Segurança 
2006).
The government of Guinea-Bissau introduces the document which illustrates the reforms of the 
defence and security sector, declaring its conceptual debt to the OECD guidelines, and agreeing 
with the interpretation that sees a transformation of the defence sector as a precondition for 
sustainable development (Republic of Guinea-Bissau Inter-ministerial Committee 2006:3). The 
background depicted to justify the need for SSR includes a summary  of the army, police and 
judiciary  sectors which highlights the strong influence of the army  in the political life of the country 
facilitated by the period of the single-party regime; and oversized bodies of armed and security 
forces, aged, untrained and poorly equipped. The dire living conditions of its citizens, their 
widespread poverty  and threats such as AIDS and natural disasters are seen as constraints for the 
achievement of SSR, but not as issues which should be directly addressed by  these development-
security policies. In particular, the year of civil war in 1998-99 is seen as the major cause of 
national poverty  and hampering development. This is at odds with a quick look at  the classification 
of Guinea-Bissau within the HDI by the UNDP which shows that in the last fifteen years the 
country  has always been listed within the bottom ten countries of the index. While the destructive 
effects of any  war are undeniable, this document does not extrapolate the source of poverty, or the 
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source of wealth from which the population would have benefited if the war had not occurred. 
Moreover, the document lacks any  explanation of how and why  a well-trained army and police can 
impact human development entitlements of citizens. It only states that:
In such a context, Guinea-Bissau’s survival clearly depends on solving the security question, 
which is also the key to a fresh start on the road to sustained development. Transforming the 
defence and security sector is hence the prior condition for internal stability, peace in the sub-
region, and development. Thus, solving the security question will create the necessary 
conditions for asserting the Rule of Law, and promoting economic growth and human 
development (Republic of Guinea-Bissau Inter-ministerial Committee 2006:25).
This leaves unanswered the question of how lack of war, in itself, creates development 
entitlements. From this presentation to donors, it comes out that the government’s effort of linking 
development and security concerns has been translated into practice by formulating two separate 
documents, the PRSP and SSR (For more detailed information about the resizing and restructuring 
of the defence and security sectors see Republic of Guinea Bissau 2007; Républica de Guiné Bissau 
- Comité Interministerial para a Reestructuraçao e Modernizaçao do Sector da Defesa e Segurança 
2006). The existence of these policy  papers is not per se plausible evidence that development and 
security are addressed together as they follow separate conceptual trends, respectively human 
development and OECD guidelines of SSR, and it  remains unclear what should bridge the gap 
between the two. Perhaps the government of Guinea-Bissau expected the EU to fill this gap and 
solve the development-security question of the country:
There have been growing expectations from the politicians of Guinea-Bissau that  this EU 
mission was essential for SSR and that  it  was the panacea for the country. Moreover, civil 
society was left  at the margin of this process due to lack of didactic work by the government 
that could not  be overcome by the EU pedagogical efforts. It  has to be taken into account that  an 
overdoing of the EU in this issue would have consolidated the widespread image that  it  is the 
EU which is reforming the army and the police with ‘obscure’ objectives of controlling Guinea-
Bissau. Following the political events in April 2010 the EU is reconsidering its participation in 
this project  creating panic among the ruling class which disseminates the false reality, probably 
to blackmail the EU, that without EU involvement there could be no SSR (interview with Gen. 
Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010).
Facing with these sets of expectations by  the SSR coach and actor, it is important to analyse the 
wording used to frame the development-security question of Guinea-Bissau and its policy answer to 
understand, away from the mist of expectations and perception of this reform, what SSR in Guinea-
Bissau is all about.
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THE SSR LANGUAGE
From the above reading of the SSR script produced by the government, it derives that: a) SSR 
are policies aiming at  the defence and security sector. This sector includes the army and the various 
police bodies. The inclusion of the justice sector is seen as accompanying the reforms of these 
bodies rather than be included for antonomasia; b) the aim is to restructure and modernise the army 
and the police; c) the underlying belief of these policies is that  a restructured and modern army and 
police will prevent conflicts and reduce people’s poverty; d) the factotum of these policies is the 
state which also has to ensure that development concerns will be addressed once security  sectors are 
modern and functional.
The study  of the language used in the SSR is necessary because it reveals more information 
about the significance and objectives of these policies. The policy document under investigation is 
the strategy document of this reform, and it is titled “Restructuring and Modernisation of the 
Defence and Security  Sector” (Republic of Guinea Bissau – Inter-ministerial Committee of the 
Restructuring and Modernisation of the Defence and Security Sector 2006). The language of the 
title reveals the subject and objective of the reform, respectively: the defence and security  sector 
and its restructuring and modernisation. The designation of this sector as defence and security  is a 
modification of the OECD definition of this sector which includes: core security actors; oversight 
bodies; justice and the rule of law; and non-statutory security forces (OECD 2007:22). This 
definition is also validated by DfID, which has been at the fore front in the promotion of these 
policies. Thus, the title of this document points out a distinction that policy  makers had tried to 
overcome: the one between defence and security actors and the inclusion of other bodies involved 
in guaranteeing the freedom from fear to citizens. This title also introduces a fragmented and 
reduced view of security which jeopardises and confuses the role of the judicial sector. If the title 
aimed at clarifying the object of the reforms, namely the army and the police bodies, is the absence 
of the judiciary sector within the title a sign that: the judiciary  is included within one of them? Or 
that the judiciary is excluded? Or that the role of the judiciary  is secondary as it will be mentioned 
only when it is necessary for the reform of the other sectors? In fact, all three hypotheses seem to 
hold. This document does not specify where the judiciary  is included, but it says that its support is 
essential for these reforms.
Another document, which illustrates the SSR action plan (Republic of Guiné-Bissau 2007) and 
which derives from the previous document, indicates four separate sectors included in the reform: 
defence, security, judiciary, and the sector for combatants for the homeland liberty. Both these 
documents say  in their titles “the restructuring and modernisation of the defence and security 
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sector”. The wording of these documents shows a conceptual difference, not a simple lexicon 
ambiguity. It calls into question the synergies among different state departments that is the main 
constitutive feature of these policies; it fragments and traps government’s concerns and efforts 
within isolated departments; and it prevents the domino effect of these policies which was 
envisaged to benefit the whole government.
The title of this document also states that the objectives of these policies are the restructuring and 
modernisation of this sector. This creates even more ambiguity. In fact, it was not necessary to have 
such a long title, as it could simply have been “Security Sector Reform of Guinea-Bissau”. Those 
who redacted these policies felt the need to specify that this reform is about restructuring and 
modernising. They did not use the word transformation, even if it is used several times in the text, 
but more importantly  they did not use the term democratisation. The ‘democratic control of the 
armed forces’ is one of the famous SSR slogans because it  embeds all SSR beliefs: the importance 
of having a democratic state system ables to exercise its control over the armed forces, this to 
prevent conflicts and reduce poverty. The SSR document of Guinea-Bissau does not mention this 
slogan at all, nor does it mention the need for a ‘civilian oversight’ of the armed forces, which is 
another SSR favourite. Instead it gives prominence to issues such as Rule of Law, usually 
accompanied by the adjective ‘democratic’. This slogan is always written in capital letter, to 
indicate that its conceptual meaning goes beyond the wording. The Rule of Law indicates the 
government’s will to operate within rules which have been democratically approved, and to reform 
institutions to enhance their capacity and highlight their responsibilities to operate according to an 
approved legal corpus.
The language used to justify SSR fits in with the securitisation of development which designates 
war as the culprit  for the country’s dire economic and social conditions. What is striking is that 
these reforms are seen as an attempt of the country to “begin afresh”, as mentioned in the text of 
this document. In the past, it was the colonial calendar which made tabula rasa of a country’s 
history and marked a fresh start  according to Western Rule of Law. The meaning of this new start 
might be related to a new policy  or political environment, which promises to address together 
development and security concerns. This linkage is not explained in the document, and statements 
such as ‘creating the conditions for’ remained isolated in the text, unexplained. What the document 
makes clear, however, is that the reforms of the defence and security sectors will concern men only. 
For instance, when talking about staff reduction and the number of people employed in the land 
army, it is stated “Land army component: 50% of personnel, i.e. 1720 men”. According to the 
language used, men only  will be employed in the: Land, Navy, Air force army; in the public order 
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police; in the national guard; in the state information service; and in the judicial police. Setting the 
tone for this over”man”ning in the defence and security sectors, was the description of the 
justification for these reforms: “the strong influence of the revolutionary  ideology, seeking to 
construct a new society with a new man, impregnated the administration of justice which was given 
the supreme role of defending the interests of the revolutionary state against its enemies” (Republic 
of Guinea Bissau – Inter-ministerial Committee of the Restructuring and Modernisation of the 
Defence and Security Sector 2006:8 emphasis added). This “man”power in the defence and 
security sectors carries out the image that the duty  to defend women - who are never mentioned in 
the text  – is a men only responsibility. Indeed, gender strategies were not considered in this SSR 
(Gya & Thomsen 2009; Valasek 2008).
The Guinea Bissau SSR document does not bridge the gender gap, as it does not explain how a 
bridge can be built between a restructured and modern army and the reduction of poverty 
experienced by the people of this country. Despite the cross-referenced policy papers of this reform, 
many foreign experts stationed in hotels waiting for a conducive moment for talking about 
restructuring and modernising the armed forces, and the usage of an ambitious but ambiguous 
language, all reveals that the meaning of security and development in this SSR might not match the 
expectations, perceptions and results in what appeared to be a promising policy context.
SSR GUINEA-BISSAU AND THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS
After having analysed the context of poverty and insecurity of Guinea-Bissau and the legal 
framework of its SSR it is now time to look at how SSR policies have translated into practice the 
development-security nexus. First of all, it is necessary to point out what  is the meaning of security 
and development embedded in these policies.
The security  objectives of this reform relate to state security  actors, in particular the army and 
the police. The objectives of this reform, which have been classified in specific, short, mid and long 
term, all focus on the resizing, restructuring and modernisation of defence and security sector, as 
listed in the SSR Action Plan (Republic of Guiné-Bissau 2007). Even in the long term objectives, 
that should favour a broader vision of security, the state military  security  apparatus remains the 
focus “to propitiate the environment for the economic development, ending up  with the Armed 
Forces being perceived as ‘national burden’”. The type of security addressed by SSR policies is the 
state military/security  sector, and the EU involvement in this reform is a defence advice exercise 
that has been carried out within the limits of its cooperation mandate (Agência Bissau Media e 
Publicaçoes 2008; Delegação da Comissão Europeia na Guiné-Bissau 2007, 2008).
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The problem with this selected view of security is that the theoretical background of these 
policies calls for a meaning of security which is people-centred and that includes development 
concerns. From this changing conceptualisation of development and security it  derives that security 
is no longer a field which is military-only, but the ‘round table’ where the state security reform is 
discussed should also include development actors, civil society groups and other representatives of 
the people whose security  is at stake. This purpose of having a more comprehensive group is not 
because a narrow view of security as military-only requires nowadays a concerted effort to be 
implemented, but because this concerted action testifies that a narrow view of security is inadequate 
to solve the national security and development questions.
In Guinea-Bissau, the presentation of a defence reform using the SSR language has caused a 
domino effect of international policy  makers’ expectations and commitments. This has put a strain 
on Guinea-Bissau, where advices and technicalities are set off against scarce national economic 
resources which should finance the bulk of SSR promises. What was presented as a program for 
restructuring the armed and police forces with the support of the EU turned out to be a “crowded” 
program, and segmented into different donors and budgetary lines (interview with UN officials 
working on SSR in Guinea-Bissau 12 June 2008). The view that it is a crowded project is also 
shared by the Head of EU SSR:
SSR is a complex and ambitious project  where there is a place for everyone. The crucial 
problem is coordination. From one side there is the obsession of UNOGBIS that says that  they 
have the role to coordinate the international community; on the other side there is the 
government of Guinea-Bissau which is not capable or interested in assuming its responsibilities 
of local ownership in order to give guidelines and coordinate the efforts of the SSR participants 
(interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010).
This coordination problem is also due to a misuse of SSR language. While in the name of the 
development-security nexus the SSR framework foresees a large participation of security and 
development partners, development actors directly engaged in SSR and willing to tackle the 
development question find themselves without an adequate theoretical framework of action; and 
without a budgetary support. While the attention that international actors give to SSR is a blessing 
for these policies, this multi-focused character of SSR can transform this attention in a two-bladed 
knife. The framework of these policies is segmented during their implementation phase and divided 
among implementing actors who tailor their engagement according to their expertise and interest. 
Their search for their most suitable field of engagement within many policy objectives is 
accompanied by their interpretation of these policies which ends up informing/transforming the 
policy itself. This implies a loss of conceptual unity of these policies, making co-ordination 
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impossible, and engaging the government in too many  dialogues, in too many  fronts, and having to 
divert resources to too many sectors. Therefore, the plurality  of actors involved with different 
mandates, budgetary lines and experts; the difficulties in using a whole-government approach in a 
fragile institutional environment; and the setting of ambitious SSR objectives at odds with a country 
ravaged by poverty, are all contributing to a policy impasse.
In the SSR agenda, poverty  reduction is included only as an indirect objective, together with 
democracy, human rights and the environment (République de Guinée-Bissau 2006:12). 
Development concerns are not addressed by SSR, as also stated in an interview “The EU SSR 
mission does not have any task directly associated with development” (interview with Gen. Juan 
Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May  2010). The only suggestion that there 
was a ‘development component’ in SSR related to civil servants’ salaries:
The ‘development’ component  of the Security Sector Reform package presented in Geneva back 
in November 2006 was partially endorsed by the international community by means of 
supporting the emergency State budget to pay for salaries for civil servants while envisaging a 
larger reform of the public administration (personal communication with a UN official 9 June 
2008).
From the analysis of the policy  documents of this SSR, development is generally regarded as 
something that the government of Guinea-Bissau can do once its army and police are resized, 
restructured and well equipped. Despite the background of national poverty, SSR policies only 
respond to a precise state security  issue. By stating that SSR prepare the condition for development, 
the government and donors’ states have managed to get ‘development people’ on board, and use all 
the bureaucracy linked to the development sector (financial resources, workers, access to 
government personnel) to facilitate their implementation. Apart from the presence of this 
development apparatus, the way development is regarded by  SSR is through its postponement to an 
unknown future.
The interpretation of security as state security and the postponement of development are 
accompanied by  a long timeline of implementation of these policies whose expectations and 
perceptions of all stakeholders, including the people of Guinea-Bissau, might converge or clash:
SSR is a medium-long term process in which not  only work must be done in the technical field, 
namely the organisation and optimisation of the inadequate security structure, but it  is necessary 
to modify the ‘mentality’ of those who are part  of this structure. This jobs will last  generations 
and therefore we start by taking technical measures which are accompanied by training of 
people to achieve an adequate functioning of the reformed institutions. At the same time, it  is 
necessary to modify the habits which have deformed the perception  of the functions of the 
security structure above all in a country that has achieved, de jure but  not de facto, a separation 
‘armed forces-state governance’ intimately linked since the independence from Portugal in 1974 
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(interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010, 
emphasis added).
In conclusion, it seems that perception is played at three different levels in the SSR Guinea-
Bissau. Donors’ states have the perception that in a policy settings with a security  and development 
shortfall, a policy  package such as SSR is the adequate tool for giving a comprehensive response 
under the sponsorship of the development-security nexus for which there is a vast consent among 
donors’ states. This banner has guaranteed the support of a large number of states and this is 
unusual for a small African country. However, what makes this state security reform appealing at 
European eyes is also that this country is used as an international hub for drug-trafficking (UNODC 
2007) which endangers European security: in fact, the EU SSR is a ESPD mission (personal 
communication with EU officials working in SSR 9 June 2008).
For Guinea-Bissau, presenting a reform of its security forces under the banner of SSR which 
followed OECD guidelines and underlying the importance of the development-security nexus 
approach guaranteed that this reform would have been positively perceived and approved by foreign 
donors, raising hope that this foreign involvement will finance the reform, reduction, modernisation 
of the security sector as well as dealing with the issue of the combatants for the homeland liberty. 
What has happened is that once the backing of foreign donors was obtained, they  limited their 
involvement to an advisory role, and the task of matching the objectives of these policies with the 
political and economic capacity of one of the poorest countries of the world was left with the 
national government.
As far as the people of Guinea-Bissau is concerned, it is unknown how their perception of a 
malfunctioning security sector and the fact of seeing representatives of rich donor states only 
advising on state security issues rather than focusing on ameliorating their poor living conditions 
will make them react in case of a declared failure of these policies. While according to donors’ 
mentality it is necessary to deal with the state so that the state can deal with its own people, in a 
country  ravaged by poverty this expectation is dim if not broken. Rather than the selective meaning 
of security embedded in SSR, it  seems that it is the postponement of development efforts and the 
vision that financial resources must be put on state security first and human development later what 
might doom SSR policies as they do not match the expectations of people and their perception that 
the link between their development and their security cannot be left to an unknown future.
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CONCLUSION
This case study has investigated the meaning of development, security  and their nexus embedded in 
SSR policies implemented in Guinea-Bissau. The study has revealed a notion of security which 
focuses on the state’s army and security forces without offering a wider formulation that includes 
other political actors involved in creating citizens’ security and development. The analysis of the 
design of these policies has highlighted how the link between development and security is still very 
much dependent on a vision of security  linked to the state’s armed forces, and of development 
which is linked to the state capacity to govern them. 
140
VII. CONCLUSION
This thesis has investigated the relation between development and security focusing primarily on 
the interface that these two discourses developed in the 1990s. I regarded this decade as a watershed 
for development and security  due to the elaboration of innovative conceptualisations such as human 
development and human security which constituted the basis for the formulation of the 
development-security nexus. I argued that the novelty of human development and human security is 
not a radical change of focus but a proclaimed mutual interdependence to an extent that nowadays it 
is no longer possible to talk about development without security  and vice versa. Thus, the analysis 
of the current promotion of the development-security nexus trend in international development and 
security policies must include a critical understanding of the meanings of development and security 
when their discourses are regarded as merged. It is also necessary to question this interdependence 
and analyse the theory and practice that see development and security issues as reciprocally 
reinforcing each other. This was the objective of this thesis.
The starting point of this research was not to take for granted the development-security nexus but 
to investigate the significance and interpretation of their merged concerns, and how they are 
operationalised. The investigation on the elaboration of the development-security nexus was broken 
down into three main areas of interest related to the different meanings of development and security 
focusing in particular on human development and human security; the various interpretations of the 
development-security nexus since the 1990s; and the analysis of how Security Sector Reform, 
publicised as the best illustration of development-security  nexus policies, are designed to translate it 
into practice.
This path of analysis was chosen because I regarded the meaning of development and security 
not as unique and predefined but as constructed according to interests, concerns, challenges of 
international relation actors. Thus in line with other critical theories of IR, especially Critical 
Security Studies and Post-Development Theories, this study has taken a Post-Positivist approach. It 
derives that the research question did not aim at testing hypotheses according to a right or wrong 
way of regarding development and security, but it investigated the meaning of development and 
security within the development-security nexus approach.
The critical view of IR and in particular the Critical Security Studies literature fed into this study 
because this research is contextualised within an international scenario where hierarchies of power 
such as state/citizens, developed/underdeveloped, North/South of the world are questioned through 
an analysis of how development, security  and international relations are constructed by a vast array 
of actors. The critical view of this thesis towards current dominant theoretical and operational 
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orientations of the development-security  nexus had also the purpose to question the person-centric 
ethos embedded in the conceptualisation of human development and human security.
This thesis highlighted the importance of unpacking the contested meanings of these terms and 
of being aware of the relations of power and interests behind the language that is used to frame a 
particular discourse. This is why  “critical”, in this thesis, means an approach that interrogates 
assumptions, investigates the “semantic battlefield” provided by concepts, and highlights different 
perspectives that look at the development-security nexus equation. The thesis’ originality and 
contribution to these bodies of literature lie in not taking for granted the validity and meaning of the 
development-security nexus but to bring to the fore the plurality  of meanings and interests that are 
implicit in this catch-phrase.
The summary of the path of research undertaken is the following: after the introductory chapter 
one, chapter two analysed the changing interpretations of development and security  focusing on 
human development and human security. This because with their formulation in the 1990s, policy 
makers acknowledged that there was a nexus between development and security  that was centred on 
the human being. In particular the chapter investigated the significance of ‘human’ in human 
development and security, and how this focus was different from the traditional development and 
security concerns that had privileged respectively state economic growth and state security. The 
chapter argued that human development and security were not radical new phenomena because 
even if they used a powerful discourse linked to a concern for humanity, they lacked in 
operationalising their concerns.
Chapter three was devoted to the study of how the link between development and security has 
been interpreted since the 1990s. I investigated the nature of this interdependence and mutual 
reinforcement, and in particular of two theoretical trends that underpinned this nexus called the 
developmentalisation of security  and the securitisation of development. These two trends that 
marked, respectively, the interpretation of the development-security  nexus in the 1990s and in 
2000s, are not expressing opposite views, according to which security is developmentalised and 
development is securitised. I saw them on a continuum, because human security asserted that there 
was a nexus between development and security  issues, while the securitisation of development said 
that development should be used for conflict prevention. The chapter included an analysis of the 
implementation aspect of the development-security nexus, the primary  illustration of which are 
SSR policies. The chapter continued with an analysis of the various interpretations of SSR by 
academics and policy  makers by  showing how their design depends on the ways in which 
development, security and their interlinkages are defined. The chapter argued that this set of 
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policies challenges the theory of the development-security nexus because even if conceptually 
development and security are merged, in practice they remain distinct or, at worst, the ‘human’ 
focus of their concerns disappears towards a renewed focus on the state.
Chapters IV, V and VI included three case studies, respectively  Armenia, Afghanistan and 
Guinea-Bissau. These case studies provided an in-depth analysis of the significance that 
development and security  acquired in the design of these policies. The Armenia case showed that 
concerns addressed by SSR are not new but are part of the attention to state governance that 
nowadays is also promoted by  SSR. What is new is the usage of the language of human 
development and human security  to question and scrutinise the capacity of the state to maintain and 
govern its monopoly of force. While the Armenia case is useful in contextualising SSR within a 
broader policy dimension centred on state governance of its security sector, the Afghanistan and 
Guinea-Bissau cases are specifically  on SSR and on how development and security concerns are 
framed within the SSR policy design. These two case studies reveal that SSR policies respond to 
state security concerns only  (or predominantly) despite using the wording of human development 
and human security. What SSR polices tackle directly is the security of the state and its capacity  to 
control, democratically, its armed force. Therefore these case studies challenge the simplistic view 
that human development and human security imply the end of the state as the centre of theorising 
about development and security. Instead, the thesis concluded, with SSR we have a reassertion of 
the state as a direct beneficiary of these policies despite the language of human security/
development used to promote them.
The originality and contribution of these arguments to the literature on the theory and practice of 
the development-security nexus is to have highlighted that phrases such as the “development-
security nexus” and “security  sector reform” are inadequate to convey a clear idea about security 
and development needs and achievements. Thus, what is necessary is not so much hypothesising the 
need for a post-SSR but an awareness of the urgency of dealing with the development and security 
deficit of people, and analysing how the choice of framing development and security  in a certain 
way influences the tools that people have at their disposal to deal with these issues.
In this regard this research will be helpful to other academics and policy makers working on the 
interrelated fields of development and security  because it underlines that it is pointless to put at the 
fore front of these discourses some interlinkages without elucidating their significance. My  research 
could be extended in new but related directions in particular on the elaboration of the notion of the 
state implicit in SSR and how this could contribute to new approaches towards development and 
security and new policy opportunities.
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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
The study of the evolving meaning of development and security  has revealed that their focus was 
also on the ‘density’ of these concepts. Namely, security  was defined as hard and soft (Aldis & Herd 
2004; Lindley-French 2004); development and security  as plastic words (Echavarría Alvarez 1982; 
Poerksen 1995) or security as fluid (Pettiford & Curley  1999). The interpretation of this density 
related to the deepening and widening of security and development issues as part of the evolving 
nature of international relations.
Considering the changing significance of these issues, the starting point of this thesis was the 
analysis of human development and human security because both discourses were regarded as 
interrelated since when in the 1990s they found in the human being a common ground where 
centring their concerns. However, saying that there is a nexus between development and security is 
not enough: it is important to research the nature of this interdependence often cited in policy 
papers (DfID 2000; OECD 2007; UNDP 1994). I investigated the meaning of this interdependence 
and mutual reinforcement, and in particular of two theoretical trends that underpinned this nexus 
called the developmentalisation of security and the securitisation of development.
I argued that  the emphasis on the concern for the human being in the development and security 
discourse in the 1990s was not such a radical new phenomenon. This because human development, 
despite stressing the need for changing the way development was so far conceived, did not offer any 
implementing routes for addressing the development question. This study analysed the evolving 
significance of development and the impact that the elaboration of human development had in 
human security and in the formulation of the development-security  nexus. Tracing the origin and 
the transformation of the idea and spirit of development implied a study  on how those occupying a 
position of policy power shaped policy interventions in the name of modernisation, of solving 
underdevelopment, of satisfying basic need rights, of fulfilling human development entitlements, 
and of addressing the need to guaranteeing them. The power of the humanism of the 1990s 
expressed by  human development was presented as creating a new development paradigm which 
gained a wide consensus for proposing a reading of the development problématique centred on the 
human being; on state’s culpability when development achievements are not met; and, as it will be 
stressed above all by  the human security discourse, on the international system of states 
responsibility when individual states fail to act.
Despite the cited victory of ‘the human spirit’ after the waning of the Cold War (UNDP 1990:III) 
paved the way to the elaboration of human development, the meaning of ‘human’ in human 
development was almost taken for granted. However, the analysis of primary  sources produced by 
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international policy makers revealed how human development highlighted first  and foremost the 
limits of economic growth packages. The interpretation of development as human development was 
not used to dismantle neoliberal economic models but to show their inadequacy, as also seen by  the 
numerous street protests during the 1980s and 1990s (Danaher et al 2001).
Thus, the emergence of human development happened at a time when the critique of neoliberal 
policies underpinning the lost decade was quite loud. This situation is not  coincidental and it reveals 
that the link between human development and economic growth model to development is not of a 
secondary  importance in the analysis of this concept. As we have seen in chapter II, human 
development highlighted the limit  of economic models that conceptualised development too 
narrowly without taking into account the need to enlarge people’s choices (UNDP 1990:10). 
However, it did not propose a strategy that replaced or modified those existing ones that were 
economic-growth driven. So, if human development can also be regarded as a trend that opposes a 
narrow economically  driven view of development, is its strength to be found only in its oppositional 
discourse (Ranis 2004)? Or in expressing a new development era by regarding the human being at 
the centre of its discourse (UNDO 1990)? Or in having included the contextualisation of the 
development problematics into a wider scenario where issues such as security, conflict, access to 
resources and so on are all interlinked and dependent on the responsibility of state(s) to guarantee 
them (UNDP 1994)?
In the thesis I argued that human development is just a powerful policy statement in the sense 
that it has not  been operationalised because the international consensus that it achieved clashed 
against the role of the state as agent of development, and the credo that human development could 
not be concretised without it. Thus, I contended, the development approach of human development 
needed to be taken further above all in relation to the ability  of the state to fulfil the human 
development entitlements of its citizens. This attention to state management capacity was later 
promoted by the human security perspective. In this regard, more than a merge of their interests 
based on sharing a people-centred approach, human development/security showed how 
development and security entitlements were tied to the state as their guarantor. Thus, rather than 
dislodging the state (Booth & Vale 1995), these concepts emphasised the significance of the state in 
addressing development and security issues.
My argument is that when talking about human development it is important to analyse its 
relation not only with other models of development, but also with human security and the merge of 
their discourses, and how all this was later on conceptualised within the policy design of SSR 
policies. In particular, its promotion as a people-centred approach gave to it the fame to be pro-
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people and against state’s interests when these jeopardise people’s interests. As seen in chapter II, 
the human development paradigm that emerged in the 1990s preached to pay attention to a broader 
range of development entitlements such as access to health, knowledge, political participation (Sen 
1999). However, this widening of development entitlements was not accompanied by the design of 
new development strategies to achieve them (Srinivasan 1994:241). Despite being an oppositional 
concept it was not so radical as an approach to reorient economic polices, so much that market-led 
economic growth policies remained in vogue. What changed was the view of economic growth as a 
mean and not an end to development (UNDP 1996:1), but this view was not operationalised.
The weakness of human development in its criticism of economic growth models put into 
question also its people-centred approach. This because, this concept reversed the hierarchy of the 
terms of the equation, such as economic growth as a means and not an end and the role of the state, 
but without constituting a radical change of its discourse. If up  to the 1990s development was a 
state-only issue, the people-centred view of human development appeared as the novelty of the 
decade. However, rather than signing the beginning of an era where people came first when 
discussing development, I argued that this people-approach stressed even more the nexus between 
people and their respective states, considering that an international response to state failure is still 
inadequate such as in Somalia, Chad, Sudan, DRC and so on. The contribution of this thesis to the 
field of human development is that it was a policy statement that lacked implementation because it 
required a scrutiny of state capability that received a push further only  by  the view of security 
embedded in the concept of human security. These findings contributed to go beyond the false 
dichotomies human development vis-a-vis state development as if human development was siding 
with people’s interests and against the ones of states. This was done in principle, but the theory of 
human development still needed the state to guarantee citizens’ entitlements. So, rather than anti-
state the human development is very much a pro-state approach when talking about the means of 
development, and a pro-people approach when talking about the end of development.
I consider that more research is needed on human development considering the widespread 
usage of this concept by policy makers when promoting development policies above all together 
with security policies such as SSR. I deem that my research on human development may  be 
extended in new but related directions, such as the relation between human development and state 
governance in SSR. In particular more clarity is needed on the role of regional and international 
organisation to support those states which do not guarantee the “fulfilment of basic material needs 
and the achievement of human dignity” (Thomas et al 1999:3), as Thomas described the linked 
between human development and human security.
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HUMAN SECURITY
While human development had the rhetoric of reorienting the theorising about development 
around a universalist approach centred on the human being, it was with the concept of human 
security that concerns were raised over the security of development entitlements. The thesis focused 
its attention on the interpretation of security as human security because this was regarded as 
exemplifying the development-security  nexus due to its view of development and security  as 
interdependent and centred on the human being. The approach of human security is not so radically 
new compared with other orientations of security. In fact, it  keeps the state as the agent for security, 
even if as a security provider rather than a security receiver. Furthermore, its vocal support to the 
need to address together development and security issues was already included in the notion of 
sustainability in human development (WCED 1987).
My research brought to the fore that the importance of human security is not so much how it is 
defined, thus there is no right or wrong definition of human security  or the so called narrow and 
broader definition (Human Security  Centre 2005; UNDP 1994), but what it allows to research. This 
is shown by the catalytic nature of this concept that has generated diverse studies on how conflicts, 
environment, migration, health and so on affect human security, and this without a unique definition 
of human security  that is inclusive of all these discourses. In this thesis, human security guided the 
investigation on the links between diverse visions of development and security and in particular on 
the meaning and the contemporary popularity  of regarding as interdependent development and 
security interests and concerns. My contribution to the field of human security  is to have unpacked 
this term and to have analysed the meaning of human security in its two aspects: its relation with 
the state, in particular through a research on SSR, and with human development.
As far as the relation between human security  and state security is concerned, the interpretation 
of security as human security aims at doubling the political safety net of individuals. The state is 
regarded as the actor in charge of guaranteeing the human security of its citizens, but this 
responsibility is also an international one because these security rights are included within the 
universalised discourse of human rights. By  enhancing citizenship rights and human rights, the 
concept of human security  got an international consensus because the hierarchy of its human-
centred discourse did not challenge the concern over state security  through the elaboration of 
security strategies that would put state security at  stake. The fact that human security revises the 
role of the state back is significant because of the need to elucidate that its people-centred approach 
coexists with the role of the state embedded in this concept. Therefore, it  is in the analysis of the 
meaning of what is the human and what is the state in human security and how both are linked with 
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the development conceptualisation that human security  is concerned about, that the meaning(s) of 
the development-security nexus and its policy can be traced.
The interest with this argument is that  human security  does not treat the security of the individual 
in isolation from the state or in a hierarchical position above state security. It is not anti-state but 
instead it questions both the provider and receiver of security and by  doing so it focuses on the 
security relation between the state and its citizens. Thus, the core of the manifold definitions of 
human security is about the scrutiny of the management of state’s functions and how they affect the 
construction of “building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood” of people (CHS 2003:1). When 
the definition of human security includes, for instance, “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, 
disease...” (UNDP 1994:23) or regards poverty as a human security threat because it threatens the 
dignity of people (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007:9), the actor in charge of protecting people from 
poverty, hunger, disease is always the state (Buzan 2007).
The usage of human security  as a research tool poses the question if there is anything else than 
state security if the state remains, after all, the agent and addressee of security  even when security  is 
centred on the human being. My study is helpful in highlighting that human security should not be 
considered as a ‘people-security’ approach in opposition to state-security interests. It points out that 
saying human security only means questioning this security equation taking into account its various 
terms such as people, states, other actors involved in security i.e. international organisations, Private 
Military Companies and so on, how their functioning and management of security issues affect 
people, and what is the relation of governance that these people have built with these actors. 
Consequently, human security should not be regarded as a label to put on people that simply 
highlights concerns for their protection, but as a “computer mouse” that can open up different 
windows containing files to explore, and see how security is constructed or threatened, and who are 
the beneficiaries and victims of these discourses.
The analysis of the view that regards human security as securing the development entitlements
(UNDP 1994) highlighted not only  the merging of development and security  concerns, but also the 
role of the state in achieving both. While how these two discourses relate to each other will be 
analysed in the next sections devoted to the theory and practice of the development-security nexus, 
it is important here to underline how the human development interpretation has been informed and 
made dependent upon the state-centric view of human security. In fact, the human development 
approach was contextualised within a state management framework built upon the fulfilment of 
human security. This made implicit two things: one was the need to make development sustainable 
in the long term, and the other was that state management capacity  became the key  function to 
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achieve human development. This sustainability was regarded during the years as been achieved in 
different ways, from the management of natural resources (WCED 1987:43), to the management of 
the state security sector that creates an environment conducive to development (OECD 2005:16). 
This implied that human development was postponed prior the fulfilment of security conditions, 
and this despite the urgency of dealing with human beings as the referent point of development as 
expressed in the rhetoric of the human development discourse. Thus, while human security 
expressed the merge between development and security, the contextualisation of this merge 
occurred within a state-citizen relation that informed both discourses of security  and development. 
Moreover, it made human development dependent on human security which was dependent on state 
security and state development. Thus the concerns for the ‘human’ in human development/security 
could only be addressed by the capacity of the state to manage development and security. It derives 
that the strongest link between development and security in the human security  view is the 
governance management capacity of the state. The weakest link between the two is their humanness 
because despite the lexicon of these discourses pervaded by the ‘human spirit’ (UNDP 1990:III) 
their state-centric lens was not only  justified but also reinforced by  a vision that  prioritised states’ 
security in the name of addressing, at a later stage, citizens’ security and development. By taking a 
Critical Security  Studies approach that says that security  is what we make of it, the analysis of the 
theories and practices of the development-security nexus revealed the multifaceted nature of the 
significance of ‘human’ in the security/development discourse.
THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS IN THEORY
Despite being still under-researched, the development-security nexus has increasingly  made its 
appearance in primary sources of various state departments and international organisations (Collier 
et al 2003; DfID 2000; OECD 2007; UN 2004, 2005a, UN 2005b; UNDP 1994). The novelty of this 
approach is that it  regards development and security  as having shared concerns and reinforcing each 
other, namely using one to operationalise the other. Achieving development, then, to have security, 
and vice versa. If at first blush this nexus appears straightforward because of the obvious 
importance of having development guaranteed, as a second thought saying that there is a nexus 
between development and security is not the same thing as saying that one needs the other and vice 
versa.
The main point of my thesis was the need to question the development-security  nexus which 
remains a hollow statement unless the meaning of development, security  and their commonality  is 
clarified, as well as the base from which their interdependence is analysed. Theoretically, the nexus 
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between development and security  is expressed by human security  which asserts the need to secure 
development entitlements. The nexus, in this regard, is that both human development and human 
security have a concern for the human being. However, an analysis of the meaning of these two 
concepts shows that the concern for the human being is the rationale for a continued attention to the 
state because this is regarded as the entity responsible for implementing human development and 
human security. Therefore, despite the publicised emphasis on the ‘human’ in human development 
and security, conceptually what we have is a reassertion of the state through the adoption of the 
language of humanity in security  and in development, as it came out when analysing the theories 
and practices of this nexus and in particular Security  Sector Reform. What is putting the 
development-security nexus on thin ice is not its mismatch between its rhetoric for the human and 
its theory  and practice focusing directly on the state. If it  was simply  this, the promoters of the 
nexus between development and security would be justified by saying that the state is simply  a 
mean to an end.
The gist is that the vulnerability of the development-security nexus discourse is in having failed 
so far to gain in proximity with people when conceptualising a perspective that takes into account 
both human development and human security. In this regard this argument highlights how necessary 
it is to elucidate that the consent for the human being coexists with a consent on the validity of the 
state, and that the timeframe of fulfilling the development-security nexus vision depends on the 
state willingness and capability to guarantee a dignified level of life to its citizens.
Moreover, the promotion of the nexus between development and security is usually done by 
citing their interdependence, and therefore omitting in explaining how these discourses merged 
before analysing how they can support each other. Interdependence makes the nexus discourse 
easier to sell because it creates a quicker and unanimous consensus by  gathering all those 
professionals working in the fields of development and security  by claiming that if you get one you 
will get the other. However, if we compare with the Cold War period, for instance, when 
development and security  followed parallel but independent tracks, it was the case of a close 
complementarity between them. As the nexus is formulated nowadays, it is their interdependence 
more than their complementarity that is promoted, above all if we regard the link between human 
development and human security.
When analysing the interpretation of the development-security nexus I focused on two trends, 
the developmentalisation of security in the 1990s and the securitisation of development in the 
2000s. The developmentalisation of security  is exemplified by human security which implies a 
reassertion of the state through a thorough scrutiny of its governance capabilities, despite the 
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promotion of its people-centred approach and the need to guarantee human development 
entitlements. The securitisation of development ties development assistance to the security  agenda 
to prevent conflicts and it gives particular attention to the governance of the security sector because 
of the need to keep the control of the armed forces under the state democratic governance. The 
significance of these two interpretations is how they regard the link between development and 
security. This research pointed out the need to unpack the interdependence, complementarity  but 
also it questioned the proclaimed commonality of development and security issues. Approaches 
such as the developmentalisation of security and the securitisation of development simplify  these 
interlinkages while converging their attention to the state as the starting point for guarantee security 
and development. While the state is arguably the main political actor that still centralises discourses 
on development and security, the language of human development and human security has so far 
not been powerful enough to push world actors to operationalise a vision of development and 
security that goes beyond a state to state dialogue. For instance, issues such as famine, refugees 
flows and epidemics have been regarded as humanitarian issues outside the mainstream of 
development and security  realms. Thus, the full fledged integration within the vocabulary of 
international relations of a human development and security perspective de-linked from the state is 
still in the making.
The development-security nexus vision is bound to create clashes between perceptions and 
expectations because it has its interpretation anchored to the centrality  of the state while using the 
language of human development and human security as the rationale for its promotion. This is why 
my research on the theoretical interpretation of the development-security nexus should benefit from 
further research to bring to the fore other relations of complementarity, dependence, antithesis that 
are shadowed and locked within a simplistic state-people relation and approach which so far has 
been incapable to offer a new conceptualisation and practice of the development-security  nexus 
which is not centred on the state.
The theoretical implications of this nexus for development and security  theories is that it  is an 
opportunity for a deterritorialisation of concepts that could shake the state-centric view implicit in 
the mainstream elaboration of development and security. The initial euphoria of the 1990s for the 
consent on human development and human security appeared during a decade of dissatisfaction 
with economic and security theories due to, among others, the debt crisis, states’ financial 
imbalances, and the collapsed of the Soviet  Union. This caused a feeling of inadequacy more than a 
loss of confidence towards the state as the agent of development and security. In this regard, the 
inadequacy  was linked to the failure to trickle down state’s wealth to people; to keep  up the Soviet 
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political apparatus and to predict its demise; failed to intervene to hamper atrocities in large scale 
such as in Rwanda; failed to solve issues such as the Nagorno-Karabakh which shows how a state 
militarised action or a militarised stalemate is still the way with which states deal with security 
matters. However, as shown by  the Civil Military Relations literature that  analysed the 1990s policy 
attention towards the governance of the security  sector, the state came out from this decade 
reinforced in its role of providing stability, peace, security and development.
THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS IN PRACTICE
The evolving meaning of development and security  embedded in the development-security 
nexus approach provides SSR policies with a multiplicity  of definitions, objectives and means. The 
practice of SSR is a broad area and through the three case studies two aspects have been 
investigated:
1) What is the novelty  of SSR policies considering that the concerns that they address are not  new. 
In fact, already in the 1990s international policy makers devoted their attention to the governance of 
the defence sector and the importance to contextualise it  within a national democratic political 
architecture.
2) The delineation of the spectrum of action of these policies, namely the meaning of the security 
sector of states and how this relates to security and development as defined by the SSR literature.
Furthermore, the complexity of these two aspects and the contemporary enthusiasm of international 
policy makers towards a policy tools that takes into account the development-security nexus make 
necessary a clarification of the certainties and misconceptions linked to these policies.
1) The novelty of SSR policies is said to be their expanded definitional boundaries which 
nowadays include also development concerns. In particular, what is new is the usage of the 
language of human security and human development to scrutinise and question the state. This 
attention is indeed the result of the human security  approach that is concerned with analysing the 
development and security contextualisation of the citizen within the security  apparatus of the state, 
as well as the focus on state governance of the 1990s. With the appropriation by SSR in the 2000s 
of the language of human security  and human development, it was the language more than the 
practice of these policies to have changed.
Saying that the governance of the security sector expresses the development-security  nexus 
implies that the consent for the human which created the nexus between development and security 
concerns has been absorbed or superseded by state security interests. Human security was the 
conceptual driving force behind the formulation of policies which affirm the imperative to address 
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together development and security  concerns. It was the concept which has linked concerns about 
people access to development entitlements, concerns about the security of these entitlements, and 
expressed all this through a language of “humanity”. Despite the publicity of incarnating the 
humanist spirit of the time and putting the human being before other state’s political interests, the 
language of SSR policies has adopted the technical wordings related to the governance of the 
security sector, using terms such as reform, democratic control of the armed forces, rule of law, 
civilian oversight, and so on. As we have seen through the Civil-Military Relation literature, and in 
particular with the case study of Armenia, this language was in vogue before the SSR-boom of the 
late 1990s, so much that states’ defence reforms are written with the language that is found in 
current policies titled SSR. The appropriation of this language in the 2000s coexists with the 
terminology  related to human development and human security, but this composite language seems 
unable so far to address all the concerns that it raises. This ambitious policy tool might cause a 
“backlash from ordinary  people who do not see an immediate change from SSR” (interview with 
Robin Luckham Institute of Development Studies 14 May 2010), this because of the expectations 
linked to the language of human development/security which might be perceived as providing with 
direct assistance to them as individuals rather than to their state’s élite. In this regard, the SSR 
implemented in Guinea-Bissau is an example of this set of policies raising expectations that 
external actors, such as the EU, will reform the country’s security sector.
If we look at the history of SSR and how development and security  are conceptualised in the 
development-security nexus, the focus remains on state governance capacity. This means that SSR 
policies, by focusing on the state, subvert the radical edge of the nexus that was centred on the 
consent for the human publicised by human development and security discourses. However, 
considering that the development and security of people in both discourses were regarded as 
dependent on their development/security rights guaranteed by the state, it resulted that the state was 
never really  absent. Thus this unchallenged primacy of the state calls into question the meaning of 
the development-security  nexus. This can be investigated when considering the conversion from the 
ideal multi-pronged objectives of SSR, security, development and democracy (OECD 2005:16) to 
the narrow sector-based approach that takes place when looking at SSR in practice such as prison 
reforms, International Humanitarian Law training to soldiers, police reform and so on (DfID 2003, 
2003a; OECD 2007). More than to do with ‘pragmatism’ because this sectorial approach can be 
regarded as the only  way in which SSR can be made practical, it  can also be that there is a flaw in 
the development-security nexus itself, or because SSR policies, despite various lofty proclamations, 
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have never been about anything more than a renewal of state security  with the development-security 
nexus becoming its rhetoric.
This is why I have defined SSR as a select set of policies aiming at  transforming the security 
sector of states perceived to be conflict prone and with which donor states expect to create 
international security through national policy security, and national development. This definition 
keeps the focus of SSR on state security governance while contextualising it within current 
international relations in which the governance of the security  infrastructure of the state is included 
in the agenda of Western states’ foreign policy  interventions. Moreover, it avoids mentioning human 
development/security not because these concerns are not there but because, at  the current 
conceptualisation and practice of these policies, these discourses are still anchored on the state 
despite the language that they use.
However, it has to be stressed that SSR policies are not about imposing reforms but it is a 
cooperation agreement based on states’ willingness to accept foreign donor states’ recommendations 
on how to run their security sector. The case of Afghanistan is isolated in this regard, as SSR was 
established since 2001 by lead-donor states in a country where a proper political leadership was not 
even there. As a British civil servant said “I do not know why SSR Afghanistan was called SSR, 
there is no logic to it, there was nothing to reform” (UK civil servant working on SSR 18 August 
2010).
2) The various definitions of SSR all agree that the spectrum of action of these policies is the 
security sector of the state. As said by an interviewee “SSR is about the security of the state” (UK 
civil servant working on SSR 18 August 2010). There is a consensus in the corpus of SSR literature 
on the definition of security  sector which includes the following groups of actors: core security 
actors, management and oversight bodies, justice and the rule of law and non-statutory  security 
forces (DfID 2002:7; OECD 2007:22; Valasek 2008:2). SSR policies have very broad objectives 
such as security, development, democracy and this definition of the security sector, so far 
unchallenged, as their field of action has limited their field of applicability  to this very  sector, and in 
doing so it has raised questions about the nature of the linkages between the security  actors and 
broad objectives.
If it is necessary for any policy to define its field of intervention, the issue with SSR is that by 
acting only on the security sector, even broadly defined, it  leaves unanswered how this leads to 
development, apart from the common statement that a properly done SSR minimise the risk of 
conflict. In fact, the “freedom from want” is assumed to be hampered by a lack of a fair and 
functioning state security sector (Groenewald et al 2002; Helly 2006; Narayan et al 2000). Indeed 
154
SSR, by having used the development discourse as a background to contextualise their significance 
as well as the ultimate objective of their intervention, have left unexplained how to achieve 
development results.
This implies that the meaning of development within SSR policies needs to be better formulated. 
As Nicole Ball said when interviewed about SSR, “conceptually the linkage to development was 
there, but in practice there has mainly been security, and policy  makers working on restructuring the 
security services don’t move on to the other aspects of the SSR agenda” (interview with Nicole Ball 
from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010). With SSR what is perceived as a 
postponement of development is actually  a conceptualisation of development that mainly focuses 
on the state which has to be capable to guarantee human development/security of its citizens. 
Guinea-Bissau is a case where people’s expectations, but also those of donor states’ have been 
tested on this issue. In this regard, the Council of Europe stated that the EU SSR mission in Guinea-
Bissau will terminate end of September 2010 due to:
political instability and the lack of respect for the rule of law in the country make it  impossible 
for the EU to deploy a follow-up mission, as originally foreseen, without compromising its own 
principles. ...The EU intensified its political dialogue with the Guinea-Bissau authorities and 
asked for clear signs of commitment to the principles of the rule of law. The recent nomination 
of General Antonio Indjai to the post of Chief of Defence Staff constitutes another setback to 
the process of democratic consolidation and confirms that the conditions for deployment  of the 
new mission are not met (Council of the European Union 2010:1).
This setback of the EU highlights the two big limitations of SSR as they are currently conceived: 
the delimitation of SSR to the security  sector and the issue of ownership  of these policies. As stated 
“SSR has no chances when the SSR coach is an international actor” (UK civil servant working on 
SSR 18 August 10). But what about the failure of the SSR objectives? Is a matter here of judging 
the means or the ends of SSR policies? Namely, in a country  like Guinea-Bissau where the 
militarisation of politics has been the norm so far, does it means that the impossibility to reform this 
sector has doomed this country not to achieve development? Rather than a conflict trap (Collier et 
al 2003), are we seen here that a set of security policies cannot overcome the ‘security sector trap’?
The same narrow conceptualisation of the field of applicability  of SSR to the security sector is 
seen not only in Guinea-Bissau but also in Afghanistan. In both cases, most of the policy  attention is 
given primarily to the armed forces and secondary to the police. SSR in Guinea-Bissau meant the 
EU giving advice on defence matters; in Afghanistan, states supporting SSR are mainly engaged in 
training and equipping Afghan forces so that they can replace Western soldiers at  the front lines. 
The difference is in the policy theatre: war in Afghanistan and a protracted political instability in 
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Guinea-Bissau. The focus of SSR on the governance of the security sector with a strong 
engagement on the military aspect has hollowed the significance and objectives of these policies by 
depriving them of their conceptual richness. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, policy makers had time 
to formulate the design of these polices which implied an assessment of the security sector, a plan 
for a crosscutting and whole government approach, and the usage of an appropriate methodology 
for supporting the governance of the security sector. This idyllic situations clashes with the one in 
Afghanistan where a military  intervention and a governance vacuum in Kabul required the start of a 
process of state governance building of which SSR was seen as part of it, in particular related to the 
recruitment, training and equipping of security sector actors. As we saw in the analysis of their legal 
framework, issues such as the judiciary, counter-narcotics were included in the security  sector only 
at the beginning of the SSR exercise but later were dropped (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
2005:117).
The issue about the conceptualisation of the security sector in SSR policies seems to have 
affected the results of these policies more than the context itself. In the wide and complex spectrum 
of insecurity that a country can experience, SSR are regarded as a series of appropriate security 
responses, as seen by  the many programs related to the security sector that can branch off from the 
SSR policy label (OECD 2007). However, in these settings of insecurity, policy makers refer to 
SSR as the reform of the security sector or its transformation (Lilly et al 2002), or reconstruction of 
this sector (Brzoska &Law 2006), or security system reform (OECD 2005), or justice and security 
sector reform (UNDP 2003a). These denominations of SSR fit  into diverse labels that are attached 
to segments of state insecurity  such as peace-building, conflict management, peace support 
operations, peace building (Brzoska & Law 2006; Hills et al 2008; Schnabel & Ehrhart 2005; 
Smoljan 2003), even if “little analysis has been done on SSR as a conflict prevention 
issue” (Groenewald et al 2002:2).
From examples of SSR implemented in various countries (DfID 2003, 2003a; OECD 2007) it 
comes out that there is no blueprint for these policies. This raises the question if it is possible to 
“speak of the existence of ‘international policies’ that are equal or appropriate to the multifaceted 
security and developmental threats facing many developing countries in the early years of the 21st 
century” (Tschirgi in Klingebiel 2006:62). While each SSR coach adapts SSR to its mandate and 
each SSR actor adopts SSR to solve selected state security problems, the issue at stake is what is 
certain about SSR. The certainty about SSR is that currently these policies are a response to a state 
security question and not much that “SSR address the security  precondition for development” as 
Hendrickson says (interview with Dylan Hendrickson from the Conflict, Security and Development 
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Group, 15 April 2010). This because the link between the reform of a security sector and its impact 
on the human development and security has not been duly extrapolated.
Therefore this implies that where SSR are implemented there is a certain degree of insecurity 
measured according to political national and/or international considerations. Considering the broad 
meaning of security, from military security  to securing development entitlements, and the wide 
spectrum of insecurity that a country  can experience, from pre to conflict and post-conflict, it 
derives that there are umpteen contexts of insecurity in the world. Consequently, while the 
conceptual base of SSR is certain, namely the development-security nexus, its policy  theatre is not 
because SSR are used to address the whole gamut of insecurity. The question is if this policy 
flexibility is possible. Afghanistan, for instance, is a war theatre, a policy theatre, a state-building 
theatre, in some areas a post-conflict theatre, or simply  a worrying humanitarian disaster theatre. 
This is indeed a case where SSR seem to fit in every face of this destroyed country. However, what 
result should be expected in terms of fulfilling the development-security nexus in each of these 
situations depends on how SSR policies are designed.
In this regard, there are those who say that SSR has become too broad, and this “questions the 
disparity between theories and practice of this new way of framing security assistance” (interviews 
with NATO military  practitioners 30 March 2010). This broadness also implies that  the number of 
actors willing to get involved in SSR is increasing. Various UN agencies, the European Union, 
NATO, OECD, have all started “talking SSR” raising problems about “lack of coordination at 
political level about who does what within the SSR comprehensive approach and the inclusion of 
NGOs and development actors” (interviews with NATO military practitioners 30 March 2010; see 
also Welch & Mendelson Formann 1998). These challenges, however, don’t seem to deter policy 
makers from promoting SSR as the passe-partout to solve situations of insecurity which is seen as 
interlinked with poverty  in countries characterised by a weak or undemocratic security sector 
management. This because, how stated by the ex USA Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on 18 
January 2006 “In this world it  is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security  interest, 
our development efforts and our democratic ideals. American diplomacy  must integrate and 
advance all of these goals together” (Vaisse 2007:15).
However, the problem is that “there is a big confusion in people’s mind, if something has to do 
with security it must be SSR” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 
21 April 2010). The question then is how far the SSR label should be stretched (Brzoska et  al 2006). 
Indeed, as Nicole Ball affirmed “we cannot call all that  relates to development and security 
SSR” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010). So, the 
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definitional boundaries of SSR are difficult to draw, and there are academics who, rather than 
searching for their ultimate definition, regard SSR as:
the sum of changes in security thinking and practicing within the framework of a specific state. 
Thus, it is a composite syntagma that exceeds, as well as includes, a series of parallel, but 
relatively separate reforms of all security factors of a particular state (Hadžic in Fluri et al 
2004:11).
This interpretation validates what Nicole Ball commented above, namely that nowadays all 
changes in security  are related to SSR. However, taking SSR as the benchmark for the changes in 
the field of security, and I would also add in the one of development, is reductionist because of the 
current incapacity to have a conceptualisation of security  and development that is not absorbed 
within the one of state security governance. The problem is how to disentangle security  from state 
sovereignty, and development from state governance, and to create a security and development 
practice that is centred on the “humanness” of development and security. This in order to be able to 
formulate policies which can address people’s development and security  concerns without locking 
them into the state governance trap, also considering the long timeframe of implementation of SSR.
At the moment, the current practice of the development-security nexus does not provide with a 
new strategy but it allows for business to go on as usual as far as the attention to state security  and 
development is concerned. This impel us to think already about the future of this “SSR 
catchphrase” (interview with a UK civil servant from MoD on 12 May 2010). However, the future 
of these policies is said to “look good if you look at defence reforms, but it  is difficult to assess the 
link between security and development. SSR is going to evolve, not to disappear” (interviews with 
NATO military practitioners 30 March 2010). Casting uncertainty on the future of SSR is not their 
rapid metamorphosis according to political necessities but their inadequacy to respond to the 
expectations that they arise by using the language of human development and human security  while 
focusing primarily on state security. This inadequacy will continue to be felt unless SSR policies 
provide with a clear meaning their publicised banner which informed their conceptual and practical 
orientation, namely the development-security nexus.
158
GLOSSARY
AIA - Afghanistan Interim Authority
ANDS - Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANM - National Armenian Movement
CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States
CMR - Civil-Military Relations
CSP - Country Strategy Papers
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organisation
DCAF - Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DfID - Department for International Development UK
ECHO - European Office for Emergency Humanitarian Aid
ECOMOG - Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EDF - European Development Fund
ESDP - European Security Defence Policy
EU - European Union
GFN-SSR - Global Facilitator Network for SSR
HDI - Human Development Index
HIPC - Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
IHL - International Humanitarian Law
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IPAP - Individual Partnership Action Plan
IR - International Relations
LICUS - Low-Income Countries Under Stress
MDG - Millennium Development Goal
MFDC - Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OCHA - United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs 
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE - Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe
PAIGC - Partido Africano para la Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde
PAP-DIP - Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building
PARP - Planning and Review Process
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PCA - Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PMC - Private Military Companies
PRSP - Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC - Private Security Companies
PSR - Party of Social Restoration
SAP - Structural Adjustment Programs
SSR - Security Sector Reform
UN - United Nations
UNDP - United Nations Development Program
UNODC - United Nations Office on Drug and Crime
UNOGBIS - United Nations Peace Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
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